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Summary
Which role do the costs and benefits of voting play for the decision of a voter to participate
in an election? Does turnout affect the aggregate choice of the electorate? Are incumbents
held to account by voters? How do electoral institutions affect the link between incumbent
performance and voting behavior? And how can we address these questions given the complex
socio-economic and political environment citizens, politicians and parties interact in?
In this thesis, I answer questions on “Voting Behavior and Electoral Choice Using Causal
Inference Methods for Observational Data.” I inquire representation, accountability and
responsiveness, and the role institutions and information play therein – all central factors for
understanding how democracy works. These questions are notoriously challenging to address.
Strategic incentives and complex interrelations of all involved actors give rise to serious
endogeneity problems. This dissertation therefore draws on a design-based approach, using
quasi-experimental evidence to contribute to our understanding on the link between citizens,
elected representatives and policy. I employ recent methodical innovations in difference-in-
difference estimation, matching strategies or instrumental variables, mostly when analyzing
administrative electoral data on the aggregate level, augmented by individual level survey
data to study the causal mechanisms involved.
My research presented in this cumulative dissertation is partially co-authored with Tho-
mas Da¨ubler, Patrick Kuhn, Arndt Leininger and Steffen Zittlau.1 A first set of papers is
concerned with individual vote choice and aggregate electoral outcomes following informa-
tion shocks and institutional differences. I show whether and how voters use information to
mandate future leaders and hold politicians to account for their performance, and that this
link is mediated by institutional features. In particular, I argue that information revealed
by sudden shocks such as natural disasters is used in a forward-looking selection logic and
not only following a retrospective reward-punishment mechanism. However, the institutional
features that affect the linkage between voters and politicians matter a great deal; especially
the electoral system affects whether primarily party based or as well candidate centered ac-
countability can occur. We make the argument that voters can more easily hold politicians
to account for scandalous behavior when voting in an open list proportional representation
1In the following, when using personal pronouns, the use of “I” implies that I address general points
on my broader research agenda or concrete research findings from a single-authored paper, the use of “we”
indicates that I address concrete research findings from a co-authored piece.
xviii Summary
systems with a two-dimensional party and candidate choice, as compared to single-member
district elections. Finally, I argue that incumbents enjoy an electoral advantage (potentially
endangering accountability) and show that this can even spill over to other electoral arenas.
In a second set of research papers, I assess causes and consequences of electoral partici-
pation as a precondition for representation and responsive governance. We show that voting
costs matter. E.g., weather shocks likely increase the personal costs of voting and hence de-
press turnout; as these shocks are not only geographically clustered but affect some citizens
more than others, this has consequences for aggregate electoral choice and representation. I
trace the electoral effects of turnout and argue that changes in costs can have consequences
for which parts of the population are mobilized to vote; therefore, moderate increases in tur-
nout need not increase the representativeness of turnout. These consequences are important
for evaluating institutional features that affect the cost-benefit calculation of electoral parti-
cipation. Particularly, we show that electoral timing, in our case concurrently held elections,
can strongly influence the benefits of electoral participation and lead to substantial increases
in turnout. This again has consequences for which groups in the electorate turn out, hence
as well for average voter characteristics and finally representation and policy choice.
My work draws on causal inference methods for observational data and highlights the
role of research design for estimating internally valid effects. All papers use a difference-in-
difference strategy: I make the general argument that selection bias from unobservable con-
founders can be mitigated by using a difference-in-difference framework and/or employing
fixed effects models. Drawing on placebo and balance tests, the differencing strategy can
even identify causal effects outright where it is plausible that event-affected observations
would have counterfactually followed the same trend as control cases. In three applications,
we suggest a difference-in-tiers approach, exploiting the fact that voters vote in two tiers
in many German elections, where party factors affect the vote similarly across both tiers,
but candidate effects plausibly affect only one of the votes. Where differencing methods are
not sufficient to induce as-if-random treatment assignment, I combine them with matching
approaches to construct valid control groups. Finally, in one case each I draw on an in-
strumental variable setting and on (geographical) discontinuities to answer the substantive
questions I am interested in. Overall, the papers in this thesis show that the design based
approach to political science questions is a highly useful methodological perspective to isolate
substantively intriguing relationships between social variables.
This thesis is organized as follows: In the following introductory chapter, I summarize
my core findings and link them to the broader literature on electoral systems, vote choice
and participation, as well as the credibility revolution in political science. Subsequently, the
published version of four, the working paper version of two of these papers, and the respective
paper appendices follow as individual chapters.2
2Where an article is already published, I provide only a summary and then link to the officially pu-
blished version of said article (following §16 IV 2, Promotionsordnung [Doctoral Regulations] der Ludwig-
Maximilians-Universita¨t Mu¨nchen fu¨r die Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakulta¨t, 18 March 2016).
Zusammenfassung
Welche Rolle spielen die Kosten und Nutzen des Wahlprozesses fu¨r die Beteiligungsentschei-
dung? Hat die Ho¨he der Wahlbeteiligung elektorale Konsequenzen? Wie werden Repra¨sen-
tanten ausgewa¨hlt, wie werden sie zur Rechenschaft gezogen? Beeinflussen institutionelle
Regeln die Beziehung zwischen Performanz und Abstimmungsverhalten? Und wie lassen sich
solche Fragen angesichts komplexer sozialer und politischer Interaktionen untersuchen?
In dieser Dissertationsschrift widme ich mich Fragen zu
”
Voting Behavior and Electoral
Choice Using Causal Inference Methods for Observational Data.“ Ich untersuche Aspekte
von Repra¨sentation, der Verantwortlichkeit von Mandatstra¨gern, von Responsivita¨t sowie
der Rolle von Institutionen und Informationen hierbei. Diese Themen sind zentral fu¨r das
Versta¨ndnis demokratischer Prozesse. Die Untersuchung dieser Fragen stellt jedoch eine met-
hodische Herausforderung dar: Vielfa¨ltige strategische Anreize und komplexe Beziehungen
zwischen den beteiligten Akteuren fu¨hren zu Endogenita¨tsproblemen, die zwingend bei der
empirischen Analyse beachtet werden mu¨ssen. In dieser Dissertation wa¨hle ich daher ei-
nen design-basierten Ansatz und nutze quasi-experimentelle Techniken – mit dem Ziel, zu
unserem Versta¨ndnis der Beziehung zwischen Bu¨rgern, gewa¨hlten Repra¨sentanten und Politi-
kentscheidungen beizutragen. Ich nutze methodische Innovationen in der Weiterentwicklung
von Differenzenscha¨tzern, Matching-Ansa¨tzen oder Instrumentalvariablen. Dabei analysiere
ich u¨berwiegend administrative elektorale Aggregatdaten. Umfragedaten auf Individualebene
kommen zusa¨tzlich zum Einsatz, um kausale Mechanismen tiefergehend zu untersuchen.
Meine Forschung in dieser kumulativen Dissertationsschrift ist teilweise in Koautorschaft
mit Thomas Da¨ubler, Patrick Kuhn, Arndt Leininger und Steffen Zittlau entstanden.3 Die
ersten drei Aufsa¨tze bescha¨ftigen sich mit der Frage ob bzw. wie Wa¨hler in ihrer Wahlent-
scheidung Informationen nutzen und auf welche Weise Institutionen Verantwortlichkeit beein-
flussen. Insbesondere argumentiere ich, dass Informationen zu Regierungshandeln, hier durch
das plo¨tzliche Auftreten einer Hochwasserkatastrophe, nicht nur retrospektiv im Sinne einer
Belohnungs-Bestrafungs-Logik, sondern auch prospektiv zur Selektion und Mandatierung ei-
ner
’
guten‘ Regierung genutzt wird. Institutionelle Faktoren mediieren, inwiefern solche Fak-
toren auf die Wahlentscheidung Einfluss haben ko¨nnen: Besonders das Wahlsystem bestimmt
3Mit der Nutzung des Personalpronomens
”
ich“ beziehe ich mich im Folgenden auf generelle Aspekte
meiner breiteren Forschungsagenda oder auf konkreter Ergebnisse von Studien in Alleinautorschaft. Die
Nutzung von
”
wir“ impliziert dagegen, dass ich Ergebnisse von Arbeiten in Koautorschaft referenziere.
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mit daru¨ber, ob Rechenschaft gegenu¨ber dem Wa¨hler prima¨r parteizentriert oder auch kan-
didatenzentriert stattfindet. Wir vergleichen dazu Prozesse der Verantwortlichkeit in einem
offenen Listenwahlsystem und einem System relativer Mehrheitswahl in Einerwahlkreisen:
Nach einem o¨ffentlichen Skandal erlaubt Ersteres dem Wa¨hler nicht nur eine Entkopplung
von Partei- und Kandidatenentscheidung, sondern ist zudem responsiver bezu¨glich kleiner
A¨nderungen in Stimmenanteilen. Die Institution eines offenen Listenwahlsystems befo¨rdert
daher kandidatenzentrierte Verantwortlichkeit. Dies gilt jedoch nur ceteris paribus. Amtsin-
haber besitzen etwa einen elektoralen Bonus: Ich zeige, dass dieser sogar in andere elektorale
Arenen u¨berspringen kann.
Die zweiten drei Aufsa¨tze behandeln Ursachen und Konsequenzen von Wahlbeteiligung
als grundlegendem Faktor fu¨r gute Repra¨sentation und responsive Politik. Wir weisen nach,
dass die Kosten der Wahl eine Rolle spielen. Wetterereignisse beeinflussen diese etwa, was
zu einem Ru¨ckgang der Wahlbeteiligung fu¨hrt. Da ein derartiger Ru¨ckgang zum einen geo-
graphisch geclustert ist, zum anderen manche Bu¨rger sta¨rker auf Vera¨nderungen hinsichtlich
der Kosten reagieren, hat dies Konsequenzen fu¨r die Wahl des Elektorats und Repra¨sentation.
Ich argumentiere hier insbesondere, dass auch eine Erho¨hung der Wahlbeteiligung elektorale
Effekte haben kann, die nicht zwangsla¨ufig auf ho¨herer Repra¨sentativita¨t beruhen. Fu¨r die
Bewertung der Auswirkungen institutioneller Regelungen, die die Nutzen und Kosten der
Wahl beeinflussen, ist dies ein wichtiger Aspekt. Wir zeigen etwa, dass der Wahlzyklus, hier
die Gleichzeitigkeit mehrerer Abstimmungen, einen starken Einfluss auf die aggregierte Wahl-
beteiligung haben kann. Dies impliziert, dass sich manche gesellschaftlichen Gruppen relativ
mehr, andere relativ weniger beteiligen. Dadurch unterscheidet sich der Medianwa¨hler, was
wiederum vermutlich Implikationen fu¨r Policy-Entscheidungen der Regierung hat.
Diese Anwendungen greifen alle auf Methoden der kausalen Inferenz mit Beobachtungs-
daten zuru¨ck und betonen die Rolle des Forschungsdesigns fu¨r intern valide Ergebnisse.
Insbesondere nutze ich Differenzenscha¨tzer als Methode, die generell geeignet ist, Selekti-
onsverzerrung durch unbeobachtete, zeitinvariante Sto¨rfaktoren zu reduzieren. Der Ansatz
erlaubt gar direkt kausale Schlussfolgerungen, wenn Placebo- oder Balance-Tests es plausibel
erscheinen lassen, dass Beobachtungen der Kontrollgruppe tatsa¨chlich den kontrafaktischen
Trend der Treatmentgruppe (d.h. den Trend ohne das Treatment) abbilden. In drei Anwen-
dungsfa¨llen zeige ich die Eignung von Differenzenscha¨tzern u¨ber die temporale Dimension
hinaus, etwa indem wir diese auf aggregierte Unterschiede in Abstimmungsmodi (Erst- und
Zweitstimme) beziehen, um gemeinsam zugrundeliegende Parteifaktoren implizit zu kontrol-
lieren und Kandidatenfaktoren in der Wahlentscheidung zu isolieren. Wo die zentrale An-
nahme an Differenzenscha¨tzer, parallele Trends, mo¨glicherweise verletzt ist, kombiniere ich sie
etwa mit Matching-Ansa¨tzen, um valide Kontrollgruppen zu konstruieren. Einzelne Anwen-
dungen nutzen zudem Instrumentalvariablenscha¨tzer oder geographische Diskontinuita¨ten,
um Effekte zu identifizieren. Insgesamt zeigen diese Anwendungen, dass eine design-basierte
methodische Herangehensweise an sozialwissenschaftliche Fragestellungen sehr gewinnbrin-
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gend ist und es gelingen kann, die substanziell interessierenden Variablenbeziehungen auch
mit Beobachtungsdaten quasi-experimentell zu isolieren.
Diese Arbeit ist wie folgt strukturiert: Im folgenden Einleitungskapitel fasse ich meine zen-
tralen Ergebnisse zusammen und Verknu¨pfe diese mit der Wahlsystem-, Wahlentscheidungs-,
und Partizipationsliteratur sowie mit der methodologischen Literatur zu kausaler Inferenz
(mit Beobachtungsdaten). Daran schließen sich in sechs Kapiteln die vero¨ffentlichte Ver-
sion von vier, sowie die Manuskript-Version von zwei Aufsa¨tzen an. Zuletzt folgen in sechs
weiteren Kapiteln die jeweiligen Appendizes.4
4Bei Artikeln, die bereits vero¨ffentlicht sind, enthalten die jeweiligen Kapitel nur eine Zusammenfassung,
gefolgt von einer Verlinkung zur vero¨ffentlichten Version des Artikels (entsprechend §16 IV 2, Promotionsord-
nung der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universita¨t Mu¨nchen fu¨r die Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakulta¨t, 18. Ma¨rz 2016).
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Elections serve two important purposes: They aggregate information and preferences; and
they give voters the opportunity to select future leaders and hold representatives to account.
Both functions are central pillars of a representative democracy. Concerning the latter, to
effectively select delegates and hold them to account, two aspects are fundamental: First,
voters need sufficient capabilities, particularly information, to not only participate in the
electoral process but make good aggregate decisions. Second, the institutional incentives for
electoral participation and choice need to be construed in such a way that they facilitate the
selection of high-quality representatives, accountability and, in the end, an overlap between
citizen preferences and legislative and executive policy making. Concerning the former, when
aggregating preferences, citizens of all backgrounds need to take part in the electoral process,
as (equal) responsiveness depends on (equal) electoral participation. This again requires
institutional incentives shaped in a way that furthers representative participation.
My dissertation relates to each of these factors under the title “Voting Behavior and
Electoral Choice Using Causal Inference Methods for Observational Data.” Hence, I study
voting behavior, which I understand broadly as the individual level decision making processes
surrounding the political participation and the vote choice decision. Therein, a particular
focus of this thesis lies on electoral choice. On the one hand, I inquire how the electorate
makes an aggregate choice with a specific focus on the mediating role of informational and
institutional factors. On the other hand, where I assess electoral participation, I do so with
the explicit or implicit goal of understanding the relationship between aggregate turnout
and aggregate electoral choice. Methodically, I use innovative research designs and recently
developed quasi-experimental methods for the analysis of observational data: The difference-
in-difference approach, matching and instrumental variable estimators, and regression dis-
continuities. This is important, as the complex setting in which political actors interact in
leads both to selection effects and unobserved confounding, hence identification is a chal-
lenging endeavor. With these methods, I then inquire how static systems with well-defined
basic conditions react to externally induced turbulances – weather shocks and natural disas-
ters, suddenly revealed political scandals or institutional reforms. These turbulances induce
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shockwaves – changes in incentives and/or the leeway of actors – that I exploit to identify
the mediating effect of institutions and information on turnout and electoral choice.
This chapter provides an introduction to the substantive questions and the methods ap-
plied. Chapter 1.1 introduces the broader state of the literature on incentives in electoral
systems, voter decision making and the electoral participation decision. Following these bro-
ader introductions to the respective fields, each of the paper contributions of this dissertation
is linked to the literature and summarized in short with its respective hypotheses and main
findings. Chapter 1.2 then gives an overview on the credibility revolution in political science,
its focus on identification through research design, and the strengths and limitations of the
approach. The methods applied in the subsequent chapters are shortly discussed, their choice
is justified and related to the ongoing discussion in political methodology, with references to
similar literatures in statistics, economics and sociology.
The following Chapters 2 to 7 then constitute the individual papers for this cumulative
dissertation, together with the respective Appendix Chapters A to F.1 The papers are, in
order of appearance:
• Chapter 2: Rudolph, Lukas and Thomas Da¨ubler (2016): “Holding Individual Repre-
sentatives Accountable: The Role of Electoral Systems”, in: The Journal of Politics,
78:3, pp. 746-762.
• Chapter 3: Rudolph, Lukas (2017): “Selecting Good Types or Holding Incumbents
Accountable? Evidence from Reoccurring Floods”, manuscript.
• Chapter 4: Rudolph, Lukas (2017): “Die Mu¨nchner Ergebnisse im Bundes- und Lan-
desvergleich: Ein Ude-Effekt in Mu¨nchen?” [“The Munich Results of the Federal and
State Elections in Comparison: An Ude-Effect in Munich?”] In: Klima, Andre´, Hel-
mut Ku¨chenhoff, Mirjam Selzer, and Paul W. Thurner (eds.): “Exit Polls und Hybrid-
Modelle. Ein neuer Ansatz zur Modellierung von Wa¨hlerwanderungen” [“Exit Polls and
Hybrid Models: A New Approach to Model Voter Transitions”]. Springer: Wiesbaden,
pp. 21-35.
• Chapter 5: Leininger, Arndt, Lukas Rudolph and Steffen Zittlau (2018): “How to Incre-
ase Turnout in Low Salience Elections. Quasi-Experimental Evidence on the Effect of
Simultaneous Second-Order Elections on Political Participation”, in: Political Science
Research and Methods, 6:3, pp. 509-526.
• Chapter 6: Rudolph, Lukas and Patrick M. Kuhn (2018): “Natural Disasters and
Political Participation: Evidence from the 2002 and 2013 Floods in Germany”, in:
German Politics, 27:1, pp. 1-24.
• Chapter 7: Rudolph, Lukas (2017): “Turning Out to Turn Down the EU: The Mobili-
zation of Occasional Voters and Brexit”, manuscript.
1Where a paper is already published, I only provide a summary followed by links to the publisher’s
version in the respective chapter (in accordance with §16 IV 2, Promotionsordnung [Doctoral Regulations]
der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universita¨t Mu¨nchen fu¨r die Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakulta¨t, 18 March 2016).
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1.1 Institutions, Information and Voting Behavior in
Comparative Perspective
1.1.1 The Rules of the Game: Electoral Systems and Accountabi-
lity
“Only the ballot box provides regular opportunities for the public to select re-
presentatives, to hold governments to account, and to kick the rascals out, where
necessary. Electoral systems are commonly regarded as some of the most basic
democratic structures, from which much else flows.” (Norris, 2004, 3)
Electoral systems and the incentive structure driving electoral choice
Despite the importance of electoral systems, scholarly attention only picked up in the last
decades. Early scientific work centered around the social choice approach2, most prominently
Arrow (1951), or otherwise was “polemic in tone” (Grofman, 2016, 524). The empirical
implications of electoral systems were first systematically analyzed by Rae (1967). Recently,
the effects of electoral systems and particular electoral rules and regulations became a central
focus of work in comparative politics and political economy. Several large research programs
can be identified, two of which are particularly relevant for this thesis (see for an in-depth
introduction Grofman, 2016):
Following the rational choice approach, a first research tradition highlights the mediating
effect of electoral systems in representative democracies: They shape the strategic incentives
voters, candidates/politicians and parties face (Cox, 1997).3 Parties and candidates are seen
as office-seeking vote-maximizers and citizens as maximizing their expected utility from the
electoral process (Downs, 1957). This approach provides a concise logical framework for
analyzing electoral system effects (Norris, 2004, Chapter 1): Starting point are the incentives
generated by electoral systems. These stem from the number of votes a voter has; whether she
can abstain; options for cumulative voting; district magnitude; and electoral rules (Thurner,
1998, 20-24). Political actors will then adapt their behavior to these rules in order to increase
their electoral chances. Particularly the electoral threshold and the ballot structure will
influence what types of candidates are fielded and what type of goods (programmatic or
particularistic benefits) are offered to voters. Voters then respond rationally to the electoral
options presented. More broadly, research in the tradition of the rational choice approach
has highlighted three stages where electoral rules affect actors and give rise to coordination
2See Thurner (2008) for an overview.
3As highlighted by Cox (1997, Chapter 1), their respective preferences and the formation of expectations
are the two other necessary elements of the strategic situation. In fact, Cox (1997) emphasizes that incentive
structures affect first and foremost the expectations of actors; these expectations then shape the coordination
of citizens and elites. However, electoral rules affect as well voters’ utility function, independent of strategy
(Singh, 2010).
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problems (Cox, 1997, Chapter 15): preferences to votes (and seats, i.e. representation); seats
to portfolios; seats and portfolios to policy.
Important theoretical work in these fields has e.g. investigated the impact of electoral
systems on voters’ utility calculations (Singh, 2010), including electoral participation (Bow-
ler, Lanoue, and Savoie, 1994); how electoral systems influence sincere vs. strategic voting
(Satterthwaite, 1975; Alvarez and Nagler, 2000; Pappi and Thurner, 2002); the influence of
electoral rules on information aggregation, updating of beliefs and strategic signaling (De-
wan and Shepsle, 2011); the conditions under which electoral systems influence party systems
(Duverger, 1951; Cox, 1997; Morelli, 2004); the connection of electoral rules to party com-
petition and the spatial theory of voting (Cox, 1990); the relation between electoral systems
and political accountability through checks and balances (Persson, Roland, and Tabellini,
1997); the impact of electoral systems on elite incentives for corruption (Myerson, 1993) or,
more broadly, public goods provision (Lizzeri and Persico, 2001). The insight that actors
face strategic incentives and coordination challenges and that the local incentives vary over
electoral systems unifies this approach. Some of these are well understood, for example how
district magnitude affects the viable choice set (Cox, 1997) or the extent to which the electoral
system induces collective vs individual representation (Colomer, 2011). For others, however,
more research is needed. For the first stage (preferences to votes and votes to seats), which
attributes of the presented choice set voters weigh when deciding is important. This concerns
particularly the relative importance of party and candidate factors in electoral competition
(see Chapter 2).
A second research tradition focuses on empirically identifying the effects of electoral rules
in a systematic fashion, relating electoral system characteristics to outcome variables at the
political system level. Scholars have taken a descriptive and/or historical-empirical approach
(Nohlen, 1986), an empirical-analytical approach at the macro level (Rae, 1967; Lijphart,
1990) or, more recently, an empirical-analytical approach focusing on comparisons at the
subnational level for the sake of better identification (Snyder, 2001). This extensive lite-
rature generally focuses on five core questions, which reflect the theoretical work outlined
above (comp. Grofman, 2016, 526f.): the influence of electoral systems/rules on voter turnout
(this question is taken up again in Section 1.1.3 and Chapter 5); on proportionality of repre-
sentation; on party proliferation; on party competition; and on the match between citizen
preferences and policy. The empirical approach shows that electoral systems have diverse
consequences. This begins with the fundamental dichotomy between plurality elections in
single-member districts (SMD) and PR representation in multi-member districts: While the
first are argued to promote single-party governments with high government accountability
and accountability of politicians to their constituents, the latter system leads to coalition go-
vernments with more diverse and more proportional representation (Htun and Powell, 2013).
Beyond the broad questions of government formation, accountability and proportionality,
electoral systems have been shown to matter for a diverse set of outcomes, e.g. the provision
of public goods (Sawat, 2011), the protection of citizen’s rights (Cingranelli and Filippov,
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2010) or the level of political corruption (Kunicova´ and Rose-Ackerman, 2005). Much of this
comes down to what the strategic approach terms incentives for candidates and parties on
cultivating a personal vote (Carey and Shugart, 1995) and to the accountability mechanisms
voters can rely on (Anderson, 2007).
In this dissertation, two papers are concerned with the role of electoral institutions on
the first stage (preferences to votes/seats), where they provide both theoretical and empirical
contributions. Rudolph and Da¨ubler (2016) (Chapter 2) take a closer look how voters’
utility calculations theoretically differ in open-list proportional election (OLPR) and in single-
member district (SMD) electoral systems and how individual accountability is affected at
the vote and seat allocation stage. Empirically, these effects are tested in a unique setting,
contrasting the performance of the same set of candidates after exposure in a political scandal
under different electoral rules. Leininger, Rudolph, and Zittlau (2018) (Chapter 5) assess how
the electoral calendar, especially concurrent (i.e. simultaneous) elections alter voter utility
calculations and how this affects electoral participation. Empirically, this is tested for an
electoral reform in the German state of Lower Saxony, leading to exogenous overlaps in the
electoral cycles of mayoral and European Parliament (EP) elections (see Subchapter 1.1.3 for
a summary).
Electoral systems and individual accountability (Chapter 2)
In this thesis, Chapter 2 most directly takes up the effects of electoral systems, linking them
to accountability4 at the individual level. Holding public officials to account at the ballot box
is a central, though difficult democratic task citizens face in modern democracies. Regularly,
citizens seem to not succeed in this job: It is e.g. troubling that corrupt politicians are
in many contexts reelected (de Sousa and Moriconi, 2013). As summarized by De Vries
and Solaz (2017), three steps are necessary for accountability to work: The presence of
information; the correct attribution of blame; a behavioral response. A behavioral response
does not necessarily follow, though, even if information signals are correctly perceived and
attributed: The literature has explained this both with the lack of viable alternatives and
with an explicit or implicit trade-off with other choice characteristics. Turning again to the
example of a corrupt politician, she may have ideological characteristics that especially voters
on the edges of the political spectrum do not find in other options on the ballot (Charron
and B˚agenholm, 2016), and/or promise benefits for which the voter is willing to accept her
behavior (see e.g. the vote buying literature, Mares and Young, 2016). This can explain
reelection.
However, the perspective of rational choice institutionalism highlights that behavioral
response is strongly shaped by the ‘rules of the game’, i.e. which incentives the political actors
face (Norris, 2004). What is lacking, however, is a well-developed formal argument whether
4I follow Fearon’s 1999, 55 of accountability, whereby A is accountable to B if there is a common un-
derstanding that A is supposed to act on behalf of B and B has some form of empowerment to sanction or
reward A for his (in)action and/or performance.
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and when electoral rules shape citizen’s incentives to sanction a politician’s misbehavior.
Additionally, as electoral systems do hardly lend themselves to experimental manipulation,
the endogeneity problem needs to be solved to empirically assess how accountability works
under different electoral rules.
With the work in Rudolph and Da¨ubler (2016) (Chapter 2), we contribute to filling this
gap. Theoretically, we contribute to understanding how electoral incentives shape the trans-
lation of preferences over candidates into votes and seats under different electoral systems.
These are central for accountability enhancing or diminishing selection. We propose a model
of voter decision making in SMD and OLPR electoral systems. Particularly, we assess the
extent to which voters can trade off party and candidate features when deciding. We argue
that OLPR is more conducive to individual accountability for two reasons: First, OLPR
decouples party and candidate choice. In the party-centered political systems most prevalent
in Western Europe, the combined party-candidate choice under SMD would allow only voters
nearly indifferent between parties to sanction politician misbehavior. Under OLPR, on the
other hand, a candidate cannot compensate for misbehavior by relying on the party label,
as voters have substitute candidates from the same party on the ballot. Second, OLPR is
more vote elastic, i.e. small changes in voting behavior are more consequential at the seat
allocation stage. Hence, our core hypothesis follows: “For a given shock to candidate inte-
grity, electoral punishment is more consequential under OLPR than under SMD” (Rudolph
and Da¨ubler, 2016, 750).
Empirically, the study draws on a within-system comparison and uses an exogenous shock
to candidate integrity in order to identify causal effects. A unique setting in the German state
of Bavaria allows us to test our hypothesis: Candidates for the Bavarian state parliament
compete in two tiers. Hence, we can compare performance for the same candidate set under
different electoral rules. Examining a political scandal exposing numerous politicians months
before election day, we then show that scandal politicians are punished more consequential
in the OLPR tier. In our case, the relative effect size of electoral punishment (estimated
as punishment effect as the share of an average control group outcome) amounts to about
40% under OLPR, but only 5% under SMD. This implies that individual accountability is
stronger in the former as compared to the latter system, which confirms our hypothesis. This
result has broader implications: It does not only help to explain ex-post punishment, but as
well illuminates the strategic incentives political actors face to cultivate a personal vote (and
conversely the relative risk they take when engaging in corrupt behavior).
Of course, the arguments presented in Chapter 2 singularly address the question whet-
her electoral systems differ in how they enable voters to hold individuals to account. These
findings are in line with cross-country evidence that voting on candidates is associated with
lower corruption levels (Persson, Tabellini, and Trebbi, 2003). However, when engaging in
constitutional design, policy makers need to consider other electoral system effects related
to politician and candidate behavior: E.g., it has been suggested that open-list systems and
intra-party competition can as well increase the incentives for corruption as (expensive) can-
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didate campaigns require financial resources (Chang, 2005). More research on these questions
is needed, and will ultimately lead to a thorough understanding of the role of electoral insti-
tutions for the selection and accountability of representatives, benefiting electoral engineering
(Norris, 2004).
1.1.2 Electoral Choice, the Role of Information and Judging In-
cumbents
“Competitive elections create a relationship of formal accountability between
policy makers and citizens – electoral rewards and punishments can be handed out
on election day. Ideally, this formal accountability leads to better governance. [...
Yet, the] theoretical literature has taught us two major lessons: incentives are dri-
ven by the incumbents desire to impress the voters, and this desire often conflicts
with the normative imperative to advance the voters interests.” (Ashworth, 2012,
184)
Grasping voter decision making
Elections serve as a device that ties policy to electorate preferences, this is one of their
central functions.5 However, the relation between elections and policy can arise through two
mechanisms: On the one hand side, elections allow voters to decide between different options,
i.e. select good party/politician types6; on the other hand, elections allow voters to punish
or reward incumbent performance (Dewan and Shepsle, 2011, 324ff). Both mechanisms lead
to correlations of voting behavior with incumbent performance, which a large literature has
empirically traced – on the macro level, e.g. econonomic performance, as well as on the
individual level, e.g. corrupt behavior (see for reviews of the literature Healy and Malhotra,
2013; Ashworth, 2012; Anderson, 2007).
To explain whether and how citizens hold their representatives to account and/or select
future leaders, a theoretical framework has to be provided, though.7
For this framework, I first discuss the rational choice approach as a benchmark. Here,
voters (the demand side) and politicians (the supply side) are understood as rational actors,
maximizing their expected utility given preferences and side constraints on a political market
(a detailed discussion is given in Thurner, 1998). This leads to the famous conceptualization
of the voting process by Downs (1957, Chapter 3), the ‘basic logic of voting’: Voters derive
utility from the future behavior of political actors. Assuming a choice situation between two
5Next to aggregating preferences/information (Dewan and Shepsle, 2011).
6Following Fearon (1999, 59) I understand ‘good type’ as a party/politician sharing voter preferences,
would be working to implement these preferences (i.e. is not corruptible), and is competent to implement
optimal policies from the voter perspective.
7See for an extensive review of the grand schools in voting behavior and important current topics in
electoral research Falter and Schoen (2014).
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parties a and b, a voter will have to calculate the party differential, E(Ut+1(a))−E(Ut+1(b)),
i.e. the expected utility a voter will derive from party a as opposed to party b being in power
in the future time period (t + 1). While conceptually simple at first sight, this proposition
entails important substantive questions, addressed by a whole subsequent research program:
How voters can derive expectations (Downs (1957, Chapter 3)), what role information and
the costs of acquiring information play (Downs, 1957, Part III), which cues voters then
use (Kahneman, 2003; Lupia, 2016), what the size of this party differential has to be to
be worthwhile to take action (and vote) (Riker and Ordeshook, 1968; Thurner and Eymann,
2000), how this calculation changes for multi-party elections and/or with multiple dimensions
of decision making (Enelow and Hinich, 1984; Davis, Hinich, and Ordeshook, 1970). It as well
has implications for the optimal strategy of parties and all other political actors – leading to
the famous spatial model of politics, the Median voter theorem and the subsequent discussion
thereon (see for an overview Dewan and Shepsle, 2011; Thurner, 1998).
This economic theory of voting stands in contrast to the social-psychological approach of
the Michigan School (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes, 1960), highlighting long term
party identification (which itself developed in social context) and short term evaluations of
candidates and issue positions as individual-level determinants of vote choice. This approach
is popular, as it flexibly allows the incorporation of candidate valence evaluations and issues
into the voting process, together with additional background variables (e.g. voter personality
or institutional structure) that affect the voting procedure (Arzheimer, 2007).8 However,
the Michigan approach has been criticized for viewing voters as ‘fools’ (Key, 1966), lacking
necessary knowledge and ideological structure (Healy and Malhotra, 2013, 286).
Discussing the assumptions underlying Down’s contribution9, the economic theory has
been extended to incorporate such aspects as well: For example, policy motivation of candi-
dates (implying a commitment problem on the side of politicians) (Fiorina, 1990) or candidate
valence as separate component of voter’s utility function10 have been fruitfully incorporated
into the spatial approach (see Dewan and Shepsle, 2011; Thurner, 1998). Lately, even a
8It as well stands in contrast to the Columbia School (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet, 1968): This
approach explains voting behavior through sociological determinants, i.e. socio-economic status, religion,
geo-location; it as well highlights processes of information acquisition and political communication, which
voters are argued to apply selectively, confirming their structurally determined preferences. Overall, the
(micro-)sociological approach of the Columbia School highlights the role of social structure, and the social
groups a voter is embedded in. This links to a fourth theoretical approach, the macro-sociological approach
(Lipset and Rokkan, 1967) highlighting the role of social cleavages for voting behavior (comp. Pappi, 1977;
Schmitt-Beck, 2007a,b).
9Most importantly, the spatial theory of voting with its policy convergence or median voter theorem
(Downs, 1957; Hotelling, 1929; Black, 1958), by which competition for votes leads to a social optimum as
policy offers by parties align with the preference of the median voter, relies on several assumptions: rational
voters with exogenous (single-peaked) policy preferences; office-seeking and vote-maximizing parties; sincere
voting; parties as homogenous actors; plurality elections; complete information; democratic competition
(comp. Dewan and Shepsle, 2011, 313; Thurner, 1998, Chap. 2.2)
10I.e. voters do not only care about policy; this aspect will be picked up again in Chapter 4 and Subchapter
1.1.2 when discussing the incumbency advantage and is part of the model in Rudolph and Da¨ubler (2016).
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unifying approach for both the spatial theory and the Michigan School has been proposed
(Adams, Merrill, and Grofman, 2005; Healy and Malhotra, 2013).
With this background, one of the central questions can be addressed that the rational-
choice approach opened up with great clarity: the forward looking nature of the democratic
selection problem and how this links to questions of political accountability. Healy and
Malhotra (2013) discuss how the rational choice approach and the Michigan approach lead
to three models of voting behavior that help understanding empirical patterns that follow a
reward-punishment logic.
Starting point for the first model is again Downs (1957), who discusses whether and how
voters derive the party differential and act upon it. Downs (1957, Chapter 3) highlights the
role of current performance evaluations for expectations on the future, weighted with a ‘trend
factor’. Past performance would only be used to decide on ties (a citizen then votes for the
current incumbent and her policies if she exceeds an idiosyncratic performance standard).
Overall, the conceptualization by Downs leads to voting based on current performance of
the incumbent and counterfactual current opposition performance, projected to the future,
where extrapolation from past performance is used only in rare circumstances – the task of
the citizen is clear: to select a future government, and information from past and present
is only useful as easily accessible cue for future expected utility. Closely linked to Downs
understanding, voting hence can be seen as manifestation of a selection mechanism (Fearon,
1999). For this, voters have to use the available knowledge on the portfolios of politicians
and parties. Fearon (1999) highlights the extrapolation from past behavior, though: An
incumbents’ action in the past carries cues for her future behavior and as it does so, voting
based on incumbent performance during the term serves not only as punishment device from
a retrospective ‘sanctioning view’, but from a prospective view as a base for ‘selecting good
types’ (Thurner and Pappi, 1998).
This first perspective emphasizes that politicians receive a mandate to act upon, imple-
menting policy preferences of citizens; however, given the difficulty of the task of selection,
citizens might just resort to rewarding and punishing past actions to generate accountabi-
lity and induce good behavior (Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes, 1999). Therefore, second,
Downs approach is modified in the settings discussed by Key (1966); Fiorina (1981) and
Ferejohn (1986), which highlight retrospective evaluations as such: Key (1966) emphasizes
an understanding of the voting process as judgment over past policies. He takes a strong
empirical focus of how economic performance affects incumbent electoral performance, whe-
reby non-aligned citizens induce accountability by rewarding well-performing politicians and
deselecting under-performers. Fiorina (1981) focuses on a reward-punishment mechanism by
which the voting decision is based on past incumbent evaluations, as ultimately voters care
about policy implementation and hence only performance evaluations can help in adequately
assessing future performance. Ferejohn (1986) focuses on the more general problem how vo-
ters can incentivice politicians to implement their policy-preferences, as self-interested actors
may not act upon past policy promises. This opens up a view on the nature of the democratic
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elections as a principle-agent relationship, featuring prominently in modern accountability
models (Ashworth, 2012).11
Third, voters may decide based on cues (psychological view) – as emphasized in the Mi-
chigan school (Healy and Malhotra, 2013), they have restrictions in taking up and processing
information (Lupia 2016: Chapter 1). There always is a tradeoff between knowledge neces-
sary for competent decision making and the restrictions on information collection. Cognitive
shortcuts and heuristics then help in decision making (Kahneman, 2003). This is already
indicated in Downs (1957, 258) observation that, given the low probability of changing the
outcome “it is irrational to be politically well-informed because the low returns from [infor-
mation] data simply do not justify their cost”, hence rational actors will only rely on “free
data acquired accidentally”, which in turn is likely biased. Consequently, in the economic
voting literature it is not so clear how well voters are able to trace the responsibility of
governments and politicians due to cognitive and institutional barriers (Anderson, 2007).
Rudolph (2017b) (Chapter 3) takes up the question whether voters are forward looking,
backward looking or both, and whether they are rational in doing so. For this, I use the case
of two centennial floods in two German river systems, each shortly before general elections. I
argue that these suddenly occurring external shocks that incumbents have to handle provide
voters with new information and test several hypothesis on voter decision making.
Voting behavior and incumbent performance: Retrospective, prospective, or
both? (Chapter 3)
Testing theories on how voters decide is empirically challenging. Ex-ante citizen mandate
decisions and ex-post electoral voter judgements as well as incumbent and challenger behavior
taking anticipated voter response into account theoretically co-occur and influence each other.
It is hence difficult to disentangle forward looking, backward looking and cue-based decision
making of voters.
In this spirit, a growing literature analyzes external shocks, especially natural disasters.
These extreme events are argued to give voters information on how to evaluate the govern-
ment: As Cole, Healy, and Werker (2012) show in their model, a drop in personal welfare
following natural disasters can with some likelihood be attributed to incumbents actions and
could therefore lead to vote losses. They confirm this empirically for extreme whether events
in an Indian setting. Similarly then, one can expect that beneficial policy at the individual
level should lead to vote gains. Healy and Malhotra (2009) find nuanced results: They argue
that voters are myopic in that they react to beneficial personal-level disaster relief, but not to
collective disaster preparedness expenditures. Therefore, on the one hand, voters are suppo-
sed to punish incumbents for disaster damage. On the other hand, the effective management
of adverse events is expected to lead to vote gains for incumbents as long as their policy
11Recent theoretical work even points to potential trade-offs between effective accountability and electoral
selection (Ashworth, Bueno de Mesquita, and Friedenberg, 2017).
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response is positively assessed by the electorate. Numerous studies have provided empirical
evidence for this latter claim: For example, Bechtel and Hainmueller (2011) estimate an
average increase of the incumbent party’s vote share of 7 percentage points in affected dis-
tricts of the German 2002 Elbe flooding, which they explain with “voter gratitude” following
generous disaster recovery funds and successful disaster management. This is one example in
a growing literature on natural disasters and incumbent performance (see Heersink, Peterson,
and Jenkins, 2017; Cole, Healy, and Werker, 2012; Lazarev, Sobolev, Soboleva, and Sokolov,
2014; Carlin, Love, and Zechmeister, 2014; Eriksson, 2016; Achen and Bartels, 2004, 2016;
Fowler and Hall, 2016; Malhotra and Kuo, 2008; Healy and Malhotra, 2009; Bodet, Thomas,
and Tessier, 2016; Flores and Smith, 2013).
Still, the findings from disaster studies are largely representations of a very general me-
chanism in the literature: They test the ‘retrospective voting’ view in the spirit of Fiorina
(1981) or Key (1966) with the benefit of plausibly exogenous exposure to economic grie-
vance/benefits. Additionally, they test whether voters apply ‘blind retrospection’ (Achen
and Bartels, 2004, 2016), i.e. show signs of seemingly irrational or cue-based behavior. Ho-
wever, the understanding of voters’ choice as prospective in modern accountability models
(Ashworth, 2012) would imply, first, that voters actually take into account not only in-
cumbents’ behavior, but as well counterfactual challengers’ actions and, second, that past
information is relevant primarily for the evaluation of an incumbents ‘type’, and therefore
contingent on counterfactual expectations of his behavior (Fearon, 1999).
Chapter 3 takes up these questions more broadly for the case of a repeated natural disaster
in Germany, the centennial floods in the Elbe and Danube river systems in 2002 and 2013,
both occurring right before elections at the federal and state level. To distinguish between
retrospective and prospective choice I propose especially two hypotheses:
First, when voters reward/punish incumbents for their actions, disaster affectedness
should be the primary driver of electoral response. However, for prospective choice it would
be enough to observe disaster management and thereby gain new information on expected
incumbent performance in the future. I therefore propose to test whether spill-overs to ge-
ographically adjacent regions are present in the cases at hand. While a positive electoral
response would be expected in disaster affected regions from both pro- and retrospective
models, spill-overs should follow from a prospective view only. I find evidence for this in all
cases.
Second, when disaster and disaster response could be treated constant over cases, diffe-
rences in voter response would be a sign that the information signal ‘beneficial policy’ is not
interpreted in isolation by voters. Especially, if incumbent and potential challenger can be
expected to pursue the same policy, one would empirically not expect a change in electo-
ral outcomes from a ‘selection’ perspective. I interpret this as holding the economic shock
constant, but analyzing it under different informational side-constraints. This line of reaso-
ning has not been taken up theoretically or analyzed empirically in the disaster literature
but would be an important test for the question whether voters decide backward or as well
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forward looking. Indeed, I find evidence that electoral gains after effective flood relief decline
with repeated exposure.
These findings provide evidence that voters are not merely following a retrospective
reward-punishment logic. However, note that this does not invalidate the retrospective voting
and/or psychological view – specific findings from the case indicate that all three theoretical
models contribute to understanding voting behavior: Particularly, I find indications for sub-
stantial decay effects in line with myopic voters (Healy and Malhotra, 2009): Even in directly
affected areas, the floods loose relevance very quickly after flood occurrence and incumbent
evaluations return back to their pre-flood levels. Additionally, flood effects are stronger in di-
rectly compared to indirectly affected areas, indicating that reward-punishment mechanisms
plays a role after all.
Spill-overs of an incumbency advantage: Candidate characteristics matter (Chap-
ter 4)
What are threats to accountability? One institutional effect that has been studied extensively
is the incumbency advantage. These difficult to measure (Erikson and Titiunik, 2015; Gelman
and King, 1990) effects are reported from many empirical contexts. It is argued that due to
better access to (state) resources, informational advantages, focused media coverage, access
to pork politics (Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart, 2000; Levitt and Wolfram, 1997; Lopes
da Fonseca, 2017), or increased familiarity (Abramowitz, 1975), incumbents enjoy an electoral
bonus over their competitors. Strategic candidate entry and exit is argued to be an important
part of the story as well (Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita, 2008; Hall and Snyder, 2015).
An incumbency advantage can endanger accountability, though (see Stonecash, 2008,
Chapter 1): If incumbents are relatively safe, and high-quality challengers potentially deter-
red, incumbents need not be similarly reactive to changes in public opinion, are less likely to
pay close attention to their constituents, less likely to be held to account for misconduct, and
overall both responsiveness. of incumbents and the match of citizen preferences and policy
may decrease. Additionally, political campaigns might center more around building perso-
nalities and less on issues and policies. Recent scholarship has, drawing on various causal
inference methods, established that incumbency effects are likely present in many democratic
contexts (Lee, 2008; Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart, 2000; Lopes da Fonseca, 2017).12
While these arguments have mostly been developed for majority/plurality electoral sys-
tems, incumbency (at lower government levels) has been noted to be an element of ‘personal
vote earning attributes’ under OLPR (Shugart, Valdini, and Suominen, 2005), and does
spill-over to the PR party-vote in mixed systems (Hainmueller and Kern, 2008).
12Examples from other settings highlight that institutional context is important for incumbency effects
to manifest, though (Klasˇnja and Titiunik, 2017). Additionally, a literature questions whether these effects
are growing in size over years, which is unclear (Stonecash, 2008). It has as well been shown that (personal)
incumbency effects produce spill-overs to concurrently held races (Hainmueller and Kern, 2008).
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Rudolph (2017a) (Chapter 4) adds to the understanding of these spill-overs in a mixed-
system with an SMD and OLPR tier. As argued in Chapter 4, spill-overs from incumbency
can extend across time and electoral level: Incumbents for one electoral arena can garner
an electoral bonus if standing in different elections. In this case, I tested whether a mayor
standing in a region-wide district for the Bavarian state parliament election garnered an
electoral bonus in his home municipality, and in the tier where he appeared on the ballot. This
would be best explained with a familiarity bonus and is consistent with psychological theories
of memory recollection in preference formations (Spa¨lti and Brandt, 2017). It is as well
consistent with a specific ‘personal-vote seeking advantage’, as having shown local service in
local office makes this candidate likely to effectively work in favor of these constituents again.
The incumbency effect likely induced voters on the margin between one of the competitor
parties and the mayoral party to select him and his party with their second, regional ballot
vote. This gave the (opposition) SPD a substantial local electoral boost for the statewide
race of around 3-4 percentage points. The causal mechanism is confirmed when analyzing
individual voter transitions and voter transition motives (Thurner, Klima, and Rudolph,
2017; Ku¨chenhoff, Shao, and Alkaya, 2017).
This transferability of an incumbency effect adds new interpretations to the incumbency
literature: As in the case at hand, it allows opposition parties to counteract the incumbency
advantage the governing candidates and party enjoy at least partly by fielding politicians
from other electoral arenas. Future work could investigate where parties field such candi-
dates with proven local ties, and how challenger quality impacts these decisions. As well,
changes in incumbency status as an example of candidate characteristics can be an important
explanation for voter transitions between parties and elections in OLPR/PR systems (Klima,
Ku¨chenhoff, Selzer, and Thurner, 2017).
1.1.3 Voting Benefits, Voting Costs and the Causes and Conse-
quences of Electoral Participation
“[D]emocratic responsiveness depends on citizen participation, and equal re-
sponsiveness depends on equal participation” (Verba, 1995, 2).
Why electoral participation is relevant and how it can be explained
Democracy, as ‘rule by the people’,13 requires not only direct linkages between representatives
and represented, but as well broad participation for responsiveness14 of decision makers to
electorate preferences. Principle-agent models (see Gailmard, 2014) imply, as representatives
(agents) are electorally accountable to their constituents (principles), that only citizens that
13From greek ‘de¯mokrat´ıa (direct democracy) and greek ‘de¯mos’ (people) and ‘krato´s’ (rule/force).
14Government responsiveness is understood here as “adoption of policies that are signaled as preferred by
citizens” (Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes, 1999, 9).
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turn out to vote matter to the principle. The interests of abstainers will thus be disregarded
in the policy making process. A similar insight follows from a selection perspective, if voters
choose in a forward-looking way politicians that share their preferences (Mansbridge, 2009).15
This will be consequential with respect to policy when non-voters have, on average, different
preferences compared to voters (Besley and Burgess, 2001).
Thus, when theoretically inquiring vote choice, and empirically investigating determinants
of accountability and democratic quality, electoral participation is a fundamental aspect to
study. A second set of papers in this dissertations hence investigates causes and consequences
of electoral participation.
Turnout in Western democracies is declining since the 1970s (Kostelka, 2017), which has
led to increasing concerns that elections under low turnout imply biased representation and
lead to public policy in favor of only a subset of the electorate (Lijphart, 1997). As those who
are less likely to turn out with voluntary voting can be expected to be citizens with lower
average social status (Tingsten, 1937), low turnout levels potentially disadvantage disadvan-
taged citizens even more. This is conceptually an old and well-known problem of democratic
decision making (Buchanan, 1974). Scholarship has since long studied who does (not) partici-
pate and how changes in voting benefits and costs relate to participation, representation and
public policy (see for reviews of the empirical literature Cancela and Geys, 2016; Blais, 2006).
As well, a broad empirical literature has investigated the counterfactual question whether
full participation would make a difference for electoral outcomes, government formation, and
policy, drawing on various methodological approaches: Observational studies come to mixed
conclusions (see e.g. the summary in Lutz and Marsh, 2007). Turnout can be influenced by
some, though not all institutional designs, and does not matter under all conditions and not
always in the same direction. Simulations and modeling of full participation based on survey
data (e.g. Kohler, 2011; Kohler and Rose, 2010; Leininger and Heyne, 2017; Bernhagen and
Marsh, 2007) have helped to explore under which conditions turnout can make a difference.
This research has indicated that turnout can affect electoral results, but matters only in
rare cases for government formation (for the German case, see Kohler (2011)). It is unclear,
though, whether the preferences of non-voters can be adequately assessed through survey
methodology (misreporting and systematic non-response are issues). Additionally, the tur-
nout decision is inherently related to electoral choice (Thurner and Eymann, 2000) and hence
aggregate turnout and aggregate electoral results are potentially endogenous. A recent wave
of quasi-experimental studies therefore approaches the effect of turnout in concrete, context
depended institutional settings with high internal validity. Closest to the question of full par-
ticipation is the quasi-experimental literature on the turnout, electoral and policy effects of
compulsory voting. This literature has e.g. shown that turnout increases with the institution
of compulsory voting, that electoral outcomes change if the baseline turnout rate (i.e. the
average participation rate under voluntary voting) is not too high, and that outcomes and
15An important difference between these two views is whether turnout in the past (that selected the
incumbent) or future turnout anticipated by the incumbent matters for representation.
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policy shift in tendency towards left-wing parties and policies (e.g. Ferwerda, 2014; Fowler,
2013; Bechtel, Hangartner, and Schmid, 2016).16
This gives rise to scholarly and policy advice to seek institutional designs that increase
electoral participation (Lijphart, 1997; Tillmann and Reichmann, 2016).Lijphart (1997) e.g.
argues specifically that, for fairness concerns and to reduce bias in representation, societies
should use all available means to maximize turnout. While compulsory voting is a prime
candidate to achieve this end, it is not feasible in many contexts.17 Therefore, interest in
less forcing institutional designs has sparked recently. Lijphart (1997) recommends amongst
others concurrent elections (increasing benefits) or reducing explicit and implicit voting costs
(e.g. registration costs, opportunity costs of voting). Three papers in this dissertation contri-
bute to these questions. First, the effect of compulsory voting on electoral participation for
the understudied case of two second-order elections is investigated (Chapter 5). Second, the
particular effect of natural disasters on participation via changes in voting costs and changes
in social capital is investigated (Chapter 6). Third, whether turnout makes a difference, here
the electoral consequences of increased turnout, is studied for the example of the United
Kingdom EU membership referendum (Chapter 7).
In order to be able to discuss the foundations and implications of these questions, a
theoretical understanding of the voting process is necessary.
Again, starting with Downs, a rational voter would always vote unless she is indifferent
between parties given voting is costless (Downs, 1957, 50).18 Introducing costs to the voting
process, Downs (1957, Chapter 14) acknowledges that (mild) voting costs lead to abstention.
Importantly, he first notes that voting costs will bear larger on citizens with lower socio-
economic status, implying a potential disenfranchisement of this part of the population.
Second, he notes that variations in costs will have a large influence on representation. Third,
16This is at least the case as long as the sanctions attached to non-compliance with compulsory voting are
not decreasing for citizens with lower socio-economic status (Cepaluni and Hidalgo, 2016).
17See Lijphart (1997) for a discussion of this. Additionally, the argument of increasing turnout via explicit
force through compulsory voting institutions has attracted critique. Saunders (2012) e.g. argues that high
turnout is not necessary for democratic legitimacy – as Saunders (2012, 307) puts it, “higher turnout is not
necessarily democratically better than lower turnout [and] the mere opportunity to vote is sufficient to realise
the value of democracy.” See Scully, Jones, and Trystan (2004) for an empirical example that low turnout can
simply imply apathy towards the political realm by some citizens, but not opposition towards the political
system as such. Particularly, Saunders (2012) argues that disproportional participation is not necessarily
problematic if underrepresented groups just have less stake in the outcome and thereby participate less.
He agrees that as soon as it is disadvantaged citizens that are less likely to participate it would indicate a
necessity to increase turnout by institutional change. Turnout would then be instrumental to achieve greater
social justice.
18Downs actually differentiates between parties offering different platforms (indifference between those
leads to abstention); or, in case they offer similar platforms, a voter would turn to an incumbent performance
evaluation relative to his ideal, comparing government performance with other past or hypothetical govern-
ments; abstention occurs if this assessment is neither good nor bad, i.e. if the voter is indifferent to a new
government by the incumbent.
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he highlights that an additional benefit from voting19 is necessary to explain the empirical
turnout levels observed in modern democracies – otherwise voting will not be rational, as
the likelihood of being pivotal (i.e. making or breaking a tie) by casting one vote are just too
small, and otherwise the act of voting will have no bearing on an actors future utility.
Downs suggestion, the long-run participation value for sustaining democracy, does not
depend on any individual’s participation, however, as sustaining democracy is a public good
and the individual voters’ contribution to it is just too small (Olson, 1965) – in the rational
framework outlined above, voting therefore should not occur at all. This gives rise to the
paradox of voting, whereby rational choice theory has difficulties in explaining why people
turn out. This has since been addressed by numerous scholars. Riker and Ordeshook (1968)
formalized the problem and carried on the solution suggested by Downs. They include
a ‘D-term’, capturing non-instrumental benefits of voting, to the equation. Other theory-
immanent fixes to the paradox of voting are summarized in Dowding (2005).20 As highlighted
by Thurner (1998, 54f.), even if the rational choice approach has difficulty explaining voter
turnout, the theory is well placed to explain the choices voters make, what the (anticipated)
consequences of/for party and candidate behavior are, and, most importantly, what we can
expect with marginal changes in the parameters (e.g. electoral closeness or a decreasing party
differential) (Barry, 1970; Grofman, 1993). Additionally, the rational choice approach allows
to disentangle theoretical mechanisms that lead to the same observed outcomes, which lends
itself to further investigation (e.g. following the spatial model, alienation and indifference
may both lead to abstention (Thurner and Eymann, 2000)). In this dissertation, the focus
will lie on explaining changes in parameters. I therefore follow the canonical approach of
Riker and Ordeshook (1968), explaining turnout by adding a ‘D-term’ in a linear-additive
cost-benefit calculus of voting.
On the individual level, assume the binary participation T of a voter in an election is
determined by
T =
{
1 , R > 0
0 , else
, where
R = p|B|+D − C.
An individual participates if her total expected utility (‘reward’ R) from the vote in an
election exceeds zero. The utility from the vote is composed of four parameters: First, the
19He calls this ‘long-run participation value’ from voting, together with the realization that democracy
cannot be sustained if no-one votes; he later discusses social prestige for voting and/or feelings of guilt for
non-voting, dismisses them from consideration, though, as they are non-political factors outside the scope of
his model.
20The most important arguments are: that voting costs are actually very low; that the ‘B-term’ comprises
global utility calculations (social preferences), and is therefore much larger than previously suggested; that
the p-term is systematically misperceived by voters and/or should be calculated differently following game-
theoretic models; that voters are actually not maximizing expected utility but follow the minimax regret
criterion.
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expected utility differential B she gains from her election specific favorite outcome a over
the alternative b. We can understand B as B = E(Ut+1(a)) − E(Ut+1(b)) in the Downesian
framework. This (party) utility differential is multiplied with the subjective probability of
being the decisive voter p. In any modern democratic setting, while p will depend on the
closeness of the race and the size of the electorate, it will in most cases be very small. For
US presidential elections, Riker and Ordeshook (1968) e.g. estimate it to 10−8. What is new
now is the explicit formulation of a D-term entering positively, which encompasses utility
gained from the act of voting as such (irrespective of the electoral outcome). Finally, the
cost term C contains various costs a voter has to bear for the voting act and its preparation,
e.g. information costs, transportation costs, opportunity costs for the time spent. Electoral
participation will then depend on whether benefits outweigh these costs.
As the probability of casting a vote that changes the outcome (a vote that makes or breaks
a tie) is very small, a positive reward, and hence individual turnout, can be most readily
explained by the D-term. This D-term encompasses, first and foremost, the affirmation of
partisan preferences. Additionally, voters potentially derive satisfaction from compliance
with the ethic of voting, affirming allegiance to the political system, as well as efficacy, or
even satisfaction from decision making as such (Riker and Ordeshook, 1968, 28). This list
is not exhaustive – later, these components have been picked up as ‘expressive benefits of
voting’ (Fiorina, 1981; Brennan and Lomasky, 1993) (comp. detailed discussion in Thurner,
1998, 48ff.; Thurner and Eymann, 2000).
Of course, the voting process could be conceptualized much broader from the start: For
example, Thurner (2009) and Thurner and Eymann (2000) address the problem whether
voters decide simultaneously or in a consecutive order when considering vote choice and
participation/abstention. The papers in this dissertation take the more standard approach
of either investigating vote choice or participation, as this is directly related to the empirical
research designs chosen. When assessing participation, the papers in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 all
draw on the Riker-Ordeshook-Framework to theoretically derive a hypothesis and interpret
results. Although more complex theories of electoral participation have been developed (e.g.
Feddersen and Sandroni, 2006; Myatt, 2015), for the problem-driven research approach taken
in this dissertation, the Riker-Ordeshook-Framework serves its purpose very well: How can
we expect behavior to change, if initial endowments and/or incentives change? The approach
taken here is a comparison of states; theoretical changes in parameters (e.g. increase in voting
costs; increase in the utility differential; differences in pivotality due to electorate size; etc.)
lead to expectations on changes in aggregate turnout, which is then empirically tested.
Natural disasters, voting costs and electoral participation (Chapter 6)
Chapters 6 and Chapter 7 study the relationship between participation and the costs and
benefits of voting in more detail. In particular, these studies contribute to the question to
what extent voting costs and (external) increases therein lead to disproportionate electoral
participation.
18 1. Introduction
Rudolph and Kuhn (2018) (Chapter 6) study whether natural disasters in- or decrease
political participation. Our research has a threefold contribution: We contribute to under-
standing the outcomes of the 2002 and 2013 federal election, where the flood disasters right
before elections in both years impacted the electoral campaigns of all parties. As flooding
has been suggested to have affected electoral results (Bechtel and Hainmueller, 2011; Pappi,
Shikano, and Bytzek, 2004), our study contributes to understanding the potential mechanism
behind (mobilization vs. persuasion). As well, we connect to a small, but growing empirical
literature (Fair, Kuhn, Malhotra, and Shapiro, 2017; Sinclair, Hall, and Alvarez, 2011; Bo-
det, Thomas, and Tessier, 2016; Remmer, 2014; Chen, 2013; Kauder and Potrafke, 2015) that
investigates how electoral participation and natural disasters are connected. This is substan-
tially important in its own right, as the expected increase in natural disasters occurrence in
coming decades (IPCC, 2013) will render an understanding of the politics of high water and
other weather extremes more important. Finally, this literature as well reveals more broadly
how and which voters react to these shocks, and how this affects accountability channels, as
natural disasters can be interpreted as an economic, psychological and informational shock
for affected citizens (Ashworth, Bueno De Mesquita, and Friedenberg, 2017; Gailmard and
Patty, 2014).
For the case at hand, we propose two competing theoretical mechanisms: Natural disasters
might positively affect turnout, if they build social capital (due to wide-spread community
self-help efforts). Social capital would positively affect the D-term21 and hence disaster
occurrence could translate into increased aggregate turnout. The opposite would follow if
voting costs increase due to natural disaster damage at the individual level – this concerns
both the direct and opportunity costs of voting. Drawing on flood exposure from the 2002
and 2013 Elbe and Danube floods, and a difference-in-differences approach with entropy
balancing, we find evidence for the latter hypothesis: Flood municipalities see a moderate
decline in turnout, and particularly so those municipalities that were hit relatively harder.
In a broader sense, this indicates that natural disaster victims, and more broadly eco-
nomically disadvantaged citizens, have less incentives to participate. This is all the more
remarkable as for these citizens (future) natural disaster preparedness, medium-term relief,
and reconstruction were on the ballot. If this pattern holds more generally, this indicates
that in a PR electoral system geographically concentrated shocks to electoral participation
will lead to a systematic under-representation of affected citizens. It is therefore particularly
relevant to reduce the costs of voting in such environments (e.g. via increased administrative
flexibility in registration procedures or the postal voting application process) (Stein, 2015).
Electoral stakes and unequal participation in the Brexit referendum (Chapter 7)
Abstention by certain groups might reflect the extent to which they feel affected by a decision
and as such would not be problematic – as increased weighting of those with higher stakes in a
21E.g., it would affect the ‘satisfaction from affirming allegiance to the political system’ (Riker and Or-
deshook, 1968, 28)
1.1 Institutions, Information and Voting Behavior 19
decision making process may actually be desirable from a normative point of view (Brighouse
and Fleurbaey, 2010). This is particularly so with referendum decisions, where single issues
are decided upon and citizens do not per se delegate legislative/executive decision making
for a certain period of time. However, whether citizens are subjectively concerned is not
necessarily reflecting the degree to which these citizens’ interests are affected by the election
(Saunders, 2012).
Chapter 7 investigates this question for the turnout increase observed with the European
Union membership referendum in the United Kingdom (UK), drawing on an instrumental
variable design with rainfall as a shock to voting costs. The paper contributes first of all to
understanding the Brexit decision, where research is just beginning to build22 and findings
on the role of turnout are contradictory. Additionally, the paper contributes more broadly
by helping to understand how turnout affects referendum outcomes through differential mo-
bilization. Theoretically I argue that this is especially important for referendum decisions,
where individual policy preferences and participation incentives can be more easily correlated
compared to parliamentary elections.
Empirically, I first of all show that the increase in turnout was heterogeneous with re-
spect to Leave/Remain support. Among occasional voters marginal to rainfall those leaning
towards Leave were more likely to participate. Pre-referendum survey evidence supports the
picture that occasional voters were not per se split on the referendum issue – but that turnout
intention was higher among latent Leave supporters, and the more so the closer referendum
day came.
This evidence highlights that turnout matters for electoral outcomes and policy decisions.
Groups of citizens that do not vote are not represented by elected officials. In the case of
referendums their uncounted opinion is of course neglected directly. In previous research,
it has especially been highlighted that the preferences of voters and non-voters likely differ.
As this research has shown, voters with lower participation likelihood may even have on
aggregate similar partisan preferences, but their mobilization potential differs depending on
certain issues on the ballot. This implies differential participation. In the end, policy may
then not reflect the preferences of all enfranchised citizens.
Election timing and the benefits of participating (Chapter 5)
Chapter 5 investigates to what extent institutional reforms can change turnout incentives and
how changes in electoral benefits relate to the turnout decision. While compulsory voting
will in most contexts be the most effective institution to close the participation gap (but
see Cepaluni and Hidalgo, 2016), the democratic case for compulsion is debatable – citizens
have a right to abstain (Lever, 2010). Lijphart (1997) suggests other institutional features
to maximize turnout, among them holding less salient, i.e. second-order, elections concurrent
to first-order elections.
22See e.g. the issue 19:4 (2017) in the British Journal of Politics and International Relations (Henderson,
Jeffery, Wincott, and Wyn Jones (2017))
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The fact that turnout in second-order elections increases when combined with ‘more
important’ elections is not surprising. It is a well-established finding in the literature (Geys,
2006): Cross-country evidence stems from a wide range of elections, be it legislative and
presidential races (Stockemer and Calca, 2014) or European, local and national elections
(Schakel, 2011) just to name two examples. Going beyond Lijphart’s proposition, Leininger,
Rudolph, and Zittlau (2018) (Chapter 5) study, however, the effect of combining two second-
order elections, where turnout is relatively low in both instances.
We contribute to the literature especially in two regards: First of all, we add to a small
literature that provides causal estimates whether and to what extent concurrent second-order
elections increase turnout (Fauvelle-Aymar and Franc¸ois, 2015; Fukumoto and Horiuchi, 2016;
Garmann, 2016). Counterfactual turnout rates create clear incentives for strategic election
timing, hence electoral calendar decisions are likely correlated with aggregate voting behavior
(Hartney and Nickerson, 2012). The recent literature takes the debate an important step
forward by seriously addressing the endogeneity problem. It has consistently shown that
concurrent local elections increase turnout by about four percentage points. This literature
has not yet causally investigated, though, what effects can be expected with two second-order
elections at vastly different levels of government. We therefore investigate turnout effects for
European Parliament and local elections. Secondly, we are the first to investigate mechanisms
that lead to the hypothesized increase, particularly whether effect size systematically varies
with the expected p- (competitiveness) and D-term (non-instrumental benefits of voting) at
the municipality level.
We theoretically argue that the benefits of voting with combined elections should increase
in the Riker-Ordeshook-Framework. Both the pB- and the D-term will be higher for an
average citizen. On the other hand, at least parts of the voting costs remain constant over
elections. Thus, concurrent elections have “economies of scale”(Aldrich, 1993, 261) to the
voter. At least some citizens that would not vote in a singular election are now pushed above
their participation threshold. We therefore expect turnout to increase when combining two
second-order-elections.
We test this empirically for the effect of concurrent local elections on EP election turnout
in Germany. Drawing on an institutional reform introducing staggered local mayoral electi-
ons in a quasi-random fashion across Lower Saxonian municipalities, we are able to show
that concurrent mayoral elections can increase EP turnout by about 20 percent (10 percen-
tage points). The effects are most pronounced in small villages and competitive concurrent
elections. This indicates that both increases in the combined pB-term and the combined
D-term contribute to explaining this effect. We as well provide evidence for the external
validity of our findings, drawing on fixed-effects comparisons of state-level EP-turnout with
and without concurrent local elections for the 1979-2014 period. Our findings lend support
to the argument that the concurrency of elections at different government levels increases
turnout much more substantially than the concurrency of two local elections.
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As well, our results are relevant for the debate on causes of the observed turnout increase
in Germany, where the personalization of the debate has been discussed as a reason:23 Our
estimates imply that more than 80% of the much noticed increase in European Election (EE)
turnout in Germany between 2009 and 2014 (from 43.3 to 48.1 percent) was likely due to the
introduction of concurrent local elections in several German states (3.4 percentage points).
Finally, this last result implies as well that a substantial part of the voting population was
potentially predominantly interested in local, not European policy, when casting their ballot
for the EP. Survey evidence from Lower Saxony supports this findings.24 This, together with
the findings from the previous two subsections, links to an ongoing debate: There is a growing
economic literature that asks whether the participation of voters marginal to the electoral
process, i.e. those less interested in politics, might lower the average quality of vote choice.
Then, low turnout could as well constitute a “blessing in disguise” (Rosema, 2007). Formal
models can show that in some contexts voluntary participation Pareto-dominates compulsory
voting (Krishna and Morgan, 2011; Bo¨rgers, 2004). Particularly, Hodler, Luechinger, and
Stutzer (2015) present a model that exemplifies a likely trade-off involved: Lower voting costs
reduce the bias in representation, but potentially increase bias from interest group politics –
they argue that uninformed voters who participate with lower costs are as well those likely to
be swayed by special interests. Empirically, they provide evidence that the introduction of
postal voting in Switzerland (i.e. lower costs) is associated with on average less knowledgeable
voters and, as a suggested consequence, lower welfare expenditure. This is in line with survey
evidence from Switzerland after concurrent referenda, where, while turnout increases, the
average levels of political knowledge of voters decreases (Schmid, 2015). Similarly, Fowler and
Margolis (2014) argue with a survey experiment that lacking information prevents American
voters to vote in line with their preferences. However, note that Schmid (2015) reports as
well an increase in information search behavior of these new voters. In the medium term,
there is some hope that an information effect would be off-set (Lijphart, 1997).
1.1.4 Outlook
Overall, the works assembled here all contribute to our understanding of two elements of a
high quality democracy: participation and (vertical) accountability (Diamond and Morlino,
2004). Who participates in the electoral process and what are the consequences of unequal
participation? Which circumstances and incentive structures further both the accountability
and the selection of political elites acting in the interest of citizens?
On the one hand, the papers in this dissertation emphasize the importance of turnout
for the responsiveness of democracy - changes in voting costs and changes in benefits have
substantial impact on who participates in elections. This has implications for electoral results.
23This was refuted, see e.g. (Hobolt, 2014)
24Average local attachment is significantly higher among voters in municipalities with 2013 concurrent EP
and mayoral elections in Lower Saxony. This survey evidence is displayed in an earlier working paper version
of this paper, available at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/309091333.
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Importantly, political actors themselves will anticipate the cost-benefit-calculus of voters. In
the Lower Saxonian case, competing state governments synchronized, desynchronized and
resychronized electoral cycles of mayoral and local council elections25 with the explicit aim of
affecting the turnout decision of citizens. It can be expected that this is motivated by electoral
consequences of concurrent elections.26 These questions are all the more important as turnout
increases must not necessarily lead to electoral outcomes that are more representative of the
population’s preferences, especially given the low turnout baselines in second-order elections.
But not only participation matters for policy that aligns with the preferences of citizens.
On the other hand, accountability and selection mechanisms need to work. I particularly
highlight the role of electoral institutions in getting incentives right in this thesis – for exam-
ple, the fact that among all parties competing in the Bavarian state parliament the CSU was
particularly implicated in the Bavarian relatives affair is likely no coincidence: Their MPs
are predominantly elected in SMD districts, where individual accountability is much lower
compared to the OLPR tier (which is much more important for all other parties’ candidates).
Both theoretically and empirically the debates the papers in this dissertation contribute
to are open. Particularly intriguing is the relationship among electoral participation and
accountability mechanisms, where institutional reforms that affect the former might have
detrimental effects on the latter (and vice versa).
For example, the relationship between concurrent (second-order) elections, increased tur-
nout and improved aggregate voter decision making is not straightforward. Numerous studies
have shown that public policy seems to shift towards policy preferences of disadvantaged ci-
tizens with increasing turnout. Bechtel, Hangartner, and Schmid (2016) e.g. argue that
compulsory voting in Switzerland, due to monetary fines, brings disproportionate amounts
of poorer voters to the polls, who support redistributive policy. Similarly, Fowler (2013)
argues that compulsory voting in Australia increased turnout among less advantaged citizens
and shifted public policy in line with their preferences (increasing pension spending); like-
wise, Fujiwara (2015) shows that the enfranchisement of poor voters in Brazil led to higher
turnout rates for the latter and subsequent increases in healthcare spending. However, recent
work by Bracco and Revelli (2017) shades doubt on whether this would follow from turnout
increases with concurrent elections as well. They highlight that when elections of higher
and lower salience are combined, a contamination of electoral considerations might occur –
despite higher turnout, this could potentially weaken accountability for the race with lower
salience, as issues particular to this level of government do no longer affect electoral outco-
mes. Whether this conclusion extends to other contexts and/or concurrent elections of equal
25An SPD-led state government introduced direct mayoral elections in 1995 with 5 year terms, to be held
concurrently with local council elections. A CDU-led government in 2001 increased mayoral term lengths to
8 years, explicitly such that they would rarely be held concurrently with local council elections. An SPD-led
government in 2013 again shortened term lengths to 5 years.
26See ongoing research by Rudolph and Leininger (2017) that shows that in Lower Saxony especially the
SPD, who introduced direct mayoral elections in Lower Saxony and aims at holding them concurrently to
local council elections, profits from concurrency.
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salience remains open, however. In the case of Lower Saxony, ongoing research (Rudolph
and Leininger, 2017) will investigate to which extent concurrent local council and mayoral
elections affect electoral outcomes and through which channels.
As well, the question ‘who participates’ directly links to the question of accountability
mechanisms under different electoral systems. As Chapter 2 shows, open list PR is furthering
accountability of individual MPs relative to an SMD electoral system (given party-centered
voting). However, it is likely different types of voters that generate this accountability:
Under SMD, the model by Rudolph and Da¨ubler (2016) shows that it is those indifferent
between parties that can choose based on candidate characteristics, and hence can de-select
poorly performing candidates. These indifferent voters are more likely to be voters with lower
than average partisan attachment, information levels and hence turnout probability. Getting
these voters to the polls might thus increase this specific type of accountability under a SMD
electoral system. However, under OLPR it is more likely that core partisans deselect poorly
performing candidates. Citizens marginal to the electoral process as such, just motivated to
participate by certain institutional designs and/or external decreases in voting costs, may
lack the necessary information levels and engagement to perform the more complex selection
of candidates under OLPR. With increasing turnout, and thus increasing votes for a party list
and/or top-ranked candidates, the deselection of poorly-performing candidates at the top of
the lists might become less likely. Future work should analyze how voters select under OLPR
(see ongoing research by Da¨ubler and Rudolph, 2017, who investigate these mechanisms
theoretically and empirically).
Last but not least, the perspective of rational choice institutionalism highlights that
the decisions of all actors are interwoven (Norris, 2004). Political actors anticipate citizen
behavior and vice versa. This complicates any empirical analysis and emphasizes, first, a
methodological focus on improved research designs. The goal would be to identify singular
causal relationships and, potentially, mediating variables. Second, a strong relation between
theory and empirical work is necessary to identify substantively interesting cases and to
interpret results. This will be discussed in the following section.
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1.2 The Credibility Revolution in the Social Sciences
“Causal inference has always been the name of the game in applied econome-
trics.” (Angrist and Pischke, 2009, 113).
1.2.1 Overview
As in the social sciences in general, research in voting behavior is prone to endogeneity
concerns. Political actors anticipate how citizens behave: they design institutions accordingly
and send informational signals strategically. Likewise, citizens take the consequences of their
actions and the institutional constraints they face into account and act strategically as well.
What is cause and what is effect when analyzing the role of institutions and information on
political participation and/or choice is therefore difficult to investigate.
Experimentation in the political sciences
In an ideal world, experimental methods could circumvent the endogeneity problem directly.
By randomly assigning a stimulus, this would allow the clean identification of causal effects in
a researcher-controlled environment. The accumulation of experimental evidence over many
contexts could then lead to a broad evidence base on important social science questions (Ba-
nerjee, 2008). This approach has been fruitfully taken where feasible: Lab, survey and field
experiments led to the credible identification of theoretically important mechanisms in the
social sciences in general, as well as in research on political institutions and political beha-
vior (McDermott, 2002; Keuschnigg and Wolbring, 2015; Kittel, Luhan, and Morton, 2012;
Faas and Huber, 2010; Druckman, Green, Kuklinski, and Lupia, 2011). Particularly, field
experiments would be the method of choice for a researcher-controlled investigation of social
science questions in a real-world environment (Baldassarri and Abascal, 2017; Grose, 2014;
Gerber and Green, 2017). For example, party and civil society organizations have teamed up
with researchers to implement ‘get out the vote’-experiments in many contexts. This research
has credibly shown that some, though not all citizens can be incentivized to participate in
the political process, and helped in finding answers on the behavioral foundations of turnout
(Gerber and Green, 2017).
However, for many research questions a researcher-controlled experimental approach would
be inaccessible, unethical or impracticable. While survey and lab experiments have great ad-
vantages, they as well raise concerns related to their artificial environment, an oftentimes
unrepresentative subject pool, experimenter bias, and, most importantly, external validity
(McDermott, 2002). While external validity can be partially addressed with field experiments,
not all questions can be answered with this methodology either (Grose, 2014). Practical re-
asons (costs and logistical hurdles) as well as ethical and feasibility concerns (constitutional
and legal boundaries, i.e. the need for democratic legitimization of institutional choice and the
necessity of a fair democratic process), in many cases prohibit a field-experimental approach.
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A promising route in these cases is ‘naturally’ occurring randomization, i.e. variation in the
independent variable of interest that is exogenous to the outcome in question. For example,
in rare cases randomization is explicitly built into the institutional design by political actors
for reasons of fairness and unbiased selection. E.g., following an electoral reform in 1994
France, departmental councilors were to be elected for 6 year terms, with half the council
renewed every three years. To choose which councilors would start to be elected first, lots were
drawn. Fauvelle-Aymar and Franc¸ois (2015) use this peculiarity to study the consequences
of election timing. Similarly, in an Indian setting, a third of village councils has the council
chair reserved for a female chairperson – which councils, however, is chosen by random draws.
This helps to identify the effects of female representation on policy choices (Chattopadhyay
and Duflo, 2004).
These examples highlight how naturally occurring variation can be gainfully exploited for
scientific purposes. The question then arises when and under which conditions observational
data can be treated ‘as if’ random.
The design-based approach
Scholarship since long recognizes this challenge. At least since the early 1900s, among the
“fundamental difficulties in the scientific study of political processes” have been (and still
are) listed: machinery for measuring the political world and statistical tools for analyzing
them; isolating causal relations sufficiently; and drawing inferences from observational data
without researcher-controlled experiments (Merriam, 1923, 287-289). In inspiration from and
close collaboration with related fields, political methodologists increasingly focus on the cau-
sal inference problem. By now, this has evolved into one of the central trends in the political
science discipline27 (Clark and Golder, 2015; Titiunik, 2015; Keele, Titiunik, and Zubizar-
reta, 2015). This literature specifically turns its agenda to the assumptions needed to give
statistical estimates a causal interpretation, and to differentiate whether statistical models
are to be interpreted descriptively or causally (Keele and Titiunik, 2015a). Experimental
designs serve as benchmark, but the design-based analysis of observational data, drawing on
natural and quasi-experimental justifications is the focus of this work.28 This methodological
27Next to the logical rigor of formal theory and, as an important recent development, the opportunities
presented by big data – however, even given the trend to big data, causal research designs to reduce bias
become no less important as inductive causal modeling or causal modeling based on machine-learning is next
to impossible (Titiunik, 2015); see as well Kauermann and Ku¨chenhoff (2016) for the importance of statistical
modeling with big data.
28There is some conceptual ambiguity in the definitions of ‘natural’ or ‘quasi’-experiments. An experi-
ment as such is defined by the constituting element of researcher control over the experimental stimulus and
explicit design of the (field/lab/survey) experimental study. This is already less clear for natural experiments
(Robinson, McNulty, and Krasno, 2009). Natural experiments imply an exogenous stimulus (‘act of nature’).
Dunning (2008) therefore defines a natural experiment by a random or as-if-random treatment assignment
process (that is not under the control of the researcher). The defining feature would be that the selection
process is unrelated to the outcome variable of interest (hence as-if-random). However, any naturally occur-
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viewpoint is becoming more and more a standard in applied empirical research in the social
sciences. Drawing on the ground-breaking conceptualization of potential outcomes in the
Neyman-Rubin-Holland-Model (Rubin, 1974, 1977; Neyman, 1923; Holland, 1986) political
science has embraced the counterfactual approach to causal inference (see below for a short
summary of the model). For the anglo-saxon context, this approach has been popularized at
least since King, Keohane, and Verba (1994), and is now standard in many introductory (e.g.
Kellstedt and Whitten, 2013) or advanced (e.g. Box-Steffensmeier, Brady, and Collier, 2009;
Morgan and Winship, 2015; Best and Wolf, 2015) text- or handbooks for political science
methodology. As well, it is available in easily accessible methodological reviews (e.g. Gangl,
2010a; Berger and Wolbring, 2014; Keele, 2015). In the German research community, the
approach is gaining ground (Faas and Huber, 2010), mostly though with direct reference to
experimental research when incorporated in German language text- or handbooks of (po-
litical) methodology (e.g. Diekmann, 2007; Behnke, Behnke, and Baur, 2010; Bra¨uninger,
Ba¨chtinger, and Shikano, 2012; Baur and Blasius, 2014). Some notable exceptions, e.g. the
summaries by Legewie (2012) or Bauer (2015) or method-focused introductions on matching
(Gangl and DiPrete, 2004; Gangl, 2010b) or fixed effects estimation (Bru¨derl, 2010) explicitly
relate to design based inference with observational data.
1.2.2 Natural Experiments: Invoked Assumptions and an Over-
view on the Applications
When thinking about causal inference, the potential outcome framework is a useful starting
point, as it outlines the identification problem very clearly. The framework can shortly be
summarized as follows: Assume a binary stimulus (‘treatment’) T and a continuous outcome
variable Y , where we are interested in assessing the effect of treatment status on manifesta-
tions of the outcome. The counterfactual approach starts with the observation that Y 1i , i.e.
the outcome for individual i under treatment (hence Y 1), and Y 0i , the outcome under control
state, would need to be simultaneously observed to determine a causal effect on the individual
level. Hence, we would need to be able to observe counterfactual realities. All subsequent
methodological discussion then center around the question whether and when the observed
ring stimulus is oftentimes not really exogenous, but rather external to the system. Deaton (2010) makes
this very important point in his discussion of the design-based approach, arguing that even an alphabetized
selection process (where every third entity in the order of the alphabet was assigned to a stimulus) may be
confounded (see as well Sekhon and Titiunik, 2012). Natural experiments are thus regularly not different from
quasi-experiments, where random treatment assignment (by both nature or the researcher) may be absent.
In any case, the point of the design based approach is to clearly outline the selection process and propose
design based or statistical corrections that make as-if-random assignment plausible (Robinson, McNulty, and
Krasno, 2009). I therefore follow the conceptual ambiguity of many scholars using the terms interchangeably
(e.g. Gangl, 2010a) and refrain from strictly distinguishing natural from quasi-experiments. The conclusion
to this chapter then takes up a fruitful conceptualization by Dunning (2008), distinguishing research designs
by the plausibility of as-if-randomness concerning the relationship of independent and outcome variable of
interest.
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outcomes in two groups, where G = 1 denotes that group members actually received the sti-
mulus (G = 0 otherwise), and where subsequently average outcomes over the groups can be
observed. The question then is to what extent E(Y 1i − Y 0i ) = E(Y 1i |G = 1)− E(Y 0i |G = 0).
As the left hand side cannot be observed, only careful theoretical argumentation and skillful
placebo tests can provide an indication whether this equation holds; otherwise, the researcher
risks to confound treatment effects with selection bias. Selection bias in this framework can
be characterized by the difference in group outcomes, had the intervention not occurred, i.e.
selection bias s is given by s = E(Y 0i |G = 1) − E(Y 0i |G = 0) (derived by rearranging the
above equation).
The potential outcome framework is, of course, not the only possible conceptualization
of the causal inference problem. Pearl (2010) provides a good overview on directed acyclic
graphs (DAGs), which are a useful approach as well. DAGs are a tool for identification,
particularly in settings with selection on observables – there, they help to structure and
represent the researchers conceptualization of the selection problem (Keele, 2015). As well,
they are highly useful for conceptualization when considering whether and which variables
(not) to control for non-parametric identification (Elwert and Winship, 2014).
Returning to the potential outcome framework, randomization will lead to s → 0 in
expectation, as by design randomization implies identical group characteristics in expectation.
The question however is, under which conditions research designs with observational data will
achieve this end. Five major causal inference techniques for observational data are available
to the researcher: difference-in-difference (DID), or more generally fixed effects estimation;
matching; regression discontinuity designs; and instrumental variables. Cutting edge research
investigates further how concepts of causality can extend to causal mediation analysis and
causal mechanisms (Imai, Keele, Tingley, and Yamamoto, 2011; Hedstro¨m and Ylikoski,
2010). The studies performed for this thesis take up one or several of the five methods to
answer questions on voting behavior and electoral choice.29 In the following, these methods
will only be discussed in brief with a focus on necessary assumptions and why these methods
were chosen for the applications at hand. The individual papers in this dissertation each
present the employed methods in more detail. For in-depth overviews on the strengths and
limitations of the methods, a broad literature exists: For difference-in-difference estimation,
Lechner (2010) is a good resource, as is Bru¨derl and Ludwig (2015) for fixed effects estimation.
Likewise, a detailed introduction to matching techniques is available in Rosenbaum (2010) or
Gangl and DiPrete (2004). A broader overview on instrumental variables is given by Imbens,
Rubin, and Angrist (1996) (see as well Sovey and Green, 2011). The regression discontinuity
approach is discussed in detail in Lee and Lemieux (2010). Textbook-length introductions
are available e.g. in Angrist and Pischke (2009); Wooldridge (2010); Imbens and Wooldridge
(2009); Morgan and Winship (2015).
29Additional techniques, such as control function methods, sensitivity analysis, bounds, or synthetic control
groups are part of the causal inference toolbox as well, but will not be discussed here.
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Difference-in-difference estimation
I first of all turn to the difference-in-difference approach. Ususally, when an external event
affects some units of observation but not others, it is not necessarily the case that these
two groups would counterfactually be comparable with respect to their potential outcomes.
However, the DID approach builds on the insight that even if not comparable in levels, they
might well be with respect to trends (Card and Krueger, 1994). Hence, the development of a
control group provides the counterfactual for what would have happened in the treated group
absent the intervention. Obviously, repeated observations, at least two, need to be present
in this case. Besides this data requirement, the DID-approach is weakly preferable to any
cross-sectional analysis, as identifying assumptions are weaker. Even with a fully randomized
treatment, using a DID approach should lead to efficiency gains and improved model fit if
additional covariates are used.30
The crucial assumption for an unbiased DID is E(Y 0i,t−Y 0i,t−1|G = 1) = E(Y 0i,t−Y 0i,t−1|G =
0) (Lechner, 2010; Bru¨derl, 2010), i.e. that changes in outcomes over time t, with t ∈ 1, 2,
would be similar both in the treated and in the control group absent the treatment (‘parallel
trends assumption’). If this is the case, it can plausibly be argued that comparing trends
between group outcomes in a pre-post-intervention design gives the researcher an estimate
for the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT).31
While the identifying assumption can be made plausible when observing parallel trends
in pre-treamtent periods, or by assessing the balance of (trends) in potential confounding
variables, whether trends are indeed parallel in the treatment period is untestable. Especially
for longer time periods, an assumption of parallel trends can become difficult to uphold.32
When estimating a DID model, a standard OLS regression framework with unit- and time-
level fixed effects is equivalent to a (non-parametric) difference-in-difference estimator for the
30Comp. Table 1 of Leininger, Rudolph, and Zittlau (2018) for an example: We estimate the effects of
concurrent elections to turnout with a DID and a cross-sectional design. Both are valid, as we can assume
selection to have been plausibly exogenous to turnout rates. Consequently, both models yield very similar
point estimates (10.2 as opposed to 9.7 percentage points increase in turnout through concurrency), the DID
model has smaller standard errors, though (0.4 compared to 0.6).
31If the researcher wants to estimate an unconditional Average Treatment Effect, the stronger assumption
is needed that the intervention has a similar average effect in the treated and as well, counterfactually, all
the control observations. Additional assumptions invoked are the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption,
which implies particularly that the intervention does not spill-over to control group observations, i.e. that
there are no interactions between units; it as well has to be assumed that there is No Effect on the Pre-
Treatment Population (NEPT), i.e. that there are no anticipation effects in the groups; finally, if additionally
time-varying covariates X are used to justify the parallel trends assumption, these must not be exogenous to
the treatment (Lechner, 2010).
32Important contributions to the literature do not address this finding with sufficient caution. E.g., one
of the pioneering contributions for the method in political science by Bechtel and Hainmueller (2011) use
a parallel trend assumption for election results for a time-period of 9 years and four elections, which is
potentially introducing bias to their estimates on the effects of flood exposure to incumbent party vote shares
in treated regions due to geographically clustered time-variant confounders (comp. Chapter 3).
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case of two time periods (Bru¨derl and Ludwig, 2015). This strategy is mostly employed in
the projects in this dissertation. Where more than two time-periods are drawn upon, a fixed
effects estimator with time- and unit-fixed effects is used, drawing as well on the parallel
trends assumption.33
The difference-in-difference approach can be adapted very flexibly. Importantly, differen-
cing is not only possible over time (Bru¨derl and Ludwig, 2015, have made a similar argument).
As shown in Chapter 2 and 4, the method is applicable in any circumstance where through
differencing one can eliminate unobservable confounders that affect both differenced units si-
milarly. In Chapter 2, Rudolph and Da¨ubler (2016) develop the difference-in-tiers approach
as specific strategy for assessing the person-specific impact of the Bavarian relatives affair.
Under the assumption that party valence should affect party choice equally in both tiers, the
valence of the district candidate is to influence only the decision regarding the first vote. 34
Matching techniques
Matching or related methods are applied in Rudolph and Da¨ubler (2016) and Rudolph and
Kuhn (2018) (Chapters 2 and 6). Matching addresses the causal inference problem directly
via the conditional independence (or ignorable treatment assignment) assumption: Assuming
that selection into treatment is a function of covariates, selection bias can be reduced by
non-parametrically accounting for imbalance in pre-treatment confounders between treated
and control observations (Stuart, 2010). Hence, it is assumed that E(Y 0i |G = 1,X) =
E(Y 0i |G = 0,X), i.e. conditional on covariates outcomes under control condition would not
differ. Importantly, matching estimators rest on the strong assumption that these covariates
are observable. As instructively summarized by Gangl and DiPrete (2004) (see as well Stuart,
2010), for most matching estimators the observations j from the control group are used to
mimic counterfactual observations i from the treatment group, hence an average treatment
effect on the treated is calculated. This can be grasped by a doubly weighted comparison of
outcomes, as ATTmatching =
∑
i|G=1wi ∗ (Y 1i −
∑
j|G=0 hij ∗ Y 0j ). Such a matching estimator
is a comparison of the outcome for each treatment group observation i, contributing with
33Additional statistical assumptions apply, particularly that the idiosyncratic errors have constant variance
and are uncorrelated over time. If this is not the case, clustered standard errors would be a best practice
(Cameron and Miller, 2015), which are applied as a conservative approach throughout.
34We thus estimate the ATT for the candidate valence effect of the scandal via the difference of CSU
first vote share YFV,d and CSU second vote share YSV,d in districts d with (YFV,d − YSV,d) = αT + (CFV,d −
CSV,d)β + (FV,d − SV,d). If we assume that the party valence effect of the scandal is constant over tiers, α
identifies the candidate valence effect. The covariates C include observable factors that influence the voting
decision differently at both levels. We control especially for candidate quality and list quality (i.e. regional
electoral district). Note that all unobserved factors that affect party choice to a similar extent over both tiers
drop out of this equation. This estimation assumes that we have identified all unobservable confounders that
affect the difference in party choice. To substantiate this assumption, results of a fixed effects specification
over time are as well reported, which additionally accounts for any unobserved time-constant candidate
factors.
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weight wi to the ATT, to a with hij specifically weighted average counterfactual for the
observation from the control group. Matching algorithms then differ by how these weights
are constructed: In particular, variants of exact matching assign one (or few) control group
matches to each treatment group observation (e.g. stratification, nearest neighbor matching,
caliper matching). Other matching estimators (e.g. mahalanobis matching, kernel matching)
use weighted control group means to mimic counterfactual treatment group outcomes (Gangl
and DiPrete, 2004, Table 1).
In this understanding, matching serves as strategic subsampling from both the treatment
and control group in order to achieve maximum comparability (Morgan and Winship, 2015,
142). This has two advantages: On the one hand side, it improves the balance between
control and treatment group observations, which has the potential to substantially decrease
selection bias. Crucial are then assumptions what degree of difference between observations
is acceptable. On the other hand, it compares only ‘comparable’ observations, i.e. treatment-
control group pairs that are balanced. Treatment effects are thus estimated from a region
of common support. This leads to increased transparency when interpreting findings: As
effects can substantially only be interpreted for the region of common support, the researcher
is prevented from extrapolating to regions off the support. For example, if certain covariates
fully determine control or treatment group status, it is impossible by definition to separate
the effect of treatment from selection bias for these observations.35
Importantly, there is no general ‘best’ approach (Morgan and Winship, 2015, 170f.): Va-
rious matching estimators have been proposed, each with their own strenghts and weaknesses
that are more or less relevant depending on the application. Chapter 2 makes use of a re-
cently developed approach, coarsened exact matching (CEM) (Blackwell, Iacus, King, and
Porro, 2009; Iacus, King, and Porro, 2012). This is a variant of exact matching – as ex-
act matching is hardly feasible with more complex social processes that lead to treatment
assignment (as exact matches will not be present with many, and especially metric, covari-
ates in finite samples), CEM allows the researcher to pre-specifiy treatment variables that
can be coarsened, i.e. where ranges can be used that contain comparable information. In
the case at hand, candidates implicated in the Bavarian relatives affair likely had specific
characteristics36 that could be meaningfully coarsened.37 This allowed us to estimate parti-
cularly credible effects for a subgroup of treated candidates. Depending on the amount of
35This distinguishes matching as well from regression analysis, which can otherwise just be understood as
a different way of constructing the weights to sum the covariate-specific effects (Angrist and Pischke, 2009,
54).
36Particularly, they were relatively older and with more legislative experience, as relative employment
regulations that some of these candidates exploited stem from the 1990s. This in turn, however led to e.g.
a higher observed placement of implicated candidates on the Bavarian open lists. This is an important con-
founder as ballot position impacts counterfactual vote shares (Faas and Schoen, 2006; Da¨ubler and Rudolph,
2017).
37Particularly, we specified age in age brackets of 10 years; more importantly, we used knowledge on ballot
placement effects (Faas and Schoen, 2006) to coarsen pre-electoral list position, differentiating 1st, 2nd, 3rd,
4th-6th, 7th-10th place and all other ranks.
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pre-treatment characteristics included, more or less treated and control observations have to
be discarded, though. Importantly, where treatment and control observations are discarded
to improve balance (and the case for an unbiased estimate) this changes the estimated ATT
to a local (Sample) Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (SATT), which is potentially
more difficult to interpret. Overall, the matching solution was very useful, given we had to
use a cross-sectional research design: We could not use DID as even for those candidates
that ran in previous time periods, the within-party competitive environment had changed
too much.
CEM is less feasible with higher-dimensional data and where there are no good theoretical
reasons for applying coarsening. For such cases, entropy balancing (EB) has been proposed
as a data pre-processing technique by Hainmueller (2012). With entropy balancing, the rese-
archer can adjust the first, second and potentially higher moments of covariate distributions
between a treated and a control group. EB keeps all treated observations, hence the SATT
as an estimand remains unchanged with this technique. The weights obtained can be passed
e.g. to a standard (weighted) regression estimator or (weighted) difference-in-means test. We
apply entropy balancing in Chapter 6: Observing that electoral participation in flooded and
unflooded municipalities in Saxony and Bavaria does not follow parallel trends in the pre-
treatment period, we cannot use a simple DID estimator. However, DID can be combined
with matching in such a setting.38 We use entropy balancing (Hainmueller, 2012) to generate
weights such that both our treatment and control group follow a parallel trend prior to the
treatment. Applying this reweighting of control group observations in the treatment period
should make both groups more comparable on background characteristics when estimating
treatment effects.
Both matching applications used in this dissertation do not rely on an estimation of the
‘propensity score’ (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983), the dominant matching technique to date.
Propensity score matching (PSM) has attracted some critique recently (e.g. by King and
Nielsen (2016, 1), who argue that “[the] propensity score should not be used for matching”).
PSM proceeds in two steps. First the probability of treatment assignment is estimated
drawing on available covariates with a logit function. Second, treatment effects are estimated
on observations with comparable propensity scores. This, however, implies that observations
with the same propensity score must not be comparable on the set of their background
characteristics. This requires that the researcher manually invests in balance checking and
regularly has to iterate between different propensity score models to achieve this balance
(Hainmueller, 2012). While PSM is useful when approximating a completely randomized
experiment with one or few covariates, in most cases matching should be understood at
mimicking a blocked experiment; for this, other matching algorithms would be suited better
(King and Nielsen, 2016).
38See Lechner (2010) for a broader discussion on how combining DID with matching is a fruitful future
avenue for causal inference designs (e.g. using matching on the temporal structure in the data to improve
DID inference).
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Overall, recent developments in matching methods, such as those applied in Chapters 2
and 6, emphasize that observational data can potentially contain a hidden experimental data
set (King and Nielsen, 2016), but that caution has to be applied which technique to use and
how to interpret results. Most importantly, matching increases the balance of covariates in
treated and control groups. When the assignment mechanism is plausibly ignorable given
these covariates, matching is useful in identifying causal treatment effects. Additionally,
compared to other techniques such as standard linear regression, matching reduces modeling
assumptions and prevents the researcher from drawing conclusions off the common support
of the data.
Instrumental variables and regression discontinuities
Just shortly, I will address strengths and limitations of the instrumental variables (IV) ap-
proach (applied in Chapter 7) and the regression discontinuity design (RDD) (applied as
geographic regression discontinuities in Chapter 5 as robustness test).
Both IV and RDD can be understood as local experiments. When necessary assumptions
are met, this has the great advantage that even with cross-sectional observational data causal
estimates can be obtained. Of course, in combination with other methods, particularly a DID
estimator, inference can be additionally strengthened (this approach is taken in this thesis).
With IV, the researcher assesses the relation between two variables X and Y , which
are potentially endogenously related – for example, Chapter 7 assesses the relation between
observed aggregate turnout and vote shares, which is likely confounded as expectations on
turnout might influence the individual calculus of voting. The researcher could then use an
instrument Z that is related to X but not to Y – in the case at hand, and in line with a
broad literature, I use rainfall (Knack, 1994), arguing that rain impacts the turnout decision
(through the voting cost function), but not voter decision making. The instrument hence
induces variation in X that is exogenous to Y . The effect of this variation in X can then
be estimated and provides for a causal local average treatment effect (LATE) (Sovey and
Green, 2011; Imbens, Rubin, and Angrist, 1996). Of course, whether the method can be
applied hinges on an in the end untestable assumption: whether Z really influences Y only
through X. This has to be made plausible through theoretical arguments and a careful
observation of the selection process (Dunning, 2008, 2012). For the effect of rainfall, it has
e.g. been suggested recently that rainfall might impact vote shares directly through the mood
of citizens. From the perspective of the economic theory of voting, this should theoretically
not matter too much, as psychological concerns are not part of the calculus of voting.39
Empirically, where this connection has been explored, it has been shown to increase risk
aversion (Meier, Schmid, and Stutzer, 2016; Bassi, 2013). This should in the case at hand
counteract the effects I find. Future research could investigate whether a potential direct
impact of rainfall on voting behavior really exists and whether it could invalidate the large
39With psychological theories, this conclusion would be different, of course.
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literature that uses rain as an instrument for turnout (see for an overview Arnold and Freier,
2015). A more important caveat of the method is discussed below in more detail: With
IV, estimates are derived for local variation in X (only a LATE is estimated). Whether
this LATE is substantially interesting depends on the context and the instrument (Deaton,
2010).40
With an RDD, the researcher exploits the fact that at a certain threshold of X assig-
nment to treatment status changes (Thistlethwaite and Campbell, 1960). E.g., with very
close elections, winners and losers are ‘as-if’-randomly determined. Researchers can then
exploit the randomness at this local threshold to derive the effect of treatment status on
outcomes of interest (within the group of very close elections, RDD has e.g. been used to
estimate the incumbency advantage (Lee, 2008)). Of course, careful attention has to be given
to the concrete assignment mechanism, and especially to the questions whether agents can
sort at the threshold (de la Cuesta and Imai, 2016). As well, only a LATE is estimated –
whether effects can be generalized depends on the concrete setting. Recently, the concept
of the RDD has been extended to take advantage of geographic discontinuities (Keele, Titi-
unik, and Zubizarreta, 2015; Keele and Titiunik, 2015b). A geographic RDD would exploit
a boundary change that affects treatment assignment, arguing that observations very close
to either side of the boundary are otherwise identical concerning their potential outcomes.
Chapter 5 uses this approach to estimate the effect of concurrent local elections on Euro-
pean Parliament election turnout. Treatment varies at the state level, where some German
federal states introduced concurrent local elections. Comparing municipalities just at the
boundaries, we show that treated municipalities see much higher aggregate turnout levels.
In this respect, the question of compound treatment effects has to be debated (Herna´n and
VanderWeele, 2011). Especially at geographic boundaries, regularly more than one politi-
cally relevant factor changes at the threshold. In the concurrent-election case, any change in
state boundaries e.g. implies different state party organizations responsible for the local EP
campaign. Whether and to what extent such compound treatments confound the estimates
is impossible to test directly. Placebo tests (as applied in Chapter 5) can help to substantiate
necessary assumptions, though.
1.2.3 Limitations and Challenges
The causal inference approach focuses the attention of the researcher to isolating one causal
relationship X → Y , taking seriously the complex, and potentially confounding, causal struc-
ture this relationship is embedded in – central challenges are selection or unobserved confoun-
ders and reverse causality. Particularly, the approach aims not only for greater transparency
40In Chapter 7, I therefore show with survey data that the change in voting costs through rainfall is
likely relevant for the broader heterogeneity in voting costs among the population of occasional voters in the
Brexit-case.
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concerning identifying assumptions (Angrist and Pischke, 2010), but guides the research to
choosing settings and methods that can reduce these assumption to a minimum.
A continuum of plausibility
Dunning (2008) proposes to locate research designs on a continuum. The extremes denote
observational studies41 and, respectively, randomized experiments. In this spirit, Figure
1.1 locates the studies in the following chapters on a one-dimensional ordinal scale with
respect to the strength of invoked identifying assumptions. Strongest, i.e. closest to the
experimental ideal, certainly is Leininger, Rudolph, and Zittlau (2018): As shown in Chapter
5 treatment assignment is most likely exogenous to counterfactual turnout levels. This is
supported by numerous placebo and balance tests, similar results using geographic regression
discontinuities at the state border, and in-depth research on the assignment mechanism.
Consequently, DID and cross-sectional results in the study hardly differ, as would be expected
from an experimental stimulus.
Figure 1.1: Locating the studies on a one-dimensional ordinal scale with respect to the
strength of invoked identifying assumptions (inspired by Dunning, 2008)
Identification is strong in the case of Rudolph and Da¨ubler (2016) as well. As outlined in
Chapter 2, the affair was largely based on decision making of members of parliament in the
early 2000s that supposedly is unrelated to electoral standings in 2013. Placebo tests for the
SMD electoral level work well – pre-treatment period trends show no difference between later
scandal districts and later control group districts; the specific difference-in-tiers-approach,
as well over time, lends robustness to these results. Concerning the OLPR analysis, both
regression and exact matching estimates point in a similar direction, irrespective of the
amount of covariates used for the latter case. That estimated treatment effects hardly change
with and without inclusion of (time-varying) controls is a good sign for the independence of
41I denote observational studies as research where it is known that observations self-select into the states
of dependent variables interesting to the researcher, but where the degree of this self-selection is unknown.
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treatment assignment to at least these observed potential confounders and the strength of
the research design.
The remaining studies rely on slightly stronger assumptions. In these cases treatment
can be considered external to the system, though not necessarily exogenous (Deaton, 2010).
This is an important distinction. On the one hand, weather events and natural disasters
are timed randomly and are at least partly events beyond the control of society. However,
geographical vulnerabilities influence the ex-ante risk for weather events and flooding (not
to speak of ex-ante disaster preparedness decision making). Additionally, weather shocks
are usually spatially correlated. In the case of Chapter 7, rainfall affected particularly the
south-east of England. To caution against false-positive effects, I therefore use a difference-
in-difference approach in combination with instrumental variables (Lechner, 2015). In this
case, I use rainfall to instrument for the turnout increase. This should remedy at least part
of the potential unobserved confounders. Again, placebo tests on unaffected outcomes (prior
election turnout; postal voting turnout) support the research design.
More difficult is an application where there is a risk that geographic clustering and unob-
served confounders induce bias not only in levels, but potentially as well in trends. In the
case of the effect of Elbe and Danube floods on voting behavior in Germany, it is e.g. likely
that the location of the treatment groups in former East Germany and Bavaria violate the
common trend assumption: Observed and unobserved traits42 potentially lead to bias when
estimating effects under the parallel-trend assumption over long time-periods as in Bechtel
and Hainmueller (2011). This is not always easily testable due to specific mechanisms of the
treatment that can be observationally equivalent.43 Overall, the interpretation of coefficient
estimates as ‘causal’ hinges on the ability of the control group to mimic counterfactual tre-
atment group outcomes. E.g., by combining DID with entropy balancing (see Chapter 6)
and by drawing on a fixed-effects framework with more than two time-periods (see Chapter
3), additionaly using flexible slopes (Bru¨derl and Ludwig, 2015), it is still possible to reduce
necessary assumptions and make identification relatively plausible. Triangulation, by compa-
ring results from aggregate with survey data, helps in assessing the strength of identification.
Finally, a fruitful route is the reduction of the control group to a more credible counterfac-
tual (here, we e.g. use ‘close-by’-regions and estimate effects not only at the district, but
as well the municipality level). This helps as well in generating more credible inference,
though for the sake of a loss of generality. Finally, even where ambiguity concerning internal
validity remains, the potential threats to identification are spelled out, which helps for the
interpretation of substantive conclusions.
42E.g. the differing party system in former East (SPD, CDU and PDS/Linke as main parties) vs. West
Germany (SPD and CDU), as well as in Bavaria (CSU dominance).
43In the case of the Elbe floods, both spill-overs and selection effects could explain a differing trend in
unaffected districts close to flooded areas. For example, as shown in Chapter 3 the whole East, not just Elbe-
flood affected districts, are on the long-term SPD-supporting trend identified by Bechtel and Hainmueller
(2011) as long-term flood effect.
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Internal and external validity
By focusing on maximal internal validity, these applications highlight how a focus on research
design can lead to credible causal inference. However, a second issue has to be highlighted:
What is the population of interest the causal effects are estimated for? This relates to the
question whether and when a finding can be generalized to other populations. This question
is most obvious with IV and RDD estimates that identify a LATE by definition, i.e. an effect
that is valid for the part of the population complying with the instrument or close to the
threshold. Effects can only be generalized to the whole study population if it is plausible to
assume a constant effects framework. This must not be the case, of course (Deaton, 2010).
Similarly, the assumptions for average treatment effects are regularly more challenging
compared to assumptions for average treatment effects on the treated: For an ATT, it suffices
that the control group mimicks counterfactual treatment group behavior. But to estimate an
ATE, the treated group would as well need to be comparable to the full population with re-
spect to its response to treatment. In the case of the Bavarian relatives affair (comp. Chapter
2), we estimate an ATT. Placebo and balance tests allow to plausibilize that counterfactual
outcomes for the treated group would have developed as in the control group. For treated
subjects, we hence ascertain effects. However, treated candidates were likely peculiar types.
We therefore cannot generalize to the full population of Members of Bavarian Parliament (or
the likely size of punishment in any other scandal). Substantively, this still allows us to draw
two general conclusions: First, a scandal such as the Bavarian one can lead to electoral pu-
nishment. Second, holding both shock and set of implicated politicians constant, punishment
is substantively larger under an open-list as compared to a single-member district system.
Which contextual factors enable or prohibit similarly enhanced accountability with OLPR
in other electoral contexts would require additional studies, though.
As highlighted by Imbens (2010) it is important to clarify what one can actually learn
from any empirical study: Design-based inference will both make transparent the credibility
of results and highlight the population to which results are applicable. At the same time,
only with knowledge on the credibility of the evidence can a proper basis be developed for
both improving theory and for good policy decisions.
1.2.4 A Black Box Approach? Room for Theory and Ways For-
ward
Given the discussion of the design-based approach so far, how can generalizable macro-
evidence be generated and where is room for theory? In their widely discussed contributions,
Deaton (2010), Rodrik (2009) and Sims (2010) highlight this as important drawbacks of the
credibility revolution. By concentrating on the isolation of singular causal effects, we learn
what works, but not necessarily how and where it works. This is a black box approach to
social science research that will leave important questions unanswered (Imai, Keele, Tingley,
and Yamamoto, 2011). The application of experimental techniques does indeed not require
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reference to a theoretical model. But without this reference, the mechanism linking cause
and effect will remain obscure and it is questionable whether science can progress this way
(Deaton, 2010). Additionally, if methodological considerations (i.e. the plausibility of identi-
fying assumptions) define which research is acceptable to the discipline, this will necessarily
restrict the universe of questions that can be addressed (and answered) by political science.
In applied causal inference research, it oftentimes is the quasi-/natural experimental varia-
tion researchers become aware of that defines the research topic, and thus subsequently the
questions that are addressed (Gelman, 2009).
One avenue to progress is relatively clear, though: Of course, the strengths of singular
causal inference papers lie in identifying causal effects. To what extent such effects travel
across contexts is unknown. Thus, broader research programs are necessary to generalize, at
best by using different (causal) research designs (Keele and Titiunik, 2015a). Importantly,
when developing such research programs, broad theoretical considerations should lead the
researcher to the selection of contexts for new studies (Samii, 2016). Evidence from various
context can then support generalizable claims.44 Additionally, cutting-edge research on causal
inference methodology is developing that helps to separate potential competing mechanisms
and to identify mediators of causal effects (Imai, Keele, Tingley, and Yamamoto, 2011). This
as well, will help to link causal inference back to theory.
Finally, for the broader question where to turn the flashlight of empirical research to,
collaboration between theoretical and empirical researchers is necessary. (Formal) theory
lends itself to the same logical rigor as causal inference. Both methods are well-suited to
assess ceteris paribus changes in a broader system. This points to the fruitfulness of an
‘Empirical Applications of Theoretical Models’ (EITM) approach that combines theorizing
and empirical work such that literatures from (formal) theorizing and empirical analysis can
build on each other (Aldrich, Alt, and Lupia, 2008).45
Of course, this approach will be at odds with the limitations of causal inference methods
at times – certain research questions will hardly lend themselves to (quasi-/natural) expe-
rimental analysis (Rodrik, 2009). A methodological openness is therefore highly desirable.
And only by understanding the limits of causal identification, incentives for developing new
methods for better inferences in such boundary cases can arise (Keele and Titiunik, 2015a).
44E.g., a strength of Rudolph and Kuhn (2018) (see chapter 6) is that evidence on a negative impact from
flood exposure on turnout stems from two very different flood events under different socio-economic contexts
and times (relatively poor and recently democratized 2002 Saxonia and relatively rich 2013 Bavaria). This
helps to more broadly connect the findings to the Riker-Ordeshook model of voting (Riker and Ordeshook,
1968). Similarly, Leininger, Rudolph, and Zittlau (2018) discuss the turnout effects of concurrent elections
for the case of the 2014 EP elections in Lower Saxony with high internal validity, using a natural experiment;
we then show that these effects are likely generalizable to all German states and over time, drawing on a
fixed-effects model for state level electoral outcomes from 1979 to 2014.
45In Chapter 2, building on decision-theoretic models of voter participation (Riker and Ordeshook, 1968;
Thurner and Eymann, 2000) and vote choice (Adams, Merrill, and Grofman, 2005; Mauerer, Thurner, and De-
bus, 2015), we develop both a theoretical and empirical argument on the electoral system effects of candidate
valence shocks in an EITM fashion.
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Chapter 2
Holding Individual Representatives
Accountable: The Role of Electoral
Systems (Rudolph and Da¨ubler 2016)
This research has been published in The Journal of Politics, 2016: Issue 78, Volume 3, pp.
746-762, ISSN: 0022-3816 (print); 1468-2508 (online), under authorship of Lukas Rudolph
and Thomas Da¨ubler (University of Mannheim).
2.1 Summary
Voters are reluctant to sanction representatives for individual misconduct if they have to
balance candidate-level and party-level factors in their choice, but this trade-off is affected
by the electoral system. Our general theoretical model explains why individual accountability
can empirically occur in single-member district (SMD) systems but is expected under less
restrictive conditions using open-list proportional representation (OLPR). The latter not only
decouples party and candidate choice but also makes seat allocation more vote elastic. For
a thorough empirical test of our argument, we draw on real-world evidence from state-level
elections in Bavaria, Germany, which are held under an unusual mixed-member system.
Exploiting a recent public scandal involving one-third of representatives, we examine how
electoral punishment of the same candidates by the same voters differs across electoral rules.
Drawing on difference-in-differences as well as matching/regression estimators, we show that
electoral punishment is substantially larger under OLPR than under SMD systems.
2.2 Published Article
The reader is kindly referred to the above-mentioned source for the full article, which is avai-
lable online at doi: 10.1086/685378. The data and code necessary to reproduce the numerical
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results in the paper are available in the JOP Dataverse1 under doi: 10.7910/DVN/E2187A .
The appendix is available as supplemental material on the article site of Journal of Politics
(see as well Appendix A).
1https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/jop
Chapter 3
Selecting Good Types or Holding
Incumbents Accountable? Evidence
from Reoccurring Floods1
Abstract
A growing literature draws on natural disasters to assess how voters hold governments accoun-
table. This literature largely interprets disasters as exogenous shock to voter information and
voter reactions to disaster occurrence and disaster management mainly as following a retro-
spective reward-punishment logic. But theoretically, voters should as well prospectively learn
on an incumbent’s type from disaster management. I provide new evidence from four large
scale centennial floods in Germany (the 2002 and 2013 Elbe and Danube floods), occurring
right before elections. I show that robust disaster management led to vote gains for federal
or state incumbents in affected districts. Additionally, strong spill-overs to adjacent regions
indicate that voters use disasters as well in a prospective logic to learn on incumbent quality.
The heterogeneous response to disaster occurrence over time and space indicates, however,
that the cue that disasters give likely depend on the timing of disaster and elections as well
as on prior beliefs on incumbents, and that psychological factors play a role. Overall, I find
support for a retrospective, a prospective, and a psychological perspective on accountability,
indicating that voters are neither solely engaging in (‘blind’) retrospection nor only updating
their selection heuristic, but that a mixture of perspectives can likely explain the divergent
findings in the literature.
1For helpful comments and feedback, I am indebted to Josef Bru¨derl, Matt Golder, Andre´ Klima, Patrick
Kuhn, Helmut Ku¨chenhoff, Neil Malhotra, Ingrid Mauerer, Natascha Neudorfer, Eric Neumayer, Thomas
Plu¨mper, Jo¨rg Spenkuch, Paul Thurner, Roc´ıo Titiunik, audiences at the LMU Munich and at the 2016
EITM Institute. Earlier versions of this chapter were presented at the 2014 MPSA Annual Conference, the
2014 DVPW Conference ‘Die Bundestagswahl 2013’, the 2014 EPSA Annual Conference and the 2015 APSA
Annual Meeting.
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3.1 Introduction
That voters retrospectively reelect or discard incumbents based on their past performance is
a longstanding argument in the discipline (Key, 1966; Fiorina, 1981; Ferejohn, 1986). But
although a primary function of elections, it is not so clear how well voters are able to hold
incumbents accountable. Cognitive and institutional barriers as well as incentive structures
likely play a role in shaping the link between voters and incumbents (see for reviews Anderson,
2007; Healy and Malhotra, 2013; Ashworth, 2012).
As outlined by Healy and Malhotra (2013), a threefold understanding of the accountability
link between voters and elected representatives provides useful. First is the retrospective
view in the tradition of Key (1966), whereby incumbents are incentiviced to act on behalf
of voters by the prospects of reelection. Second is a selection perspective: Fearon (1999)
highlights that past information is predominantly useful for mandating future leaders. Third
is a psychological view (Kahneman, 2003; Lupia, 1994): Voters have to rely on cues and
heuristics when facing complex decisions in information scarce environments such as the
voting booth. Therefore, cognitive and emotional biases will affect the relation between
incumbent performance, voter evaluations thereof and voting.
Empirically, it is challenging to detect and to separate these channels. They are oftentimes
observationally equivalent. Are voters deselecting incumbents because they did not meet
voters’ standards or because voters learned that their quality is insufficient for the next
term? As well, how can empirical patterns of incumbent support be detected given that
challengers enter or exit strategically and that incumbents send strategic signals depending
on the electoral business cycle?
A growing literature consequently draws on external shocks such as natural disasters2 to
infer under which circumstances and how voters react to incumbent performance and changes
in their personal environments.
This literature assesses on the one hand whether voters attribute disaster occurrence to
incumbents (in)action (Achen and Bartels, 2004, 2016; Fowler and Hall, 2016; Heersink, Pe-
terson, and Jenkins, 2017), and on the other hand whether voters reward (punish) incumbents
for their (in)successful management of natural disasters and for the provision of disaster re-
lief. For this, considerable effects in both Western democracies (e.g. Healy, Malhotra, and
Mo, 2010; Carlin, Love, and Zechmeister, 2014; Bechtel and Hainmueller, 2011; Gasper and
Reeves, 2011; Healy and Malhotra, 2009; Chen, 2013; Eriksson, 2016) and autocratic or de-
2Sometimes, these events are referred to as exogenous. Natural disasters, as inferred from their qualifica-
tion as ‘natural’, are generally seen as events beyond the control of society and are thus external to the system.
Particularly, when disasters strike is a random event. This must not imply that the events are exogenous,
however, as the geography they hit in is predetermined (Deaton, 2010). This requires an empirical strategy
(such as fixed effects models) to deal with potentially correlated errors. Additionally, while the occurrence of
disasters is external, the ex-ante-vulnerability of a society to disasters, and the ex-post management of the
event is a under genuine political control (e.g. Gaillard, Liamzon, and Villanueva, 2007). I therefore relate
to these events as ‘external’ rather than ‘exogenous’.
3.1 Introduction 61
veloping contexts (Lazarev, Sobolev, Soboleva, and Sokolov, 2014; Cole, Healy, and Werker,
2012; Fair, Kuhn, Malhotra, and Shapiro, 2017) are reported, with few exceptions (e.g. Bodet,
Thomas, and Tessier, 2016). Generally, effective disaster management improves an incum-
bents’ reelection prospects among the affected population (Bechtel and Hainmueller, 2011;
Gasper and Reeves, 2011; Healy and Malhotra, 2010). Psychological biases might lead voters
to either attribute adverse events to incumbents in a sense of ‘blind retrospection’ (Achen
and Bartels, 2004) and/or lead voters to evaluate performance myopically, though (Healy
and Malhotra (2009), but see Bechtel and Hainmueller (2011)).
A recent theoretical literature highlights the fact that voters as well face the task of se-
lecting ‘good types’ (Fearon, 1999; Ashworth, Bueno De Mesquita, and Friedenberg, 2017;
Alt, Bueno de Mesquita, and Rose, 2011; Ashworth, Bueno de Mesquita, and Friedenberg,
2017; Thurner and Pappi, 1998). From this perspective natural disasters give voters cues on
incumbent behavior under stressful circumstances and carry information on otherwise unob-
served incumbent quality. This perspective emphasizes that natural disaster management
contains valuable information for both affected and non-affected citizens as it signals ex-
pected future incumbent performance. Empirically, evidence on such ‘demonstration effects’
(Lazarev, Sobolev, Soboleva, and Sokolov, 2014) is scarce, though.
The present analysis draws on data from an exceptional exposure to repeated natural
disasters to explore how voters hold incumbents to account with the information revealed
from disasters occurrence: Four large-scale river floods, which hit southern (Danube river
system) and eastern (Elbe river system) Germany both in August 2002 and again in June
2013. The disasters had a very similar aggregate impact with an estimated 8-9 billion Euros
of disaster damage in both 2002 and 2013. The political response by federal and state
governments was swift and massive: 7-8 billion Euros in emergency relief were distributed
and well over 200.000 man days of federal forces employed, publicly judged to be an effective
management of the floods (Pappi, Shikano, and Bytzek, 2004). Both disasters occurred
shortly before general elections in September 2002 and 2013. The present analysis extends
Bechtel and Hainmueller (2011), who analyze one of the cases (the 2002 Elbe flood).
In the next section, I first clarify which theoretical expectations would follow from the
three models of accountability (retrospective, prospective and psychological view) with re-
spect to flood exposure and disaster relief. I then propose specific hypotheses that can be
tested in the case at hand. The unique circumstances of these four floods provide a perfect
scenario to explore whether and why adverse events of similar size and with similar incum-
bent behavior have heterogeneous electoral impacts. Important contextual factors, such as
the institutional setting or political culture (Anderson, 2007) are held constant. This allows
to identify features that usually do not lend themselves to a cross-case comparison.
The following analysis draws on election data from the 1994 to 2013 general elections in
Germany and state elections in Bavaria. A time and united fixed effects model is used to
compare changes in the proportional representation (PR) vote shares of federal and state
incumbents. District level data is used to assess the large scale average effects of the flood,
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municipal level data for a more fine grained analysis of spillovers. Cross-sectional as well as
panel survey data allows to corroborate results and additionally assess mechanism.
My results support all three models of accountability, highlighting the complex decision
making processes voters employ.
As a core finding, robust post-disaster policy is related to an increase in incumbent vote
shares. In line with the literature (Bechtel and Hainmueller, 2011), I find that in north-eastern
Germany, where several German states were affected in the Elbe river floods in 2002 and 2013
the federal incumbent is rewarded (chancellors Schro¨der/Merkel); in Bavaria, for the Danube
floods 2002 and 2013, it however is the state level incumbent (governors Stoiber/Seehofer).
These findings are consistent with both retrospective and prospective accountability models.
In contrast to Bechtel and Hainmueller (2011), I do not find robust evidence for long-lasting
electoral rewards after disaster shocks.
Importantly, adjacent non-affected areas see large spill-over effects, indicating that a bro-
ader mechanism of ‘demonstration effects’ occurs (Lazarev, Sobolev, Soboleva, and Sokolov,
2014). This is consistent with prospective, but not retrospective accountability models.
While the electoral response to the 2002 flood was large in magnitude, it was dampened in
2013. This can most likely be explained by a slightly larger temporal distance between flood
and election, which links to models of myopic voter decision making (Healy and Malhotra,
2009). Cross-sectional survey data indicates that even such extreme events quickly fade
from the minds of voters. Additionally, prior incumbent evaluations and repeated exposure
potentially matter for the electoral response.
Overall, the case indicates that voters use the information revealed from incumbent be-
havior after severe events in a complex fashion. Attribution, timing, pre-disaster incumbent
evaluation and repeated exposure explain substantial heterogeneity in effects. Theoretically,
several of these mechanisms imply that voters use the information revealed by disaster ma-
nagement as well prospectively for candidate selection as opposed to retrospectively in a
reward-punishment logic.
In the following sections, the theoretical framework and the state of the literature are
discussed, before introducing case, data and research design. Section 3.6 presents results and
robustness tests and discusses the findings, before Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Accountability, Selection and Natural Disasters
The relation between voter preferences, elections and policy can arise through two chan-
nels: On the one hand side, elections allow voters to decide between different options, i.e.
party/politician types; on the other hand, elections allow voters to punish or reward incum-
bent performance and deselect underperformers (Dewan and Shepsle, 2011, 324f.). Both
mechanisms lead to correlations of voting behavior with incumbent performance, which a
large literature has empirically traced – on the macro level, e.g. econonomic performance, as
well as on the individual level, e.g. crisis management or corrupt behavior (see for reviews
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Healy and Malhotra, 2013; Ashworth, 2012; Anderson, 2007; Dewan and Shepsle, 2011; De
Vries and Solaz, 2017).
I use the comprehensive theoretical overview of Healy and Malhotra (2013) to distinguish
three broad accountability models, situate the empirical findings of the disaster literature
thus far and develop expectations for the case at hand:
First of all, in the spirit of the ‘sanctioning view’, constituents relate their material fate
to their political evaluations and vote choice. What Kiewiet and Rivers (1984, 370) refer
to as ‘retrospective voting model’ implies voting in response to economic conditions that is
backward-looking, oriented towards incumbents and based upon economic outcomes, not po-
licies. Principle-agent theory would highlight in such a model that citizens provide politicians
with incentives to act on their behalf by threatening deselection for bad (economic) outco-
mes (Gailmard, 2014). A central motivation for this perspective is the observation that, once
selected, voters need some enforcement mechanism to discipline politicians as they might be
tempted to shirk from their mandate (Ferejohn, 1986, 5; see as well Barro, 1973). Empiri-
cally, Key (1966) was the first to trace such a retrospective response to economic outcomes
(see as well Fiorina, 1981). Recently, a broad literature has suggested that natural disas-
ter shocks provide good opportunities to credibly draw inferences whether and when such
retrospective incumbent evaluations occur: This chapter e.g. builds directly on Bechtel and
Hainmueller (2011), who estimate an average increase of the incumbent party’s vote share of
7% in affected districts of the East German 2002 Elbe flooding, which they explain with “vo-
ter gratitude”. Similar explanations of retrospective disaster policy evaluations are reported
for various election types (e.g. local, national parliamentary, presidential) and developed and
developing contexts (e.g. Canada, Chile, Germany, India, Russia, Sweden, US) (Healy and
Malhotra, 2009; Gasper and Reeves, 2011; Bodet, Thomas, and Tessier, 2016; Cole, Healy,
and Werker, 2012; Lazarev, Sobolev, Soboleva, and Sokolov, 2014). This literature finds both
rewards after effective management/flood relief payments and shows that bad management
can lead to worse incumbent performance (Eriksson, 2016; Healy and Malhotra, 2010). In
some settings, even the evaluation of the democratic system at large is at stake (Carlin, Love,
and Zechmeister, 2014; but see Fair, Kuhn, Malhotra, and Shapiro, 2017).
From this, for any natural disaster, a first core hypothesis would follow: Voters reward
effective disaster management and disaster relief. Hence aggregate political units that ex-
perience effective disaster relief should respond by rewarding incumbents electorally as well.
I will investigate this hypothesis for the 2002 and 2013 floods at Elbe and Danube and as-
sess whether incumbents see higher vote shares in flood-affected districts.3 As in a federal
system of shared government responsibility it is a priori unclear to which level voters attri-
bute responsibility (Gasper and Reeves, 2011; Reeves, 2011), I will trace effects on the state
3Note that recent theoretical contributions question this straightforward relationship. Ashworth, Bueno
De Mesquita, and Friedenberg (2017) propose a model where this relationship depends both on prior beliefs
of the electorate and the governance production function.
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and federal level.4 Note that the retrospective reward/punishment-logic would not imply
spill-over effects to non-flood-affected areas.
Secondly, in the spirit of the ‘selection perspective’, extreme events are argued to give
voters cues on how to evaluate the government: They reveal information on incumbent
quality that is relevant to assess their future expected performance. At the same time,
natural disasters provide a case in point for elected officials to signal their quality to the
electorate. Fearon (1999) prominently highlights that voters probably think about elections
as a selection problem, where they aim to choose politicians that they see most likely to share
their preferences and act upon them. This is close to the original rational choice formulation
of the election problem by Downs (1957): in his formulation, rational preferences concern
the party differential and are forward looking, although informational constraints imply that
retrospective performance assessments can serve as a cue (see Thurner, 1998; Thurner and
Pappi, 1998). Importantly, the link between voter behavior and politician behavior is affected
by strategic selection and choices (Ashworth and Bueno De Mesquita, 2014). Thus, the
surprise element of natural disasters lends itself to circumvent some of the endogeneity and
reverse causality problems that researchers experience when assessing standard economic
performance measures and campaign indicators. Past research has particularly highlighted
that ‘demonstration effects’ can occur (Lazarev, Sobolev, Soboleva, and Sokolov, 2014), it
has not linked this directly to a selection perspective, though.
From this, for any natural disaster, several hypotheses follow: Observationally equivalent
to the retrospective perspective introduced above, the successful management of adverse
events should lead to vote gains for incumbents (Cole, Healy, and Werker, 2012). Importantly,
not only affected voters should be responding to the natural disaster, however. The fact that
a politician proves to be a ‘good type’ is relevant for the whole electorate. As the information
signal ‘successful management’ will most directly be picked up in affected districts and their
vicinity, I expect positive spill-overs to adjacent areas from the floods. Another expectation
follows from the selection perspective: When assessing whether an incumbent is a ‘good
type’, her performance is compared to counterfactual challenger behavior5. Holding the
policy constant, the better a challenger would be expected to perform, the less incumbent
policy will be electorally rewarded.
Third, negative shocks might be attributed to incumbents irrespective of their responsi-
bility. Achen and Bartels (2004) e.g. provide evidence that natural disasters, from weather
shocks to shark attacks, correlate both with economic decline and decreasing vote shares of
incumbents on average. Vote shares drop independent of the direct responsibility of elected
officials for these events. Achen and Bartels (2004) argue that rational voters should only
be punished/rewarded for social events (i.e. the management of the shock) and thus suggest
that voters drift off into “blind retrospection”. They might just experience emotional biases
4Empirically, this is only possible where electoral evaluations take place for both federal and state in-
cumbent.
5Comp. e.g. the selection model in Fearon (1999, 73): “the better the expected performance of the less
competent type [...], the more demanding is the optimal performance criterion”.
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whereby ‘bad’ events lead to sad feelings that translate into incumbent evaluations (Healy
and Malhotra, 2013). In this perspective, voting behavior is irrational and/or the attribution
of responsibility flawed.6 Empirically, the ‘blind retrospection’ argument has both seen re-
cent empirical support (Heersink, Peterson, and Jenkins, 2017) and refutations (Fowler and
Hall, 2016) – empirically, it is difficult to separate from the expected positive (negative) re-
sponse after (in)successful disaster management and relief, though; in this chapter I can only
assess the combined effect of robust relief to prior damage. Emotional biases are just one
element of psychological aspects of voting behavior, however, when explaining patterns of
retrospective voter decision making (Healy and Malhotra, 2013). As information acquisition
is costly, voters have to rely on cues. But these cues are only imperfect shortcuts to assess
incumbent performance. As well, voters may experience cognitive biases when assessing in-
cumbent performance. In this respect, recency is a noted phenomenon. In the economic
voting literature, voters are for example argued to substitute performance in the last year for
overall term-performance due to an ‘end-heuristic’ (Healy and Lenz, 2014).7 In the disaster
literature, voters have been shown to behave myopically: They reward ex-post relief pay-
ments, but more efficient ex-ante disaster preparedness spending does not cross their time
horizon (Healy and Malhotra, 2009).
From this, a further hypothesis follows: Disaster effects are relatively short-lived and
influence incumbent performance evaluations only for a limited amount of time.
Finally, the theoretical literature highlights that retrospective and prospective evalua-
tions, i.e. accountability and selection perspectives, are likely ongoing at the same time
(Thurner and Pappi, 1998). Fearon (1999) explicitly develops a model that combines a se-
lection and accountability logic. Similarly, Ashworth, Bueno de Mesquita, and Friedenberg
(2017) note how forward and backward looking decision criteria might actually inter- and
counteract each other. Empirically, these perspectives have not been tested, however, in a
combined framework.
3.3 The 2002 and 2013 Floods Along Elbe and Danube
Following decades of relative quiet in both the Elbe and the upper Danube basin, beginning
with the 2000s two large scale, ‘one hundred year’ floods of similar magnitude hit both river
6The interpretation of these findings is disputed. In some models, the negative association of disaster
damage with incumbent vote shares can be considered a rational outcome under information uncertainty
(Ashworth, Bueno De Mesquita, and Friedenberg, 2017; Gailmard and Patty, 2014). Cole, Healy, and Werker
(2012) argues that rational voters would attribute some share of negative disaster consequences to incumbents
as long as responsibility for the event is not fully observed.
7As well, in the lab it has hence been shown that recent events carry more weight than temporal distant
ones (e.g. Huber, Hill, and Lenz, 2012). And while parts of the literature report long lasting electoral effects
of natural disasters, these effects are argued to decay over time as well (e.g. Bechtel and Hainmueller, 2011;
Eriksson, 2016).
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systems in 2002 and 2013 (Blo¨schl, Nester, Komma, Parajka, and Perdiga˜o, 2013; Merz,
Elmer, Kunz, Mu¨hr, Schro¨ter, and Uhlemann-Elmer, 2014).
These floods affected two very different socioeconomic and political contexts: The Elbe
floods primarily struck in the federal states of Saxony and Saxonia-Anhalt, a relatively poor
area of Germany still in a catch-up process after the economic decline in post-Cold-War
Eastern Germany. The Danube floods mainly hit the southern parts of the state of Bavaria,
an economically prosperous area of Germany. Both the 2002 and the 2013 flood are with
respect to timing unique, occurring right before general elections: the Elbe floods in August
2002 (August 06, 2002 to September 12, 2002) were followed by federal elections on September
22, 2002; the Danube floods occurred in June 2013 (May 18, 2013 to July 4, 2013) with state
elections in Bavaria on September 15, 2013 and federal elections following on September 22,
2013.
Both times concentrated heavy rainfall caused severe flooding in Central Europe, breaking
multiple records such as an all-time high along the Elbe in the city of Dresden (7.40m in 2002
above normal) and along the Danube in the city of Passau (7.72m in 2013 above normal – a
500 year high). The record rainfalls in the upstream catchment areas of Elbe, Danube and
their tributaries resulted in the adverse of simultaneous flood peaks on various rivers with
subsequent breakages of dikes even further downstream in the lowlands of northern Germany
(Elbe), Austria and Hungary (Danube). Both the 2002 and 2013 floods caused casualties
(21 in 2002 and 8 in 2013 in Germany alone) and tens of thousands of people needed to be
evacuated (30,000 in 2002 and 85,000 in 2013 in Germany alone). Both floods were classified
as, depending on the location, 20 year to above 500 year flood events.(LUA, 2002; LFU, 2014;
Bundesregierung, 2013) The floods caused billions of Euros worth of damage (approximately
9 billion in 2002 and approximately 8 billion in 2013) in Germany8.
Figure 3.1 shows state and district boundaries, the Elbe and Danube river system, as well
as flood affected districts for 2002 and 2013.
The response of the federal and state governments was swift and massive. Over 200,000
man-service-days of federal forces (270,000 in 2002 and 215,000 in 2013) were employed to
stabilize dikes and aid in evacuations (CSU, 2013; BMVg, 2002) and the federal government
and the state governments agreed in both cases to each bear 50% of the costs.(BMI, 2013)
A considerable part of this aid was handed out very quickly without much red tape, and
directly to all affected households that applied, following federal and state level regulations.9
In both cases the incumbent politicians, Gerhard Schroeder in 2002, and Angela Merkel in
8There of course is heterogeneity in the damage suffered by individual districts both within and between
the events. The federal state of Saxony for example experienced damage amounting to about 6.1 billion in
2002 (8 of 13 districts severely affected). In the federal state of Bavaria damage amounted to 1.3 billion in
2013 (19 of 96 districts affected).
9e.g. in Saxony 2002, 500 Euro per affected person, maximum 2,000 per household, were handed out to
all households that applied (Restriction: max. household income below 40.000 Euro) (SSR, 2002); in Bavaria
2013, this ‘instant flood support’ amounted to 1,500 Euro per household without any income restriction
(BMI, 2013).
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2013, together with their cabinets initiated large scale flood relief funds worth several billion
euros (Bundesregierung, 2013).
Germany being a federal state, the political management of such events lies jointly in
the hand of federal, state and district level politicians and administrators. While financial
contributions were decided at the federal and state level (excluding damage to federal pro-
perty), implementation of the flood loss compensation programs is in the hands of district
officials. In terms of civil society, the flood sparked a large extent of grass-root mobilization
among citizens who volunteered filling sand bags, offering shelter, and providing relief goods.
Especially in 2013, social media networks were used to steer relief and dike protection work.
Information flows were often times uncoordinated by government agencies and even sidelined
official channels at times.
Finally, it is important to note how the federal elections in 2002 and 2013 differ from each
other. The 2002 election was dominated by a weak incumbent, with polls indicating a clear
victory for the opposition candidate, the governor of Bavaria (Hogwood, 2004; Pappi, Shikano,
and Bytzek, 2004; Pulzer, 2003). The surprise win of the SPD with incumbent Chancellor
Schro¨der, coming out with a plus in PR votes of only 6,000 and a five seat majority for
his SPD-Greens coalition, was consequently convincingly linked to the exogenous shock of
the 2002 floods, the robust response of the then SPD government (Bechtel and Hainmueller,
2011) and its successful display of crisis management skills (Bytzek, 2008, 2007). In line with
this argument, the 2002 flood was noted to have played a major role in the media coverage of
the 2013 electoral campaigns, especially of SPD and Greens (Eilders, Degenhardt, Herrmann,
and von der Lippe, 2004). In contrast, the 2013 federal election was dominated by a strong
CDU incumbent, Chancellor Merkel, who had lead the German economy successfully through
the Euro crisis (Hoff and Hough, 2014).
3.4 Data
The following analysis draws on administrative election data and election survey data. Main
dependent variable is the PR vote share (i.e. second/party vote share) of the incumbent in a
geographic vicinity.10
First of all, the broader impact of the floods is analyzed with district level election data
(N=402) on all German districts for the general elections 1994, 1998, 2002, 2005, 2009 and
2013 in 2013 boundaries (of these districts, 96 are located in Bavaria and 76 in former Eastern
Germany). I gathered additional data on a standard set of control variables of economic
voting (available for the time period 1998-2013).11
Second, I assembled a data set with municipality level election data for the states of
Saxony (1998-2013), Saxonia-Anhalt (1994-2013), Lower Saxony (1998-2013) (Elbe flooded
10I do not consider the first vote, as first vote shares are inconsequential for the federal incumbents standing
and local district incumbents are directly responsible for neither flood preparedness nor flood relief.
11Data is obtained from the federal statistical office (www.regionalstatistik.de)
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states) and Bavaria (1990-2013) (Danube flood) to substantiate treatment effects and assess
geographic spill-overs.12 I additionally added control variables on population density and
population size (logged) to capture heterogeneity in rural and urban municipalities.13
The coding of flood treatment on district level for 2002 and 2013 is based on districts
calling a ’state of emergency’ during one of the flood events as reported by the federal
government (Bundesregierung, 2013). Flood coding on municipality level draws on flood
satellite layers where these are available. Layers exist for the Elbe 2002 and 2013 flood in
Saxonia and the Danube 2013 flood in Bavaria and Saxonia-Anhalt.14 Where flood layers
do not exists or where these were unreliable as satellite images were taken before/after flood
peaks, I drew on government reports on affected rivers to code municipality affectedness
(HND, 2002; BfG, 2014; Bundesregierung, 2013; LUA, 2002; LFU, 2014; AG Hochwasser,
2002).
Third, pre- and post-election survey data is used: Daily polling data (cross-section on
district level) from Forsa is analyzed for 2002 and 2013 (weekly n = 2500) and from Politba-
rometer for 2013 (weekly n = 1700, irregularly conducted in 23 pre-election weeks).15 Finally,
an online panel on 2009-2013 (electoral precinct level, N = 1002) for Germany and two Ba-
varian pre-electoral cross-sectional surveys are used (N=3,036 and N=4,730). Within the
surveys, respondents are coded as ‘flood affected’ if they live in affected districts/precincts
as defined above.
3.5 Empirical Strategy
Events such as floods, although they are external to the system under study, are not under
control of the researcher; estimation is therefore at risk of confounding treatment effects
with selection bias (e.g. Sekhon and Titiunik, 2012). One approach to decrease necessary
assumptions is a difference-in-difference framework (Lechner, 2010), drawing on unit and
time fixed effects that control for time-invariant unobserved confounders in treatment and
control observations by relating treatment to changes in outcome variables (Bru¨derl and
Ludwig, 2015; Bru¨derl, 2010). Time-variant bias is controlled for where observable, otherwise,
12For the states of Brandenburg and Mecklenburg-West Pomerania, as well affected by the Elbe floods
though to a minor degree, I could not obtain a continuous time series of community level electoral data, due
to substantial changes in community boundaries following large reforms. These are therefore not contained
in the municipality level analysis
13Data is obtained from the federal (www.regionalstatistik.de) and federal state statistical offices of
the flood affected La¨nder Bavaria, Lower Saxony, Saxonia and Saxonia-Anhalt (see https://www.destatis.
de/DE/PresseService/Adressbuch/National.html for their web-portals).
14Obtained from Saxonian State Government (https://www.umwelt.sachsen.de/umwelt/wasser/8844.
htm) and Vista Cooperation http://www.vista-geo.de/en/portfolio-items/flood-monitoring/ (many
thanks to Heike Bach and Martina Hodrius from Vista for the kind provision of data and help in preprocessing
GIS files).
15Data is obtained from Gesis, http://www.gesis.org/en/home/.
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parallel trends have to be assumed. In terms of the Rubin Causal Framework (Rubin, 1974),
the approach assumes that for observartions i, i = 1, n, counterfactual electoral outcomes in
treatment regions (Y 0i |F = 1) are comparable to observed electoral outcomes in non-affected
observations (Y 0i |F = 0). With a difference-in-difference strategy, two time periods t and
a vector of time-variant controls X, the identification problem contracts to the assumption
that cross-sectional bias between treatment and control regions is, conditional on covariates,
constant over time, i.e. E(Y 0it − Y 0i,t−1|F = 1, X) = E(Y 0it − Y 0i,t−1|F = 0, X) (Lechner, 2010).
The average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) is then estimated by a fixed effects
regression with
Yit = αt + βFit + δi +Xitγ + it
with αt as time dummies to account for time fixed effects, Fit as binary measure for flood
exposure, δi as unit fixed effect, intended to capture unobserved heterogeneity of units, Xit
as a vector of time variant controls and it as idiosyncratic error term. This specification will
be applied to both the district, municipality and partially the survey data.
As the analysis deals with geographically concentrated events, potential unobserved time-
variant confounders most likely are geographical confounders as well. Hints to apply the
method cautiously comes from placebo analysis. Appendix Table B.1 reports pre-treatment
trends for areas later affected by the flood – while pre-treatment trends for the SPD in
the Elbe river system reveal substantively low and insignificant coefficients, coefficients for
CDU/CSU vote and the SPD in Bavaria show non-parallel pre-treatment trends. This is
likely due to time-varying spatial heterogeneity in the political units.16
The following strategies are adopted to address these potential common trend violations:
First and most importantly, where feasible, the district level sample is in a second step
restricted to proximate regions, thus analyzing effects within affected states/regions along
the Elbe or Bavaria. The underlying assumption is that geographic proximity improves the
balance of unobserved confounders. For the district level, models three to six of Appendix
Table B.1 e.g. show that geographic proximity substantially improves the placebo analysis.
For the municipality level, this strategy is adopted on the one hand by restricting the control
sample and on the other hand by using nearest neighbor matching on longitude and latitude,
16This might e.g. stem from differences in party system: Germany has three relatively distinct party
systems. In Bavaria, the CSU, sister party of the CDU, competes with distinct conservative profile as
dominant right-of-center force. In the rest of western Germany, CDU and SPD are the main competitors. In
the former East Germany, on the one hand side the party system is more volatile, with more swing voters, on
the other hand the Left Party as successor of the GDR’s Socialist Union Party competes partially on par with
CDU and SPD. Additionally, the 1998 election saw a large decline of the CDU especially in eastern Germany
(column 4 in Appendix Table B.1 estimates CSU second vote shares in an average Eastern district dropping
by about 10 percentage points). With the post-unification build-up process taking longer then expected, the
government was especially unpopular in the East, which explains the large negative effect specifically for the
CDU there (Arzheimer and Falter, 2003; Hough, 2003).
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as the average balance of observable and unobservable confounders will plausibly improve
relative to any random pair of municipalities.17
Second, the baseline models will estimate effects for a long pre/post-treatment time-
span, such that short-term fluctuations are less likely to bias results. Intuitively, this invokes
the interpretation of treatment effects under parallel trends between treatment period and
pre-treatment period as opposed to treatment and an average of pre-treatment periods. Ro-
bustness tests report effects with a short term two-period comparison, where time-varying
short-term factors are more likely held constant over cases. Additionally, I employ a modeling
strategy invoking flexible trends as suggested by Bru¨derl and Ludwig (2015, 374-381): This
approach acknowledges that heterogeneity in time trends between units might be present.
Using data from additional time periods, differences in levels and differences in trends are
canceled out. The treatment effect is thus estimated allowing for individual-specific slopes.
This approach has the great advantage of relaxing the parallel trends assumption altogether
and allowing for heterogeneity in trends between treatment and control units.
Third, the relevance of potential violations of the common trend assumption is assessed
drawing on rolling cross sectional as well as panel survey data, exploiting variation in respon-
dent location and time to disentangle (treatment induced) spill-overs from (confounding)
differences in pre-treatment trends.
Finally, where geographic confounders are observable, they will be included in the analysis.
For example, district level controls include election state-year dummies when state governors
(with home advantage) run in general elections (here: Bavaria 2002 and Lower Saxony 1998
and 2002).
3.6 Results
This section reports findings for the 2002 and 2013 floods in Germany along Elbe and Da-
nube. District level data shows that the incumbents generally profit from relief effort. In
northeastern Germany, the federal incumbent gained electorally. In Bavaria, the state level
incumbent is rewarded. Municipality level analysis in northern Germany (Saxony, Saxonia-
Anhalt and Lower Saxony) and southern Bavaria indicates that flood effects are just as large
in close-by compared to directly affected municipalities. Survey data indicates that even
broader spill-overs occured especially in 2002 along the Elbe. Finally, there is substantial
variation in the size of rewards over time, which are much smaller in 2013. This suggests
that voters take past exposure and the campaign environment into account.
17One tradeoff with this strategy is that a geographic SUTVA violation is plausible: With geographic
proximity, the observation of flood response (and consequently information on incumbent quality) is more
likely. Comparing geographically close units then implies comparing treated units among themselves, even
if these are likely to be more balanced with respect to unobservables. Under the assumption that the relief
effect dominates the damage effect, coefficients will be biased towards 0 with this approach.
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3.6.1 District Level Analysis 2002 and 2013
Results for 2002
In the following, results for the Elbe and Danube floods in 2002 and 2013 are reported in
Table 3.1 (Elbe Flood 2002 and Danube Flood 2002, Federal Elections), Table 3.2 (Elbe
Flood 2013 and Danube Flood 2013, Federal Elections) and Table 3.3 (Danube Flood 2013,
State Election).
As can be seen from Table 3.1, along the Elbe the federal incumbent SPD with chancellor
Schro¨der saw an increase in their second vote share, the state incumbent CSU with challenger
Stoiber, governor of Bavaria, increased its vote share along the Danube (in Bavaria). Effects
are large and significant for the Elbe flooded districts (4.5 percentage points in Model 1),
when estimated against the trend in all non-affected and the Elbe states. The effect size drops
to 1.6 percentage points in Model 2, when it is estimated against the trend in not directly
affected districts in all Elbe states. Two explanations for this drop in coefficients between
Model 1 and 2 are possible: Spill-overs to not-directly affected areas, or violations in parallel
trends. Analysis of pre-election district level survey data (reported in Appendix Section B.3)
indicates that spill-overs are the likely explanation, as SPD-support rises sharply in the weeks
after flood exposure. This implies that the true effect in directly affected municipalities is
substantively large with around 4.5 percentage points. This analysis replicates a central
part of Bechtel and Hainmueller (2011), who used electoral district data to show this effect.
Following the argument in Bechtel and Hainmueller (2011) on ‘lasting voter gratitude’, i.e.
that voters still reward the SPD in the next federal election of 2005, I as well report tests
for these temporal spill-overs. For this, I include a lag for the 2002 flood in Model 1 and
2. Contrary to the analysis in Bechtel and Hainmueller (2011), I cannot replicate their
result. This is most likely the case as the temporal spillover effect picked up by Bechtel and
Hainmueller (2011) is due to the geographical concentration of Elbe regions in East Germany,
with East Germany being on a generally more pro-SPD trend in 2005 compared to the rest
of the control group.
Model 3 and 4 recover the effect on electoral returns for the CDU/CSU in Danube-flood-
affected districts. As can be seen from Model 3, flood effects are smaller, with 3.0 percentage
points, and similarly significant. They are similar in size when estimated only on Bavarian
districts.
Hence, for the 2002 Elbe flood the federal incumbent, for the 2002 Danube flood the state
incumbent saw a substantial increase in his vote share in flood affected areas. These results
are especially remarkable for Bavaria, where both state and federal incumbent appeared on
the ballot - electorally, only the former profited. Note that the 2002 electoral bonus for the
state incumbent could be interpreted as a punishment of the federal incumbent (the SPD
lost as the CSU gained electorally) – Appendix Chapter B.4 discusses, why the effects are
consistent with an attribution of responsibility and subsequent rewards to the federal level
along the Elbe and the state level along the Danube.
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Figure 3.1: Map of German district and state boundaries with Elbe and Danube river systems
and disaster districts. The Elbe river system is depicted in light and dark (main tributaries)
blue. The Danube river system is depicted in brown and green (main tributaries). Unaffected
districts in unaffected (affected) states are depicted in light (darker) pink. 2002 and 2013
affected districts are depicted in dark green. Only 2002 (2013) affected districts are depicted
in blue (brown).
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Table 3.1: 2002 Elbe and Danube flood effects on district level
Unaffected and Elbe Elbe States Unaffected and Bavaria Bavaria
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. var.: PR vote share SPD SPD CDU-CSU CSU
Elbe Flood 2002 4.84∗∗∗ 1.65∗∗
(0.70) (0.70)
Lag on Elbe 2002 0.64 -0.28
(0.50) (0.51)
Danube Flood 2002 2.99∗∗∗ 2.85∗∗∗
(0.64) (0.60)
Year 2002 -1.20∗∗∗ 0.64 1.84∗∗∗ 9.78∗∗∗
(0.21) (0.44) (0.22) (0.37)
Year 2005 -6.24∗∗∗ -8.03∗∗∗ -1.29∗∗∗ 0.19
(0.35) (0.70) (0.28) (0.40)
Year 2009 -17.9∗∗∗ -21.2∗∗∗ -5.22∗∗∗ -6.85∗∗∗
(0.38) (0.75) (0.32) (0.50)
Constant 48.6∗∗∗ 52.7∗∗∗ 65.1∗∗∗ -58.0
(6.82) (7.69) (5.64) (52.7)
Economic and political controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1224 548 1060 384
Clusters 306 137 265 96
District level data for Germany (total yearly n=402). Fixed effects estimation with district and election year
fixed effects drawing on 1998-2009. Standard errors clustered by district reported in parentheses. Controls on
population density, share of employed on district population, share of employed in agriculture, in production, in
manufacturing, in construction, in trade, in financial services, in other services, and state incumbent being an SPD
incumbent, as well as SPD or CSU governor running for chancellor included. Control group consists of all districts
in states unaffected by floods and all unaffected districts within states affected by this respective flood. Dependent
variable is the party’s PR vote share as indicated. Respective control group means 2002: 41.31 (SPD, unaffected
and Elbe states), 44.74 (Elbe states only), 45.23 (CDU-CSU, unaffected states and Bavaria), 58.76 (CSU, Bavaria).
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Results for 2013
Turning to the 2013 floods, as can be seen from Table 3.2, in the 2013 federal elections the
federal incumbent CDU/CSU profited along the Elbe (Model 1 and 2), but not along the
Danube (Model 3 and 4). The CDU vote shares in flood-affected regions rose, significant at
the 1% level, by about 2.2 percentage points when compared to the trend of districts in non-
affected and Elbe states. Compared to close-by districts in the Elbe states, the CDU is up
about 1.1 percentage points in flood affected districts (significant at the 5% level). Danube
flood affected districts, on the other hand, show a negative trend of -2.4 percentage points
compared to districts in states unaffected by the flood and Bavaria. This negative trend
however becomes substantially small (-0.35 percentage points) and insignificant with the
control group drawing from Bavaria only. Analysis of pre-election district level survey data
(reported in Appendix Section B.3) indicates that a common trend violation is more likely,
as incumbent support in polling data does not change substantially with disaster occurence.
This indicates that the true effect in directly affected municipalities is substantively small
with around 1.1 percentage points along the Elbe and close to 0 along the Danube for federal
elections.
However, the state incumbent CSU saw positive electoral returns in flood-affected districts
in the State Elections preceding the Federal Elections by one week. As reported in Table 3.3,
flood affected districts show significant (at the 5%-level) positive returns of about 1.6 per-
centage points (Model 1), robust to the inclusion of control variables (Model 2, estimated
effect size of 1.9 percentage points, significant at the 10%-level).
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Table 3.2: 2013 Elbe and Danube flood effects on district level
Unaffected and Elbe Elbe States Unaffected and Bavaria Bavaria
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. var.: PR vote share CDU CDU CDU-CSU CSU
Elbe Flood 2013 2.35∗∗∗ 1.01∗∗
(0.45) (0.49)
Danube Flood 2013 -2.41∗∗∗ -0.38
(0.33) (0.31)
Year 2005 -1.69∗∗∗ -4.58∗∗∗ 0.26 1.02∗∗∗
(0.32) (0.66) (0.30) (0.35)
Year 2009 -1.90∗∗∗ -2.70∗∗∗ -3.22∗∗∗ -5.46∗∗∗
(0.35) (0.79) (0.33) (0.39)
Year 2013 6.43∗∗∗ 6.04∗∗∗ 4.49∗∗∗ 1.59∗∗∗
(0.36) (0.70) (0.36) (0.45)
Constant 21.4∗∗∗ 24.8∗∗∗ 59.9∗∗∗ 69.5∗∗∗
(4.82) (6.23) (5.61) (7.11)
Economic and political controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1224 548 1060 384
Clusters 306 137 265 96
District level data for Germany (total yearly n=402). Fixed effects estimation with district and election year fixed
effects drawing on 1998 and 2005-2013. Standard errors clustered by district reported in parentheses. Controls
on population density, share of employed on district population, share of employed in agriculture, in production,
in manufacturing, in construction, in trade, in financial services, in other services, and state incumbent being an
SPD incumbent, as well as SPD or CSU governor running for chancellor included. The treatment group consists
of districts flooded at respective river. Control group consists of all districts in states unaffected by floods and all
unaffected districts within states affected by this respective flood. Dependent variable is the party’s PR vote share
as indicated. Respective control group means 2013: 40.95 (CDU, unaffected and Elbe states), 39.36 (CDU, Elbe
states only), 44.27 (CDU-CSU, unaffected states and Bavaria), 49.60 (CSU, Bavaria).
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Table 3.3: 2013 flood effects on district level in Bavaria for state elections
Bavaria
(1) (2)
Dep. var: PR vote share CSU CSU
Floods in district 1.57∗∗ 1.88∗
(0.63) (0.98)
Year 2008 -17.3∗∗∗
(0.46)
Year 2013 -13.3∗∗∗ 3.94∗∗∗
(0.32) (1.08)
Constant 60.9∗∗∗ 35.7
(0.22) (36.5)
Economic and political controls No Yes
N 270 180
Clusters 90 90
Voting district data for State Level Elections in Bavaria
(total yearly n=90). Fixed effects estimation with district
and election year fixed effects drawing on the 2003, 2008
and 2013 state election. Standard errors clustered by dis-
trict reported in parentheses. Control variables include
log of population, share of employed, share of immigrants,
incoming migration, construction work, district tax in-
come, district debt, district affected by ‘relatives affair’
and allowing for a distinct time trend for northern Bava-
ria. Control variables only available for 2008 and 2013.
Dependent variable is the CSU total PR vote share in an
electoral district. Respective control group mean 2013:
46.67 (CSU, Bavaria).
These results indicate that the federal incumbent CDU/CSU was electorally rewarded
for flood management, but only in Elbe-affected states, and to substantially a lesser extent
compared to 2002 with about 1 percentage point. Similar to 2002, along the Danube, flood
exposure did not relate positively to the electoral performance of the federal incumbent.
Voters rewarded the state incumbent at the Bavarian state elections, but again to a lesser
extent as in 2002. Expressing the treatment effects as a share of control group means18, the
18Drawing on the coefficients for the main specifications Model 1 and 3 in Table 3.1, and Model 2 in
Tables 3.2 and 3.3.
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effect size varies between about 12% for the Elbe 2002, 7% for the Danube 2002, 3% for the
Elbe 2013 and 4% for the Danube 2013. This gives an indication for the substantially smaller
effects in 2013 as compared to 2002.
3.6.2 Municipality Level Spill-Overs for 2002 and 2013
Municipality level data allows for a fine grained assessment of spill-over effects. For this,
effects for directly affected municipalities (i.e. municipalities along the flooded rivers) are
contrasted to indirectly affected municipalities (i.e. other municipalities in affected districts)
and municipalities more distant from the flood regions in the states of Saxony, Saxonia-Anhalt
and Lower Saxony (Elbe) and southern Bavaria (Danube).
Table 3.4 reports results for affected municipalities along Elbe (Model 1) and Danube
(Model 2) in 2002. Affected municipalities along the Elbe see a large increase in SPD vote
shares of 4.7 percentage points. This effect is similarly large in close-by municipalities in
affected districts (4.3 percentage points) and even higher in other non-affected municipalities
of East Germany (5.4 percentage points). For Danube affected municipalities, estimated
effects are smaller (1.0 percentage points), with slightly larger effects in close-by municipalities
(1.3 percentage points).
Table 3.5 reports results for federal elections in affected municipalities along Elbe (Model
1) and Danube (Model 2) in 2013. Along the Elbe, effects are at about 1.2 percentage
points for directly affected municipalities, slightly higher in close-by regions and estimated
substantially larger (4.0 percentage points) in other, non-affected municipalities in the East.
In southern Bavaria, affected municipalities see a slight decline in CSU vote shares of about
0.5 percentage points (Model 2), with a similarly large effect in close-by municipalities for
state elections. However, for the state elections, CSU vote shares did increase significantly
by about 1.9 percentage points (Model 3). Effects are significant at the 1%-level.
These results are consistent with the district level results and lend additional detail to
the overall picture: Within affected districts, strong spill-over effects are present.
3.6.3 Robustness
Besides the consistency of district level and the more fine-grained municipality level analysis,
I provide a summary below for additional tests with the data:
I conducted the following robustness tests for the district level regressions, aimed at
lending plausibility to the underlying assumption of parallel trends:
Appendix Table B.2 reports results for the main specifications of Tables 3.1 and 3.2 with
the dependent variable being the respective competitor party. As expected, results mirror
the analysis in the main tables – i.e. when the SPD profits, the CDU looses and vice-versa.
This implies that parallel trend violations for specific parties are unlikely to bias results.
Appendix Table B.3 reports results restricting the time fixed effects to the preceding
legislative period only. Results are robust to this estimation strategy, although less strong
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Table 3.4: 2002 flood Effects on municipality level - Elbe and Bavaria
Elbe Municipalities Danube Municipalities
(1) (2)
Dep. var.: PR vote share SPD CSU
Affected municipality 4.53∗∗∗ 1.03∗∗∗
(0.17) (0.25)
Other municipality in affected district 4.21∗∗∗ 1.33∗∗∗
(0.22) (0.23)
Other non-affected municipalities in East 5.27∗∗∗
(0.22)
Election year 2002 3.64∗∗∗ 8.04∗∗∗
(0.21) (0.22)
Election year 1998 5.34∗∗∗ -5.11∗∗∗
(0.18) (0.16)
Election year 1994 -1.07∗∗∗
(0.11)
Population controls Yes Yes
N 2340 5296
Clusters 1061 1324
Municipality level data for the states of Saxonia (1998-2013), Saxonia Anhalt (1994-2013), Lower
Saxony (1998-2013) (all Elbe affected) and Bavaria (1990-2013) (Danube). Observations in Ba-
varia are restricted to southern Bavaria. Fixed effects estimation with municipality and election
year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by district reported in parentheses.
for the Elbe. This implies that parallel trends violations are unlikely to stem from flood-
unaffected years.
Finally, Appendix Table B.4 reports results of a fixed effects regression with individual
slopes (Bru¨derl and Ludwig, 2015, 374f.). This approach relaxes the necessary parallel trends
assumption altogether and allows for individual district-level trends in party vote shares.
Results are generally robust, besides the positive coefficient for CDU vote shares along the
Elbe 2013, which is still positive, though close to zero and insignificant.
For the municipality level, I conducted a test drawing on geographic proximity and ma-
tching (comp. for a similar approach Keele, Titiunik, and Zubizarreta, 2015), aimed at
creating better balance on unobservables and lending credibility to the causality of main
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Table 3.5: 2013 flood effects on municipality level in the Elbe states and southern Bavaria
Elbe States Southern Bavaria
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. var.: PR vote share CSU CSU CSU
Other municipality in affected district 1.22∗∗∗ -0.53∗∗∗ 2.21∗∗∗
(0.24) (0.15) (0.26)
Affected municipality 1.19∗∗∗ -0.50∗∗∗ 1.86∗∗∗
(0.25) (0.16) (0.30)
Rest of eastern Germany 3.96∗∗∗
(0.43)
Year 2009 2.33∗∗∗ -8.66∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.096)
Year 2013 9.13∗∗∗ -0.49∗∗∗ -15.2∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.11) (0.18)
Year 2008 -20.5∗∗∗
(0.14)
Population controls Yes Yes Yes
N 3183 3972 3972
Clusters 1061 1324 1324
Municipality level data for federal elections (Model 1) for the states of Saxonia
(2005-2013), Saxonia Anhalt (2005-2013), Lower Saxony (2005-2013) (all Elbe
affected) and for federal (Model 2) and state elections (Model 3) for Bavaria
(2005-2013) (Danube). Observations in Bavaria are restricted to southern Ba-
varia. Fixed effects estimation with municipality and election year fixed effects.
Standard errors clustered by district reported in parentheses. Control variables
include log of population and population density. Estimated constant is not
shown.
treatment effects: Appendix Table B.5 reports results from nearest neighbor matching on
latitude and longitude of municipality centroids as well as population density and log po-
pulation. Results generally confirm the effects for directly affected municipalities, with the
exception of the Elbe 2002. There, the treatment effect is still positive, but strong spillovers
likely bias against finding effects for directly affected as opposed to close-by not directly
affected municipalities.
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Finally, Table 3.6 and Table 3.7 lend support to the results found for Elbe and Danube
2013: Table 3.6 estimates a fixed effects regression for a panel of the voting-age population
between 2009 and 2013. In Elbe-flooded districts, the evaluation of the CDU/CSU and
Merkel increases significantly by about 0.6 points on a 10-point scale. For the evaluation of
CDU/CSU, this is as well the case in East Germany. In Bavaria and other unaffected districts,
no change in evaluations appears. Similarly, drawing on two cross-sections on Bavarian state
level, the attitude towards the CSU (Model 1 and 2) and incumbent Seehofer (Model 3 and 4)
increased significantly for flood affected districts, as can be seen from the interaction term in
Table 3.7 (by about 0.5 points, robust for the ex- (Model 1 and 3) or inclusion (Model 2 and
4) of individual level controls). Such survey data is not available for the 2002 time-period.
Table 3.6: 2013 panel data on CDU and Merkel rating
Rating on 10 point scale of
(1) (2)
CDU Merkel
Respondent in Elbe flood 2013 district 0.58∗ 0.62∗∗
(0.31) (0.29)
Other district in East Germany 0.48∗ -0.19
(0.27) (0.27)
Respondent in Danube flood 2013 district -0.065 -0.10
(0.21) (0.23)
Other district in Bavaria -0.061 0.13
(0.20) (0.22)
Constant 5.57∗∗∗ 6.30∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.056)
Panel wave effects Yes Yes
N 5972 6029
Clusters 1002 1002
Estimation with observation and time fixed effects. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Panel data (n=1002) from GESIS fielding in several waves in 2009
and 2013; observations from post-election wave in 2009 and pre-election waves
in 2013 used. Post-flood waves (all in 2013) coded as affected if respondent from
disaster district.
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Table 3.7: 2013 cross-sectional survey data on CSU and Seehofer rating
Rating on 10 Point Scale of
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CSU CSU Seehofer Seehofer
Flood in 2013 in district=1 -0.10 -0.25∗ 0.027 -0.067
(0.14) (0.15) (0.17) (0.16)
Flood in 2013 in district=1 × 2013=1 0.51∗∗ 0.46∗∗ 0.53∗∗ 0.47∗∗
(0.23) (0.21) (0.24) (0.22)
2013=1 0.33∗ 0.18 -0.17 -0.13
(0.18) (0.16) (0.21) (0.17)
Constant 5.64∗∗∗ 6.00∗∗∗ 5.77∗∗∗ 6.12∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.18) (0.15) (0.18)
Individual controls No Yes No Yes
Region controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 7766 7753 7601 7590
Data from two pooled cross-sections from 2011 (on state-level smoking referendum
in Bavaria, n=3,036) and 2013 (on state election survey from Making Electoral De-
mocracy Works project, n=4,730). Treatment effect estimated by interaction term of
year effect and Danube-flood affected electoral district. Standard errors, clustered by
district, in parentheses. Control variables include year effect, as well interacted with
‘relatives affair’ in district in 2013, respondent female, age categories, household size,
religion, dummies for low education, high education, self-identified ‘left’, self-identified
‘right’.
Overall, robustness tests with survey data and additional specifications and estimation
strategies for the district and municipality level data lend support to the results presented
above.
3.6.4 Discussion
In line with the literature, this chapter shows that effective disaster management is associated
with positive electoral prospects of incumbents. This finding is in line with a retrospective
reward-punishment model (Ferejohn, 1986), where effective disaster relief is electorally rewar-
ded by affected constituents. However, this results are consistent with a prospective selection
model as well. Three additional findings require a more detailed discussion:
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First of all, electoral rewards are similar in directly affected and close-by municipalities.
This is a strong indication that what Lazarev, Sobolev, Soboleva, and Sokolov (2014) called
‘demonstration effects’ is driving the observed aggregate response and, more generally, is con-
sistent with a prospective accountability model (Fearon, 1999). As the size of the population
directly affected by a disaster will regularly be low relative to the eligible population, this
is actually the relevant group for assessing the overall political effects of natural disasters.
For example, only about 13% of the German electorate (7.7 of 62 million) actually live in
flood-affected districts. Within these, only about 60% actually live in flood affected commu-
nities.19 Again, within these only a margin has experienced a direct threat and/or damage
from the floods20 As unaffected municipalities, and thus unaffected households, show strong
reactions to the disaster, it is likely that overall the electoral response is driven by these
‘demonstration effects’. This argument is important, as it adds a new theoretical interpreta-
tions to the disaster literature: So far, the accountability literature drawing on disasters as
external shocks considers primarily the ‘affected’ population, i.e. those citizens experiencing
damage (and disaster relief), being evacuated and/or saved, and links this to retrospective
and psychological voting models (comp. review of Oliver and Reeves, 2015). It is e.g. ar-
gued that this population shows ‘voter gratitude’ (Bechtel and Hainmueller, 2011) following
disaster relief and/or is ‘myopic’ towards disaster preparedness (Healy and Malhotra, 2009).
The relevance of ‘demonstration effects’ highlights, however, that much broader processes
are going on: natural disasters reveal information on the quality of the incumbent to the
public, and this can, as indicated especially for the 2002 flood, make a large difference for
voting behavior. Evidence on this can be seen from survey data: Figure 3.2 displays rolling
cross-sectional survey data, aggregated to monthly evaluations of the SPD for untreated sta-
tes, flooded districts along the Elbe and unflooded districts in 2002 eastern Germany. On
the one hand side, this assesses whether the positive effects replicate in survey data as well
(comp. similar analysis in Bechtel and Hainmueller, 2011). On the other hand, I thereby
evaluate whether the behavior of voters in adjacent areas follows similar temporal patterns.
As can be seen, the evaluation of the SPD increases substantially with flood onset in the
beginning of August in all three regions. This increase is even steepest in non-affected for-
mer East German districts. One note of caution concerns the upward trending evaluation
of the SPD in Elbe flooded states already in July.21 Such changes are not expected from
retrospective accountability models, but can be explained with forward looking incumbent
evaluations (Thurner and Pappi, 1998).
19Based on the sample of communities at hand from Bavaria, Lower Saxony, Saxony and Saxonia-Anhalt.
20Rough calculation leads to an upper bound of 17% of the population in affected districts and 28% of
the population in affected municipalities being directly affected. These figures are calculated by the share
of all people evacuated (85.000) and an upper bound for households experiencing damage ((insured damages
(180.000) / share of households insured against disaster damage (0.32)) * average household size (2.01) =
1.301.475) (Bundesregierung, 2013).
21Appendix Figures B.1-B.3 show the same evaluations for Danube 2002 and Elbe and Danube 2013. No
similarly strong patterns are observed there.
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Figure 3.2: Share of voters intending to vote SPD in 2002. The figure reports average
monthly vote intention for the ‘SPD’ by subgroups. Respondents are a random drawn of
a Germany wide rolling cross-section (average weekly n=2500, Forsa Study Nr ZA3909).
Yellow bars depict 90%-confidence intervals. Subgroups are coded through electoral precincts.
Respondents declaring to abstain, giving no answer or reporting to be undecided are excluded.
Second, the attribution of responsibility is key for explaining electoral changes. The
observed effects imply that federal incumbents were attributed the response in the states along
the Elbe, while state incumbents were attributed the response in Bavaria. This is surprising,
as the costs of disaster relief were split between state and federal level and the forces on the
ground were as well both federal and state forces working hand in hand. Survey evidence
from 2013 is consistent with this presumption: Table 3.7 reports the change in rating of state
incumbent Seehofer and his party CSU along the Danube in a cross sectional difference-in-
differences set up. In flooded districts, both ratings increase. This increase is substantial with
an average of about 0.5 points on a 10-point-scale. The effect stands in contrast to evaluations
of Merkel and the CDU (estimated from a 2009-2013 panel of respondents): As indicated
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in Table 3.6, the Merkel/CDU rating improved in Elbe affected districts to a similar extent,
but not along the Danube. The similar effects for incumbent and party ratings indicate
that effects work both through the evaluation of the incumbent and through his/her party.
Still, future research has to explore in more detail the factors that led to this differential
attribution. Both the aggregate and the survey evidence indicate that the attribution of
response to political actors is not straightforward, even when administrative arrangements
are relatively transparent. Lazarev, Sobolev, Soboleva, and Sokolov (2014) highlighted the
importance of visits on the ground, in an effort to gain visibility. This is an aspect that could
matter here as well. For 2002, Appendix Section B.4 summarizes anecdotal evidence that
patterns of federal and state incumbent visits in flooded areas go along with the later observed
electoral rewards. Alternative explanations are possible, though. Malhotra and Kuo (2008)
e.g. emphasize the importance of both partisan bias and adequate information. Especially
partisan bias could have led in the CSU stronghold Bavaria to an attribution of disaster
management with the state incumbent only. Even more, the role of the federal government
was likely more pronounced along the Elbe, where disaster relief and flood management had
to be coordinated among multiple states.
Third, the difference in absolute and relative effect size in 2002 and 2013 deserves an
explanation. Despite a similar socio-economic environment and similar aggregate disaster
impact, the floods differed in their aggregate electoral implications. Below, I point to time
discounting as most plausible explanation. This highlights as well that voters experience
biases when holding governments to account, in line with psychological voting models.
Given previous findings in the literature, the difference between a four month and a two
month duration between flood onset and election should not be that consequential. Existing
research on natural disasters and accountability e.g. estimates effects with much longer time-
spans: e.g. Cole, Healy, and Werker (2012) estimate for Indian voters a cut-off of a one-year
time period when disasters do no longer impact aggregate electoral outcomes. Similarly,
Lazarev, Sobolev, Soboleva, and Sokolov (2014) note increased government support one year
after forest fires in Russia. Bechtel and Hainmueller (2011) and Eriksson (2016) even argue
for a persistent influence of natural disasters on vote choice over several electoral cycles. Still,
even if an especially high impact of the disaster just before election day could be expected (as
e.g. argued by Chen, 2013), the drops in coefficient size are unexpected. However, Figures
3.3 and Figure 3.4 show that even these extreme events quickly disappear from the minds
of voters (see as well Bytzek, 2008). As can be seen from both figures, with flood onset
the flood was the most important topic both in affected districts/states and in the rest of
Germany. However, the interest in the floods reached its peak 2-3 weeks into the disaster
and quickly faded afterwards. While the 2002 flood was still among the top issues for some
voters at election day, it was not in 2013.22 Similarly, federal incumbent support along the
22Bytzek (2008), based on polling data, the timing of symbolic crisis management events and newspaper
reporting even argues that 2002 effects could have been larger, had the 2002 elections occurred two weeks
closer to the 2002 floods.
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Figure 3.3: Share of population seeing the flood as top two problem in Germany 2002 before
elections. The figure reports average weekly mentioning of ‘Floods’ as top two most important
problem in the country by subgroups. Respondents are a random draw of a Germany wide
rolling cross-section (average weekly n=2500, Forsa Study Nr ZA3909). Yellow bars depict
90%-confidence intervals. Subgroups are coded through electoral precincts.
Elbe in 2002 saw a remarkable spike just after the floods and into election day - only to fade
quickly and even below pre-flood levels just afterwards in flood affected, close-by and more
distant districts (comp. Figure 3.2). Especially if ‘demonstration effects’ among non-affected
voters are driving the aggregate response, this temporal patter could explain the reduction in
effect strength. The information gained with disaster management was potentially replaced
with other relevant campaign events in the meantime. However, this interpretation highlights
the role of psychological biases in the retrospective performance evaluation of governments
(Healy and Malhotra, 2013). If time is that critical, time discounting could be incorporated
into theoretical models when comparing different informational signals over time. Further
evidence from Huber, Hill, and Lenz (2012) indicates that the temporal dimension likely
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Figure 3.4: Share of population seeing the flood as top two problem in Germany 2013 before
elections. The figure reports average weekly mentioning of ‘Floods’ as top two most impor-
tant problem in the country by subgroups. Respondents are a random draw of a Germany
wide rolling cross-section in 2013 with 18 pre-election waves (average weekly n=1700, Polit-
barometer Study Nr ZA5677). Yellow bars depict 90%-confidence intervals. Subgroups are
coded through states.
plays an important role. They similarly report that subjects in a lab experiment weigh the
most recent information more heavily in evaluating incumbents and note that this limits the
application of retrospective voting theory - just as well as the selection perspective.23
23I discuss alternative explanations for this differential flood response between 2002 and 2013 related to
expectations of government performance, expected challenger behavior and disaster preparedness in Appendix
Section B.5.
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3.7 Conclusion
This chapter analyzes the linkage between disaster management and voting behavior following
large scale river floods in the Danube and Elbe river systems of northern and southern
Germany in 2002 and again in 2013. Due to idiosyncrasies in candidate selection and election
timing, the electoral performance of the federal incumbent can be analyzed for the Elbe flood,
and the electoral performance of the federal and the state incumbent for the Danube flood.
I report a general picture of electoral rewards over the four cases, in line with the literature
(e.g. Lazarev, Sobolev, Soboleva, and Sokolov, 2014; Bechtel and Hainmueller, 2011; Cole,
Healy, and Werker, 2012; Fair, Kuhn, Malhotra, and Shapiro, 2017; Gasper and Reeves, 2011;
Healy and Malhotra, 2009). In Elbe flood affected districts, the federal incumbent profits,
in Danube flood affected districts the state incumbent – pointing to the importance of the
attribution of policy to actors. Most importantly, large spillovers of a similar magnitude
as the main effect to non-affected areas are present within affected districts – an indication
that voters learn on the incumbent’s type through disaster management, consistent with a
selection model of accountability. The present analysis hence goes beyond the argumentation
that beneficial policy after disasters (e.g. household-level aid) leads to retrospective rewards
by affected voters (comp. e.g. Healy and Malhotra, 2009; Bechtel and Hainmueller, 2011) and
indicates that the electorate sees government policy as an information signal for incumbent
quality and future performance. Future research could investigate, which dimensions of
incumbent quality are affected. It has e.g. been argued that the handling of the 2002 disaster
was interpreted as indication of strong leadership skill Pappi, Shikano, and Bytzek (2004).
While incumbents have profited largely from effective disaster relief in 2002, they did
less so in 2013. In relation to the average control group incumbent vote share, the effect size
amounts to 12% for the Elbe flood 2002 and 7% for the Danube flood 2002, but only 3% for the
Elbe flood in 2013 and 4% for the Danube flood in 2013. Evidence from weekly cross-sectional
data implies that even such extreme events fade quickly from the minds of voters. The
smaller average 2013 effect is therefore consistent with the slightly larger timespan between
flood event and election in 2013. More broadly, this implies that voters face psychological
hurdles when assessing retrospective performance of incumbents and that recency effects are
important (Healy and Lenz, 2014).
The observations in this chapter tie to a larger literature on the electoral consequences of
distributional policy. It has been observed that incumbents use their discretionary power to
deploy federal funds for strategic means (e.g. Francken, Minten, and Swinnen, 2012; Garrett
and Sobel, 2003; Neumayer, Plu¨mper, and Barthel, 2014; Reeves, 2011; Brollo and Nannicini,
2012). This could well be true in the case at hand, as especially the former East Germany
is considered to have a large share of swing voters (Hough, 2003). The differing rewards
for federal and state incumbents as well suggest that policy making could be strategically
employed. However, in the analysis at hand these strategic factors are likely held constant
over cases. Future research should track to what extent this plays a role (e.g. by exploring
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the level of disaster relief effort with larger temporal distance to elections) and how voters
react in this strategic interaction (Gailmard and Patty, 2014).
The analysis speaks as well to the literature on ‘blind’ retrospection. This literature asses-
ses whether natural disasters per se24 influence incumbent evaluations and are an indication
of irrelevant events influencing voter behavior, with mixed results: Some see a relationship
(e.g. Achen and Bartels (2004, 2016); Heersink, Peterson, and Jenkins (2017)) others, in part
reanalyzing this data refute a relationship (e.g. Fowler and Hall (2016); Remmer (2014)).
The results presented here indicate that the post-disaster management of the shock might
be the important variable to look at. While disaster occurrence is external to the political
system, the politician’s reaction to the disaster is not and might well be taken up by voters
as a signal of her quality. This allows for a reinterpretation of prominent findings: Achen
and Bartels (2004) argue that coastal communities in New Jersey affected by the 1916 shark
attacks irrationally punished the incumbent president for events outside his control. But
besides ‘blind’ retrospection, an in the eyes of voters insufficient cushioning of this shock
might just have signaled lacking quality and led to this electoral reaction.
Finally, as the world faces and will face an expected increase in the frequency of severe
natural disasters (IPCC 2013), understanding the political consequences of natural disasters
and especially their recurrence becomes important. The case at hand is a unique example
in this regard, with two centennial floods affecting the very same river systems within a
decade. The heterogeneity of electoral reactions over cases points to the need of additional
research: How does repeated disaster exposure change voting behavior over a longer time
period? When and to what extent do citizens demand more effort in disaster relief? What
role do prior beliefs on incumbent and challenger quality play? Answering these questions
will be important in a world where disasters of large magnitude will not only become more
frequent, but will likely occur within geographical clusters (IPCC 2013).
24See for other events influencing personal livelihoods, though not caused by politicians Bagues and Esteve-
Volart (2016), Healy, Malhotra, and Mo (2010), Busby, Druckman, and Fredenhall (2016), but Fowler and
Montagnes (2015) and Healy, Malhotra, and Mo (2015).
Chapter References 89
Chapter References
Achen, C. H., and L. M. Bartels (2004): “Blind Retrospection. Electoral Responses to
Drought, Flu, and Shark Attacks,” Estudio/Working Papers (Centro de Estudios Avanza-
dos en Ciencias Sociales), No. 199, pp. 1–40.
Achen, C. H., and L. M. Bartels (2016): Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do
Not Produce Responsive Government. Princeton University Press, Princeton.
AG Hochwasser (2002): “Hochwasser 2002 im Land Sachsen-Anhalt: Auswertung des
Katastrophenschutzmanagements,” Arbeitsgruppe Hochwasser 2002 unter Leitung des Re-
ferats 25 im Ministerium des Inneren, Sachsen-Anhalt.
Alt, J., E. Bueno de Mesquita, and S. Rose (2011): “Disentangling Accountability
and Competence in Elections: Evidence from U.S. Term Limits,” The Journal of Politics,
73(1), 171–186.
Anderson, C. J. (2007): “The End of Economic Voting? Contingency Dilemmas and the
Limits of Democratic Accountability,” Annual Review of Political Science, 10(1), 271–296.
Arzheimer, K., and J. W. Falter (2003): “Ist der Osten wirklich rot? Das Wahlverhalten
bei der Bundestagswahl 2002 in Ost-West-Perspektive,” Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte,
September, 27–35.
Ashworth, S. (2012): “Electoral Accountability: Recent Theoretical and Empirical Work,”
Annual Review of Political Science, 15(1), 183–201.
Ashworth, S., and E. Bueno De Mesquita (2014): “Is Voter Competence Good for Vo-
ters?: Information, Rationality, and Democratic Performance,” American Political Science
Review, 108(3), 565–587.
Ashworth, S., E. Bueno de Mesquita, and A. Friedenberg (2017): “Accountability
and Information in Elections,” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 9(2), 95–
138.
Ashworth, S., E. Bueno De Mesquita, and A. Friedenberg (2017): “Learning
About Voter Rationality,” American Journal of Political Science, in press.
Bagues, M., and B. Esteve-Volart (2016): “Politicians’ Luck of the Draw: Evidence
from the Spanish Christmas Lottery,” Journal of Political Economy, 124(5), 1269–1294.
Barro, R. J. (1973): “The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model,” Public Choice,
74(Spring), 19–42.
90 Chapter References
Bechtel, M. M., and J. Hainmueller (2011): “How Lasting Is Voter Gratitude? An
Analysis of the Short- and Long-Term Electoral Returns to Beneficial Policy,” American
Journal of Political Science, 55(4), 852–868.
BfG (2014): “Das Hochwasserextrem des Jahres 2013 in Deutschland: Dokumentation und
Analyse,” Bundesanstalt fu¨r Gewa¨sserkunde - Mitteilungen, 31.
Blo¨schl, G., T. Nester, J. Komma, J. Parajka, and R. A. P. Perdiga˜o (2013):
“The June 2013 Flood in the Upper Danube Basin, and Comparisons With the 2002, 1954
and 1899 Floods,” Hydrology and Earth System Sciences, 17(12), 5197–5212.
BMI (2013): “Flutkatastrophe 2013: Katalog der Hilfeleistungen,” Discussion Paper August,
Stab Fluthilfe im Bundesministerium des Innern [German Federal Ministry of the Interior].
BMVg (2002): “Hochwasserkatastrophe im August 2002: Einsatz der Bundeswehr,” Dis-
cussion Paper August, Bundesministerium der Verteidigung [German Federal Ministry of
Defense].
Bodet, M. A., M. Thomas, and C. Tessier (2016): “Come Hell or High Water: An
Investigation of the Effects of a Natural Disaster on a Local Election,” Electoral Studies,
43, 85–94.
Brollo, F., and T. Nannicini (2012): “Tying Your Enemy’s Hands in Close Races: The
Politics of Federal Transfers in Brazil,” American Political Science Review, 106(4), 1–20.
Bru¨derl, J. (2010): “Kausalanalyse mit Paneldaten,” in Handbuch der sozialwissenschaft-
lichen Datenanalyse, ed. by C. Wolf, and H. Best, chap. 36, pp. 963–994. VS Verlag fu¨r
Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden.
Bru¨derl, J., and V. Ludwig (2015): “Fixed-Effects Panel Regression,” in The SAGE
Handbook of Regression Analysis and Causal Inference, ed. by H. Best, and C. Wolf, pp.
327–357. SAGE Publications, London.
Bundesregierung (2013): “Bericht zur Flutkatastrophe 2013: Katastrophenhilfe, Ent-
scha¨digung, Wiederaufbau,” Discussion Paper September, Stab Fluthilfe im Bundesminis-
terium des Inneren [German Federal Ministry of the Interior].
Busby, E. C., J. N. Druckman, and A. Fredenhall (2016): “The Political Relevance
of Irrelevant Events,” mimeo, pp. 1–13.
Bytzek, E. (2007): Ereignisse und ihre Wirkung auf die Popularita¨t von Regierungen:
Von der Schleyer-Entfu¨hrung zur Elbeflut, vol. 6 of Studien zur Wahl- und Einstellungs-
forschung. Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1 edn.
Chapter References 91
(2008): “Flood Response and Political Survival: Gerhard Schro¨der and the 2002
Elbe Flood in Germany,” in Governing after Crisis: The Politics of Investigation, Accoun-
tability and Learning, ed. by A. Boin, A. McConnell, and P. t. Hart. Cambridge University
Press.
Carlin, R. E., G. J. Love, and E. J. Zechmeister (2014): “Natural Disaster and
Democratic Legitimacy: The Public Opinion Consequences of Chile’s 2010 Earthquake
and Tsunami,” Political Research Quarterly, 67(1), 3–15.
Chen, J. (2013): “Voter Partisanship and the Effect of Distributive Spending on Political
Participation,” American Journal of Political Science, 57(1), 200–217.
Cole, S., A. Healy, and E. Werker (2012): “Do Voters Demand Responsive Govern-
ments? Evidence from Indian Disaster Relief,” Journal of Development Economics, 97(2),
167–181.
CSU (2013): “Hochwasser-Katastrophe 2013: Koalition hilft schnell und unbu¨rokratisch,”
Discussion paper, CSU Landesgruppe, Deutscher Bundestag.
De Vries, C. E., and H. Solaz (2017): “The Electoral Consequences of Corruption,”
Annual Review of Political Science, 20(1), 391–408.
Deaton, A. (2010): “Instruments, Randomization, and Learning about Development,”
Journal of Economic Literature, 48(June), 424–455.
Dewan, T., and K. A. Shepsle (2011): “Political Economy Models of Elections,” Annual
Review of Political Science, 14(1), 311–330.
Downs, A. (1957): An Economic Theory of Democracy. Harper, New York.
Eilders, C., K. Degenhardt, P. Herrmann, and M. von der Lippe (2004): “Surfing
the Tide: An Analysis of Party and Issue Coverage in the National Election Campaign
2002,” German Politics, 13(2), 218–242.
Eriksson, L. M. (2016): “Winds of Change: Voter Blame and Storm Gudrun in the 2006
Swedish Parliamentary Election,” Electoral Studies, 41, 129–142.
Fair, C. C., P. M. Kuhn, N. Malhotra, and J. N. Shapiro (2017): “Natural Disas-
ters and Political Engagement: Evidence from the 2010-11 Pakistani Floods,” Quarterly
Journal of Political Science, 12(1), 99–141.
Fearon, J. D. (1999): “Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians,” in Demo-
cracy, Accountability and Representation, ed. by A. Przeworski, S. C. Stokes, and B. Manin,
chap. 2, pp. 55–97. Cambridge Univ Press, Cambridge [a.o.].
92 Chapter References
Ferejohn, J. (1986): “Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control,” Public Choice,
50(1), 5–25.
Fiorina, M. P. (1981): Retrospective Voting in American National Elections. Yale Univer-
sity Press, New Haven.
Fowler, A., and A. B. Hall (2016): “Do Shark Attacks Influence Presidential Elections?
Reassessing a Prominent Finding on Voter Competence,” mimeo, pp. 1–28.
Fowler, A., and B. P. Montagnes (2015): “College Football, Elections, and False-
Positive Results in Observational Research,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Scien-
ces of the United States of America, 112(45), 13800–13804.
Francken, N., B. Minten, and J. F. M. Swinnen (2012): “The Political Economy of
Relief Aid Allocation: Evidence from Madagascar,” World Development, 40(3), 486–500.
Gaillard, J.-C., C. C. Liamzon, and J. D. Villanueva (2007): “Natural’ Disaster?
A Retrospect into the Causes of the Late-2004 Typhoon Disaster in Eastern Luzon, Phi-
lippines,” Environmental Hazards, 7(4), 257–270.
Gailmard, S. (2014): “Accountability and Principal-Agent Theory,” in The Oxford Hand-
book of Public Accountability, ed. by M. Bovens, R. E. Goodin, and T. Schillemans. Oxford
University Press, Oxford [a.o.].
Gailmard, S., and J. W. Patty (2014): “Preventing Prevention,” mimeo.
Garrett, T. A., and R. S. Sobel (2003): “The Political Economy of FEMA Disaster
Payments,” Economic Inquiry, 41(3), 496–509.
Gasper, J. T., and A. Reeves (2011): “Make It Rain? Retrospection and the Attentive
Electorate in the Context of Natural Disasters,” American Journal of Political Science,
55(2), 340–355.
Healy, A., and G. S. Lenz (2014): “Substituting the End for the Whole: Why Voters
Respond Primarily to the Election-Year Economy,” American Journal of Political Science,
58(1), 31–47.
Healy, A., and N. Malhotra (2009): “Myopic Voters and Natural Disaster Policy,”
American Political Science Review, 103(3), 387.
(2010): “Random Events, Economic Losses, and Retrospective Voting: Implications
for Democratic Competence,” Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 5(2), 193–208.
(2013): “Retrospective Voting Reconsidered,” Annual Review of Political Science,
16(1), 285–306.
Chapter References 93
Healy, A., N. Malhotra, and C. H. Mo (2015): “Determining False-Positives Requires
Considering the Totality of Evidence,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
of the United States of America, 112(48), E6591.
Healy, A. J., N. Malhotra, and C. H. Mo (2010): “Irrelevant Events Affect Voters’
Evaluations of Government Performance,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
of the United States of America, 107(29), 12804–12809.
Heersink, B., B. D. Peterson, and J. A. Jenkins (2017): “Disasters and Elections: Es-
timating the Net Effect of Damage and Relief in Historical Perspective,” Political Analysis,
25, 260–268.
HND (2002): “Hochwasser 2002 Bayern,” Discussion paper, Hochwassernachrichtendienst
Bayern.
Hoff, B.-I., and D. Hough (2014): “Not Much Ado About Quite a Lot? The German
Election of September 2013,” Representation, 50(1), 129–137.
Hogwood, P. (2004): “The Chancellor-candidates and the Campaign,” German Politics,
13(2), 243–267.
Hough, D. (2003): “It’s the East Stupid!’ Eastern Germany and the Outcome of the 2002
Bundestagswahl,” Representation, 39(2), 137–145.
Huber, G. a., S. J. Hill, and G. S. Lenz (2012): “Sources of Bias in Retrospective De-
cision Making: Experimental Evidence on Voters’ Limitations in Controlling Incumbents,”
American Political Science Review, 106(4), 720–741.
IPCC (2013): “Working Group I Contribution to the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report, Cli-
mate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis,” International Panel on Climate Change,
AR5(March 2013), 2014.
Kahneman, D. (2003): “Maps of Bounded Rationality: Economicst Psychology for Beha-
vioral Economics,” The American Economic Review, 93(5), 1449–1475.
Keele, L., R. Titiunik, and J. R. Zubizarreta (2015): “Enhancing a Geographic
Regression Discontinuity Design Through Matching to Estimate the Effect of Ballot Initi-
atives on Voter Turnout,” Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series A: Statistics in
Society, 178(1), 223–239.
Key, V. O. (1966): The Responsible Electorate. Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
Kiewiet, D. R., and D. Rivers (1984): “A Retrospective on Retrospective Voting,”
Political Behavior, 6(4), 369–393.
94 Chapter References
Lazarev, E., A. Sobolev, I. V. Soboleva, and B. Sokolov (2014): “Trial by Fire: A
Natural Disaster’s Impact on Support for the Authorities in Rural Russia,” World Politics,
66(4), 641–668.
Lechner, M. (2010): “The Estimation of Causal Effects by Difference-in-Difference Met-
hods,” Foundations and Trends in Econometrics, 4(3), 165–224.
LFU (2014): “Junihochwasser 2013 - Wasserwirtschaftlicher Bericht,” Discussion paper,
Bayerisches Landesamt fu¨r Umwelt.
LUA (2002): “Das Elbehochwasser im Sommer 2002,” Discussion Paper 73, Landesumwel-
tamt Brandenburg.
Lupia, A. (1994): “Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in
California Insurance Reform Elections,” American Political Science Review, 88(1), 63–76.
Malhotra, N., and A. G. Kuo (2008): “Attributing Blame: The Public’s Response to
Hurricane Katrina,” The Journal of Politics, 70(01), 120–135.
Merz, B., F. Elmer, M. Kunz, B. Mu¨hr, K. Schro¨ter, and S. Uhlemann-Elmer
(2014): “The Extreme Flood in June 2013 in Germany,” La Houille Blanche, 1, 5–10.
Neumayer, E., T. Plu¨mper, and F. Barthel (2014): “The Political Economy of Natural
Disaster Damage,” Global Environmental Change, 24, 8–19.
Oliver, A. J., and A. Reeves (2015): “The Politics of Disaster Relief,” in Emerging
Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences: An Interdisciplinary, Searchable, and Lin-
kable Resource, ed. by S. M. Kosslyn. John Wiley & Sons, New York.
Pappi, F. U., S. Shikano, and E. Bytzek (2004): “Der Einfluss politischer Ereignisse
auf die Popularita¨t von Parteien und Politikern und auf das Parteiensystem,” Ko¨lner
Zeitschrift fu¨r Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, 56, 51–70.
Pulzer, P. (2003): “The Devil They Know: The German Federal Election of 2002,” West
European Politics, 26(2), 153–164.
Reeves, A. (2011): “Political Disaster: Unilateral Powers, Electoral Incentives, and Presi-
dential Disaster Declarations,” The Journal of Politics, 73(4), 1142–1151.
Remmer, K. L. (2014): “Exogenous Shocks and Democratic Accountability: Evidence From
the Caribbean,” Comparative Political Studies, 47(8), 1158–1185.
Rubin, D. B. (1974): “Estimating Causal Effects of Treatments in Randomized and Non-
randomized Studies.,” Journal of Educational Psychology, 66(5), 688–701.
Chapter References 95
Sekhon, J. S., and R. Titiunik (2012): “When Natural Experiments are Neither Natural
nor Experiments,” American Political Science Review, 106(1), 35–57.
SSR (2002): “Richtlinie des Sa¨chsischen Staatsministeriums des Innern u¨ber die Gewa¨hrung
von Zuschu¨ssen fu¨r die Beseitigung von Hochwasserscha¨den vom August 2002 im Freistaat
Sachsen,” .
Thurner, P. W. (1998): Wa¨hlen als rationale Entscheidung. Oldenbourg, Mu¨nchen.
Thurner, P. W., and F. U. Pappi (1998): “Retrospektives und prospektives Wa¨hlen in
Mehrparteiensystemen mit Koalitionsregierungen. Die Bundestagswahl 1994,” in Wahlen
und Wa¨hler: Analysen aus Anlaß der Bundestagswahl 1994, ed. by M. Kaase, and H.-D.
Klingemann, pp. 113–144. VS Verlag fu¨r Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden.
96 Chapter References
Chapter 4
Die Mu¨nchner Ergebnisse im Bundes-
und Landesvergleich: Ein Ude-Effekt
in Mu¨nchen?
This research has been published in Exit Polls und Hybrid-Modelle. Ein neuer Ansatz zur
Modellierung von Wa¨hlerwanderungen, edited by Klima, Andre´, Helmut Ku¨chenhoff, Mirjam
Selzer, and Paul W. Thurner, Springer: Wiesbaden, 2017, Chapter 2, pp. 21-35, ISBN: 978-
3-658-15673-2 (print); 978-3-658-15674-9 (online).
4.1 Summary
This chapter is embedded within a broader research project of Andre´ Klima, Helmut Ku¨chen-
hoff, Mirjam Selzer, and Paul W. Thurner, proposing new approaches for estimating voter
transitions with an application to voter transitions between 2008 and 2013 state, 2009 and
2013 federal and 2013 state and federal elections in the municipality of Munich, Germany.
The chapter starts by demonstrating that the 2013 Munich federal and state election results
follow very much the average voting behavior on federal, and even more on state level. This
supposes that voter transitions in Munich are potentially similar in other voting districts of
Bavaria, or even Germany. In the second part of the chapter, I investigate specific observed
differences between the Bavarian trend and the Munich trend for the state elections 2013. I
propose a particular candidate effect and interpret this as local incumbency advantage: The
former mayor of Munich, Christian Ude, ran as opposition leader for the SPD state election
campaign. I therefore expect a particular spill-over of a local incumbency effect in Munich.
As the electoral system provides voters with two votes in two tiers, where both votes counts
towards the PR result, but Ude was listed as candidate only in the second tier, I assess whet-
her voters use the electoral system in this way. With a difference-in-difference design, I can
show that SPD total votes increase by about 2-3 percentage points in Munich, but SPD second
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votes by about 4-5 percentage points. This increase is likely a consequences of former Green
voters splitting their vote in favor of Christian Ude. Theoretically, this would be consistent
with a model, where candidate effects work predominantly where voters are nearly indifferent
on party terms.
4.2 Published Book Chapter
The reader is kindly referred to the above-mentioned source, online available at doi: 10.1007/978-
3-658-15674-9 2, for the full article. The appendix is available as OnlinePlus-site on the
Springer book web pages1 (see as well Appendix Chapter C).
1http://www.springer.com/de/book/9783658156732
Chapter 5
How to Increase Turnout in Low
Salience Elections:
Quasi-Experimental Evidence on the
Effect of Simultaneous Second-Order
Elections on Political Participation
(Leininger, Rudolph and Zittlau 2018)
This research is has been published in Political Science Research an Methods, 2018 (online
first: 2016), Issue 6, Volume 3, pp. 509-526, ISSN: 2049-8470 (print); 2049-8489 (online), un-
der authorship of Arndt Leininger (University of Mainz), Lukas Rudolph and Steffen Zittlau
(University of Mannheim).
5.1 Summary
Voter turnout in second-order elections is on a dramatic decline in many modern demo-
cracies. This article investigates how electoral participation can be substantially increased
by holding multiple of these less important elections simultaneously. Leading to a relative
decrease in voting costs, concurrent elections theoretically have economies of scale to the in-
dividual voter and thus should see turnout levels larger than those obtained in any stand-alone
election. Leveraging as-if-random variation of local election timing in Germany, we estimate
the causal effect of concurrent mayoral elections on European election turnout at around 10
percentage points. Exploiting variation in treatment intensity, we show that the magnitude
of the concurrency effect is contingent upon district size and the competitiveness of the local
race.
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5.2 Published Article
The reader is kindly referred to the above-mentioned source for the full article, online availa-
ble at doi: 10.1086/685378. The appendix is available as supplementary material on PSRM’s
article site (see as well Appendix Chapter D). Replication files are available in the PSRM
Dataverse at doi: 10.7910/DVN/TJTZT2.
Chapter 6
Natural Disasters and Political
Participation: Evidence from the 2002
and 2013 Floods in Germany (Rudolph and
Kuhn 2018)
This research has been published in German Politics, 2018 (online first: 2017), Volume 27,
Issue 1, pp. 1-24, ISSN: 0964-4008 (print); 1743-8993 (online), under authorship of Lukas
Rudolph and Patrick M. Kuhn (Durham University, United Kingdom).
6.1 Summary
How do natural disasters affect electoral participation? The existing social science literature
offers contradictory predictions. A considerable body of research in sociology and psycho-
logy suggests that traumatic events can inspire pro-social behaviour, which might increase
turnout. Yet, political science has long held that even minor changes to participation costs
of low benefit activities can lead to considerable drops in civic engagement. Consequently,
natural disasters should reduce electoral participation. We show how these distinct views can
be jointly analysed within the Riker-Ordeshook model of voting. This paper then reports re-
sults on the impact of the 2002 and 2013 floods in Germany on turnout in federal and state
elections in Saxony and Bavaria, conducted few weeks after the floods. Analyzing commu-
nity level turnout data, and drawing on a difference-in-differences framework, we find that
flood exposure has a consistent negative effect on turnout. This indicates that the increase
in the costs of voting outweighed any increase in political engagement in our case and stands
in contrast to findings from developing contexts, where flood management was convincingly
linked to electoral participation.
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6.2 Published Article
The reader is kindly referred to the above-mentioned source for the article, online available
at doi: 10.1080/09644008.2017.1287900. The underlying data to reproduce the numerical
results in the paper are available at the Harvard Dataverse at doi: 10.7910/DVN/X3VUSW.
The appendix can be found as supplemental material on the article site of German Politics
(see as well Appendix Chapter E).
Chapter 7
Turning Out to Turn Down the EU -
The Mobilization of Occasional Voters
and Brexit1
Abstract
Large amounts of low-propensity voters participated in the Brexit referendum. Theoretically,
I argue that when turnout baselines are low the issue-specific mobilization potential of these
voters helps explain election outcomes. More generally, we can expect that outcomes become
more volatile with intermediate increases in electoral participation. This is all the more li-
kely in referendums, with weak partisan preferences and single issues dominating decision
making. I find evidence consistent with the argument for the Brexit referendum. I draw on
an instrumental variables approach exploiting large amounts of rainfall on referendum day
and show that occasional voters marginal to rainfall predominantly supported Leave. Survey
data is consistent with the view that especially Leave supporters were susceptible to small
variations in voting costs and that turnout intention was heterogeneous with respect to Le-
ave/Remain preferences. This contributes to understanding the Brexit decision and, more
generally, highlights the role of turnout for referendum outcomes.
7.1 Introduction
Low turnout potentially poses serious challenges to both the legitimacy of representation
and the legitimacy of public policy. As citizens do not abstain at random, low turnout likely
1I thank John Aldrich, Matthias Fatke, Sona Golder, Arndt Leininger, Ingrid Mauerer, Steffen Murau,
Oliver Pamp, Christopher Prosser, Paul Thurner, participants at the 2016 EITM summer institute and the
2017 MPSA conference as well as audiences at LMU Munich for helpful comments and suggestions. UK
rainfall data provided by the UK Met Office is kindly acknowledged.
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implies both representation being skewed and policy being shifted towards the interests of
voters as opposed to the eligible population (Lijphart, 1997).2 As socioeconomic covariates
and electoral participation correlate, the core expectation of a large body of research is that
left-of-center parties and positions are underrepresented with decreases in turnout (Tingsten,
1937).
Empirically studying the effects of turnout is challenging, however, as turnout decision and
electoral choice are endogenously related both at the individual and the aggregate level. A
large recent literature therefore focuses on exogenous variation in turnout due to institutional
features or external variation in voting costs to investigate the partisan effects of turnout.
In many contexts, substantial partisan effects are reported. However, the evidence largely
centers around presidential (e.g. Hansford and Gomez, 2010; Fowler, 2015), general and state
legislative (e.g. Arte´s, 2014; Fowler, 2013; Ferwerda, 2014) or local elections (Cepaluni and
Hidalgo, 2016; Arnold and Freier, 2015; Finseraas and Vernby, 2014).3
We know much less about who turns out and partisan effects of participation in refe-
rendums. Much of the evidence stems from the Swiss case: Exogenous increases in turnout
in Swiss referendums (due to compulsory voting) led to increased support for leftists policy
(Bechtel, Hangartner, and Schmid, 2016). Similarly, drawing on the introduction of postal
voting for Swiss federal ballot propositions, Hodler, Luechinger, and Stutzer (2015) show
that less educated voters were most sensitive to variations in voting costs.
Beyond the Swiss case, turnout in EU/EEC referendums has been studied as a notable
exception, mostly with observational research designs(Hobolt, 2005, 2009).4 However, so far
the literature has not studied extensively whether and how turnout, and particularly increases
in turnout, are related to referendum outcomes. Amongst the few papers that address this
issue is Qvortrup (2016), who reports a strong cross-country correlation between turnout
levels and EU/EEC approving referendum shares in all EU/EEC referendums between 1972
to 2015. The present study contributes directly to this question, as this relationship has not
yet been confirmed with a causal identification strategy. This fills an important gap: While
2This widely cited argument is not uncontested. See e.g. Saunders (2012) for a nuanced discussion.
3Indeed, these studies usually find a relationship between turnout and vote shares. One set of studies
draws on variation in institutional design to establish the partisan effects of increasing turnout. In some
contexts the change in representation is marginal (Ferwerda, 2014), but in most quite sizable. The direction of
effects has a tendency: There seems to be more evidence that left-of-center parties and positions profit in many
contexts (Schmid, 2015; Fowler, 2013, 2015; Bechtel, Hangartner, and Schmid, 2016), in particular settings
however it is right-of-center electorates (Cepaluni and Hidalgo, 2016; Berinsky, 2005) or both positions
(Finseraas and Vernby, 2014) that see increases in electoral support. This picture is reinforced by another
set of studies, using changes in weather conditions to instrument turnout: e.g. Hansford and Gomez (2010)
report substantial partisan effects of voter turnout in the US, benefiting the Democrats, and using rainfall
as instrument. Partisan effects are noted for rainfall in other elections as well (see Arnold and Freier, 2015,
for an overview).
4Relatedly, there of course is a large literature explaining turnout, especially lower turnout levels, for
European Parliament elections. As these are generally seen as second-order elections, turnout is likely influ-
enced more by domestic factors (Hobolt, 2009, comp. e.g.[). However, some EU centered explanatory factors
of turnout likely carry over to (high stakes) EU referendums (e.g. De Vreese and Tobiasen, 2007).
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it has been argued that turnout intention in EU elections covaries with attitudes towards the
EU, especially if they reach a first-order importance (comp. e.g. Hobolt and Tilley, 2014,
Chap. 8, Fn. 12), most EU-related research on voting behavior focuses on factors that
influence vote choice, not participation (Hobolt and Tilley, 2014).
In the following, I propose that with one-off single-issue referendums, we can expect the
mobilization potential of occasional voters to be lopsided, i.e. for some occasional voters
their participation likelihood is higher. Hence, whenever issue salience, campaigning or other
external factors succeed in mobilizing occasional voters, and hence where we observe increases
in turnout, this should affect electoral results. This argument builds on the observation
that low propensity voters have heterogeneous preferences (Finseraas and Vernby, 2014). In
this light, studies researching turnout and ballot initiatives have argued that salient issues
influence the turnout intention (Biggers, 2011), but likely mobilize specific segments of the
population over others (Campbell and Monson, 2008).
I apply this question to a recent referendum with high salience, the ‘United Kingdom
European Union membership referendum’ (‘Brexit referendum’) on 23 June 2016. Given the
expected closeness and the high stakes involved, turnout reached a comparatively high level
of 72.2% – in comparison, the last UK general election that saw turnout above 70% was in
1997, and turnout for European Parliament elections never reached 40% in the UK.5 Pollsters
and forecasters had both seen a vote for Remain as likely outcome of the election, the Leave
share of 51.9% came as a surprise for many, and the role of turnout has been publicly debated
in the aftermath. The setting therefore is an important case to analyze the relevance of an
increase in turnout for electoral outcomes.
Drawing on plausibly exogenous variation in turnout due to exceptionally high rainfall
on election day in parts of the country and a first differences design, I argue that a stronger
turnout increase led to an increase in the Leave share. In line with earlier research I find
that rainfall depressed turnout. Subsequently, I report that a (weather induced) variation in
turnout of about one percentage point led to an increase in the Leave share of around 0.6-0.7
percentage points in England. Placebo tests on unaffected outcomes (2014 European Election
turnout; postal voting turnout) lend support to my identification strategy. Additionally, I
draw on survey data from the British Election Survey. Individual-level analysis indicates
that small variations in the costs and benefits of voting especially affected Leave supporters.
I can as well show that the observed turnout increase was likely heterogeneous with respect
to Referendum preferences: Compared to regular voters, occasional voters are not found
to exhibit stronger preferences for Leave as such. However, among occasional voters, those
holding the sovereignty and immigration issue as most important for their voting decision
score higher on the self-reported turnout intention scale. Likewise, close to election day, past
5A similar referendum with high salience in recent times was the 2014 referendum on Scottish indepen-
dence with an even higher turnout of 84.6%. More generally, EU membership referendums regularly see
high participation rates (Hobolt, 2009, 9), close to turnout in general elections (e.g. in Denmark, comp.
Green-Pedersen, 2012), but rarely higher.
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supporters of the United Kingdom Independence Party (Ukip) have a significantly higher
likelihood of participation compared to non-Ukip supporters.
The chapter contributes to the literature on turnout and vote shares in the under-studied
context of referendums: My findings show that while left wing parties have endorsed the
Remain position, turnout increase in a single-issue context with weak partisan cues must
not lead to better representation of these positions. This highlights that with low turnout
baselines, the population of occasional voters holds sufficiently heterogeneous views to be
important for the outcome (if mobilized). It additionally raises the question how voters
resolve conflicts between partisan preferences and issue orientations in referendums (Selb,
Kriesi, Ha¨nggli, and Marr, 2009).
As well, the chapter contributes to the emerging literature trying to understand the
‘Brexit’ decision: So far, emerging findings on the role of turnout are mixed: Some report
correlations between high turnout and Remain support (Manley, Jones, and Johnston, 2017)
others between high turnout and Leave support (Zhang, 2016). The present analysis is the
first to use a causal identification strategy. I argue that rainfall on election day serves as an
external shock to voting costs. This reveals that marginal occasional voters that participated
in the referendum were on average largely leaning towards Leave.
Finally, the chapter adds to a recent, growing literature that shows that weather con-
ditions affect electoral participation in many settings (see Arnold and Freier, 2015, for an
overview).
The following sections will discuss under which conditions the mobilization of occasional
voters should influence electoral outcomes. Subsequently, the case of the Brexit referendum,
the data used and the research design will be summarized. Section 7.6.1 and 7.6.2 then
present and discuss the results, before section 7.7 concludes.
7.2 When Mobilization Makes a Difference in Referen-
dums
Elections oftentimes do not center around economic issues. This, however is one of the major
foundations of Tingstens proposition: Abstention is predicted by low socio-economic status
(SES); in turn, when turnout increases, it would follow that the participation of low SES-
voters increases relatively, and as their (economic) interests are represented by leftist policies
and parties, outcomes should shift relatively in this direction (Tingsten, 1937). But what
can we expect with referendums focusing on single policy questions? In the following, I will
present a more general theoretical argument on the consequences of increasing turnout in
referendums and develop expectations for the case of the Brexit referendum.
Conceptually, let the eligible population consist of regular voters and occasional voters.6
I understand regular voters as the share of the eligible population that we would regularly
6DeNardo (1980) has made a similar argument and formalized this.
7.2 When Mobilization Makes a Difference in Referendums 107
expect to turn out absent motivational factors, e.g. without an intense campaign environ-
ment, a salient issue/specific personalities on the ballot, institutional factors, specific weather
conditions, etc. Among occasional voters7 only a fraction turns out. How high this fraction
is depends on the above mentioned motivational factors.
The population now is called to vote on a referendum with a binary yes/no choice. A
voter selects whichever option gives her a higher (expected) utility (Downs, 1957). At the
same time, in line with the Riker-Ordershook-Model of voting (Riker and Ordeshook, 1968),
the participation of voter i occurs if p∗ (|EUi(yes)−EUi(no)|)+D−C > 0. This means that
a voter participates if the material benefits of voting (the probability of making a difference
for the outcome, p, times the expected utility increase in choosing one’s preferred outcome)
and immaterial benefits of voting, D, are larger than the voting costs, C.8 I follow the broad
understanding of the D-term by Riker and Ordeshook (1968, 28), who subsume under the
term standard civic duty but as well expressive elements. Particularly relevant here is what
they call ‘the satisfaction from affirming a partisan preference’.
Importantly, we can expect that the D-term is heterogeneous over voters. Regular voters
will, by definition, have a high D-term that pushes them above the participation threshold
in any election. We can understand these voters as those that derive a large satisfaction from
the act of voting itself. For the rest of the population, ‘the satisfaction from affirming a [re-
ferendum] preference’ is then the crucial element that determines their participation. As the
act of voting itself does not suffice to bring them to the polls, it will depend on the referendum
issue whether a voter reaches her idiosyncratic participation threshold. Hence for any given
referendum, some of these voters will be more likely than others to participate. Conversely,
there will be voters that are not regularly turning out overall, but certain to participate when
specific issues are on the ballot. On the aggregate level, the referendum outcome will then be
a weighted share of support for the referendum question in the population of regular voters
and occasional voters that participate.
In this setting, relevance of occasional voter turnout for aggregate outcomes will depend
on three factors. These at the same time help to contextualize empirical findings in the
literature:
First, the difference in aggregate preferences of regular and all occasional voters matters:
This quantity is a priori unknown and would be observable when contrasting unequivocal
participation with the participation of only regular voters. The literature drawing on com-
pulsory voting as exogenous shock to turnout has made a case in point that the preferences of
these two populations differ in many contexts (e.g. Bechtel, Hangartner, and Schmid, 2016)9
7I use the terms occasional voters, peripheral voters, and low-propensity voters interchangeably, to denote
eligible citizens who are not expected to turn out regularly over many elections but are responsive to mobilizing
factors.
8See as well Thurner and Franz U. Pappi (1998) for a more detailed overview on the framework.
9Similarly, extant observational research from many contexts has argued in this direction (e.g. White and
McAllister, 2007), although this is not uncontested (comp. e.g. Lutz and Marsh, 2007).
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Second, the share of occasional voters in the population matters. This quantity can be
understood as the ‘turnout baseline’, i.e. the average participation rate that can be expected
without specific motivational factors. The higher this turnout baseline, the higher the share
of regular voters, and the less relevant are both the turnout rate and the preferences of
occasional voters. This is one explanation why in some settings turnout fluctuations have
made no or low differences (Ferwerda, 2014): A fixed increase in participation will have a
lower impact the higher the ‘turnout baseline’.
Third, and which is the central argument for the case at hand, both occasional voter tur-
nout and the average preferences of those occasional voters that participate likely depend on
the potential outcomes of the election. This is to say that there will be factors that correlate
both with the distribution of the election-specific D-term and the preference distribution.
On the individual level, common factors determine participation likelihood and choice within
the group of occasional voters. Hence, given low turnout baselines and an intermediate de-
gree of mobilization, the effect of turnout on referendum outcomes depends on the direction
of this correlation. There is no a priori reason which directions electoral outcomes should
shift to with such tilted occasional voter participation. Even more, when issues on the ballot
go beyond the traditional left-right-scale, we would not even expect a tendency of ‘leftist’
policies/parties profiting. For any referendum, what would matter is whether the desire of
expressing partisan preferences is higher in the pro- or remain camp.10
Overall, electoral outcomes likely become more difficult to predict with low turnout ba-
selines and fluctuation in the participation of occasional voters. Over many elections, results
should become more volatile in such settings. The argument therefore resembles the ‘volati-
lity effect’ posited by Hansford and Gomez (2010), which again builds on DeNardo (1980):
The argument is that occasional voters hold lower partisan attachments, or even have no
stable political attitudes, and hence, if they vote, are more difficult to predict in their choice.
In the setting proposed here, however, even if occasional voters had stable attitudes, their
different mobilization potential and the correlation of turnout intention and preferences alone
suffices to induce volatility.
Empirically, we can expect this variation in turnout to be particularly relevant in high-
stake referendums with low baseline turnout.11 The EU membership referendum in the UK is
an important case to test this. The remainder of this chapter will therefore examine whether
the increase in turnout affected electoral outcomes and whether heterogeneity in preferences
of occasional voters explains heterogeneity in their turnout intention. We would expect this
to be the case, if the degree of Leave/Remain support and mobilization correlate. With
a high focus of the pre-referendum debate on values and emotions (Inglehart and Norris,
10One hypothesis that could be investigated in future research is whether the reversal of the status quo
is potentially more mobilizing among occasional voters. Reverse arguments have been made, however (e.g.
Schuck and Vreese, 2009).
11While it would be applicable to any binary choice framework (e.g. as well runoffs in presidential elections),
low partisan attachments are key in explaining divergence from Tingsten (1937).
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2016) and a vote against a (in most pre-election opinion polls depicted) majority position
(Feddersen and Sandroni, 2006), this is to be expected.
7.3 The Brexit Case
This section briefly outlines the circumstances of the UK EU membership referendum 2016
and the data used for the analysis is this chapter. Following longstanding internal challenges
of EU membership both in the broader public and the Conservative Party, in 2013 then Prime
Minister David Cameron promised a referendum if he won the next general election. This
was held on 23 June 2016, on the question “Should the United Kingdom remain a member
of the European Union or leave the European Union?” (Lynch, 2015). Against expectations
of both pollsters (which predominantly saw a lead for Remain12) and betting markets (which
saw about an 85% likelihood for Remain just before election day13), 51.89% of voters opted
for ‘Leave the EU’, with Leave leading by 1,269,501 votes. High turnout accompanied the
referendum: With 33,577,342 total votes 72.21% of registered voters turned out.
Research on Brexit is currently still ongoing. Various explanations for the referendum
outcome have been proposed: On the aggregate level, correlations between higher Leave
share, lower average education, income and age have been noted (Arnorsson and Zoega, 2016;
Manley, Jones, and Johnston, 2017), as well as unemployment (Zhang, 2016) and additionally
a strong tradition of manufacturing employment and poorer public service provision (Becker,
Fetzer, and Novy, 2017). Geography has been found to matter less, once socio-demographic
factors are taken into account; neither a north-south devide, nor geographical patterns of
major party support are argued to match the pattern of referendum outcomes (Manley,
Jones, and Johnston, 2017).14 Underlying reasons for these correlations have been argued
to lie in the immigration issue (Viskanic, 2017; Goodwin and Milazzo, 2017), but as well
austerity measures and rising inequality (Dorling, 2016). On the individual level, Swami,
Barron, Weis, and Furnham (2017) show that in a sample of 300 British adults Leave vote
intention was predicted by feelings of national attachment and perceptions of threat from
(Muslim) immigrants. Clarke, Goodwin, and Whiteley (2017) argue that, additional to
age, education and class effects, individual risk assessments, cost-benefit calculations and
emotional reactions towards the EU have are predictors of a Leave vote, as well as attitudes
towards campaign leaders (Clarke, Goodwin, and Whiteley, 2017). Finally, findings on the
role of turnout are mixed: Some find correlations between high turnout and Remain (Manley,
Jones, and Johnston, 2017), some with high turnout and Leave (Zhang, 2016). The present
analysis contributes to this open question with a causal identification strategy.
12According to data compiled by The Huffington Post, Remain was leading in 73% of its simulations (see
http://elections.huffingtonpost.com/pollster/uk-european-union-referendum).
13According to data compiled by PredictWise (see http://predictwise.com/politics/uk-politics).
14This is an important finding as unobserved geographical confounders are a potential threat for the
weather based identification strategy used in this chapter (as rainfall is necessarily geographically clustered).
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7.4 Data
To analyze the effects of this turnout increase I gathered data on the level of local authorities
for Great Britain. Data on the 2016 referendum outcome in the UK are obtained from the
Electoral Commission for 380 local authorities.15Following the GSS coding system, this is
data on local authority level, i.e. unitary authorities (for England, Scotland and Wales),
non-metropolitan districts (two-tier) and metropolitan boroughs (for England). According
to the electoral commission, this is the smallest geographic unit for which electoral results are
available.16 I additionally gathered data on 2014 European Parliament Elections turnout and
United Kingdom Independence Party (Ukip) vote share as baseline and additional control,
which is available for the same unit of analysis.
Data on rainfall on election day is obtained from the UK Met Office17 and reflects day-
time rainfall (900 - 2100 hours) in millimeters for 248 weather stations across the UK on 23
June 2016. Election day rainfall was especially severe in the south and east of the country,
where even some polling stations had to be closed.18 Rainfall mostly affected regions of the
country with an average annual rainfall below the country average.19 Drawing on shapefiles
obtained from the UK Data Service,20 I calculated rainfall per local administration. For
this, I averaged the rainfall of weather stations located within a local administration or, if
an administration had no weather station located in it, within a 20 km radius of its centroid
(see Figure 7.1).
I additionally gathered data on economic and socio-demographic controls21 to increase
the precision of estimates: This is data on 2011 ethnic composition of local authorities and
2011 migration statistics22 and data on control variables for population size, density, age
structure, local economy23 (all for 2011) and labor market (for 2016)24 and is obtained from
the UK Office of National Statistics. These are the most recent population statistics available
(as of July 2016).
One important note concerns election results for Northern Ireland and Gibraltar: Election
data for the referendum is available on the level of UK parliamentary constituencies for
Northern Ireland (N=18) and for Gibraltar (N=1). But as neither election data for the
15The data is publicly available at http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/.
16Personal communication with the Electoral Commission on 6 July 2016.
17Data obtained by personal communication with the Weather Desk Team of the Met Office, 6 July 2016.
18See http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/climate/uk/summaries/2016/june.
19Comp. the spatial distribution of annual UK rainfall in the last decade and June 2016 anomaly rainfall
at http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/climate/uk/summaries/anomacts.
20See https://census.edina.ac.uk/bds.html.
21A control variable for average education levels/share of high (low) educated was not directly available
from the ONS; the education variable is partially proxied by share of labor force employed in high (low)
skilled labor, and by the unemployment rate.
22Available from http://www.nomisweb.co.uk/census/2011/.
23I.e. the share of employment in high, and respectively low skilled labor.
24Available from http://www.ons.gov.uk/.
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European Parliament election nor data for control variables is available on the same level,
both Northern Ireland and Gibraltar were excluded from the analysis.
Summary statistics for all variables used in the analysis are found in the Appendix for
this chapter (Appendix Table F.1).
7.5 Research Design
Levels of electoral participation and aggregate vote choice are likely correlated (Hansford and
Gomez, 2010).Without addressing the endogeneity involved, conclusions on the relationship
between levels of turnout and electoral support are potentially biased. A solution is an
instrumental variable, proceeding in two steps: First, the instrument has to be related to
the participation decision (first-stage relevance), but not to electoral choice (the exclusion
restriction) (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). Second, the exogenous variation induced by the
instrument is used to assess the endogenous variation between turnout and electoral choice
(second stage). This paper draws on variation in rainfall during election day as a suitable
instrument for voting costs, depressing turnout but not influencing vote choice. Numerous
studies have used rainfall as instrument for electoral participation, and find that rain is
predominantly negatively related to turnout (see Arnold and Freier, 2015).
Thus, in the first stage, the change in turnout is instrumented by rainfall R on election
day (in mm), thus
∆Ti = α1i + β1Ri +X
′
iγ1 + i. (2)
This then leads to a second stage instrumental variable regression of
∆Yi = α2i + β2∆ˆTi + X
′
iγ2 + i. (3)
Depending on specification, the analysis additionally controls for a vector X of socio-
economic and political variables25 that further increase the precision of estimates and excludes
confounders.
For the first stage, this approach is justified: Table 7.1 indicates, as expected, a negative
relationship between rainfall and turnout: One millimeter of rainfall on election day is related
to a turnout decrease of 0.2 (Model 1, without controls) to 0.1 percentage points (Model 2,
25The analysis uses controls that potentially correlate with aggregate turnout and aggregate Leave support,
specifically: the ethnic white population share; the population share being immigrants from outside the
UK; population share aged 20-30; population share aged 60+; share of unemployed; share of employed in
high skilled labor; share of employed in low skilled labor; change in 2015-2016 unemployment; population
density; population size (logged); share of Ukip support in last European Parliament election (for non-
delta specification of explanatory variable only); regional dummies for Scotland, Wales, Northern England,
Southern England, London.
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Figure 7.1: Rainfall in the United Kingdom on election day
The dots depict the 248 weather stations in the United Kingdom and day-time rainfall (900 - 2100 hours)
on June 23rd, 2016 (referendum election day). In green, estimated rainfall amounts in local authorities are
depicted, from no rain (white) to slight rain (light green (0.2 mm)) and heavy rain (dark green (42.2 mm)).
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with controls), with the first difference between referendum turnout and European Parliament
turnout as dependent variable.26 This implies, given average election day rainfall of 4.3 mm,
an average effect of rain on turnout of -0.5 (Model 2) to -0.9 (Model 1) percentage points,
which is similar in size to what the literature finds (Arnold and Freier, 2015). Instrument
relevance is further supported by F-statistics above 10 as recommended as a rule of thumb
by Staiger and Stock (1997).27
For the second stage, a potential problem for the analysis is the spatial correlation of
rainfall. In the case at hand, there is for example no variation of rainfall in Wales, the north
of England (North East and North West) and barely variation in Scotland.28 There is a risk,
therefore, that by chance rainfall on election day fell in an area that is politically different
even controlling for the variables contained in X. I apply three strategies to address this
problem:
First of all, the analysis on the one hand explicitly controls for geography.29 On the other
hand, the main specifications of the analysis are restricted to the ‘rainy’ parts of England.30
As potential unobserved confounders are likely geographically clustered (Johnston and Pattie,
2006, Chap. 7; Johnston, Pattie, and Manley, 2017), the potential for unobserved confounders
to bias the estimates is thereby lowered. Binarily distinguishing local authorities with rain
and without, reported in Appendix Table F.4, provides support for this strategy: important
determinants of Leave such as prior Ukip support and unemployment are both not statistically
distinguishable anymore in the sample of ‘rainy’ regions. Still, results for the whole sample
are equally reported and substantively similar.
Second, I use a first difference design to control for potential level differences in baseline
turnout and Leave share. This allows to relax the assumption of no (geographic) confoun-
ding in levels of the dependent variable to no confounding in trends (i.e. the parallel trend
assumption (Lechner, 2010; Bru¨derl and Ludwig, 2015)). Rainfall then is assumed to not
26Results are fully reported in Table F.6. Table F.5 provides evidence that the relevance of rain is assessed
similarly for the full sample (Model 1) and with referendum turnout levels as dependent variable (Model 2).
27I am not aware of published research that investigates the effect of UK referendum day weather on
changes in turnout. Independently, Chris Hanretty in a blogpost (30 June 2016, online at https://medium.
com/@chrishanretty/rain-and-the-referendum-961a03064c4b) indicates a negative, though insignificant
relationship between turnout levels and rainfall once controlling for expected leave share and past EP turnout.
His approach differs from mine: He looks at levels not trends (i.e. not explicitly controlling time constant
turnout determinants), uses different weather data (pixels on a weather grid), has a different specification
of controls, and does not include other socio-demographic controls. These differences in approaches likely
explain why Hanretty finds negative, though insignificant effects of rainfall on turnout, while I find a negative,
but significant effect of rainfall on the increase in turnout. Additionally, there is independent (unpublished)
research by Becker, Fetzer, and Novy (2017) who argue that rainfall and train cancellations had a negative
effect on turnout in the London area.
28Three authorities experience rainfall above 1, none above 2.5 mm.
29Control variables include: indicators for Wales, Scotland, North England (regions East Midlands, North
East, North West, Yorkshire), South England (regions East, South East, South West, West Midlands), and
London.
30I.e. to English regions experiencing rain, excluding North East, North West, Scotland and Wales.
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Table 7.1: Relevance of instrument
Rainy regions (England)
(1) (2)
2016 referendum turnout - 2014 EE turnout
Average rainfall (mm) -0.21∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.029)
Constant 39.4∗∗∗ 30.0∗∗∗
(0.33) (6.26)
Region controls No Yes
Socio-economic controls No Yes
N 275 275
Adj. R2 0.042 0.79
F-statistic 19.2 43.5
Regression of election-day rainfall (in mm) on election day turnout. Robust
standard errors in parentheses.
Control variables included (as indicated) are the ethnic white population share;
the population share being immigrants from outside the UK; population share
aged 20-30; population share aged 60+; share of unemployed; share of employed
in high skilled labor; share of employed in low skilled labor; change in 2015-2016
unemployment; population density; population size (logged); share of Ukip
support in last European Parliament election (for non-delta specification of
explanatory variable only); regional dummies for Northern England, Southern
England, London. Sample is restricted to ‘rainy’ regions in England.
** (*,***) indicates p < 0.05 (0.1, 0.01)
have by chance affected especially those regions that were on different Leave-support trends
compared to the rest of the sample. Again, results for level regressions are equally reported
and substantively similar. As baseline, I use European Parliament (EP) election turnout and
Ukip vote share (indicating Leave support) rather than the last UK General Election. The
EP election is chosen as baseline for three reasons: First, like the referendum, the EP election
was first and foremost concerned with European Union membership and immigration as a
central issue, other than the General Election where the more general economic issue played
the most important role for voters (Treib, 2014; Dennison and Goodwin, 2015; Lynch, 2015;
Tonge and Geddes, 2015); second, the EP election follows a proportional representation elec-
toral system that gives voters incentives to reveal their true preferences, other than at the
General Election where backers of the Leave position from both Conservatives and Labour
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have strategic incentives not to support Ukip depending on the competitive environment in
their local constituency (Cox, 1997). Both the focus on the EU/immigration issues and the
electoral system make it more plausible to assess the degree of anti-EU-support (as well by
voters who might support Labour or Conservatives otherwise (Evans and Mellon, 2016)) by
measuring Ukip support in the European Parliament 2014 elections. Third, the reporting of
EP election results matches referendum counting areas, while General Election results are
reported for different electoral districts. Main independent variable used in the analysis is
therefore the instrumented first difference in 2016 Referendum turnout (Ti,t) and European
Parliament election turnout (Ti,t−1). Substantively, this modeling choice additionally puts
the focus on the research question what the impact of the differential increase in turnout
implies for Leave support.
Finally, while it can in principle not be tested whether rainfall is exogenous to turnout in
the case at hand, we can find indications for this in placebo tests: As suggested by Angrist
and Pischke (2009), I conduct a placebo test on whether referendum day rainfall is related to
unaffected outcomes. For this, Appendix Table F.2 reports regressions of rainfall on turnout
at the 2014 European Parliament election. Once dummies for region are controlled for,
the placebo relationship is close to zero and insignificant (Table F.2, Model 2 and 5), and
even more so with additional controls (Model 3 and 6). The placebo-relationship is even
weaker if the analysis is restricted to the rainy regions of England (Model 4 of Table F.2),
providing additional support to the strategy laid out above. The difference in pre-treatment
postal voting applications and ballot box turnout provides for additional placebo tests: While
structural shifts in participation patterns should extend to postal voters as well, rainfall could
not affect the postal vote participation decision. Appendix Table F.3 reports regressions of
rainfall on postal ballot turnout (i.e. envelopes returned over envelopes issued) at the 2016
Brexit referendum. Again, once geography is controlled for, coefficients are substantially close
to zero and insignificant. The same null-finding is reached when assessing the correlation of
rain with the overall proportion of the Referendum electorate issued with a postal vote.
Likewise, the difference in 2016 Referendum and 2014 European Election postal turnout is
not influenced by rain. On the other hand, the negative relationship between rainfall and
polling station turnout is more negative (though not significantly different) compared to
overall turnout, as expected.31
7.6 Results
7.6.1 Results on Aggregate Turnout
Table 7.2 reports results of the instrumental variable regression, with the share of Leave (Mo-
dels 1-3) and the difference in Leave share and 2014 European Election Ukip share (Model
31Findings available upon request.
116 7. Turning Out to Turn Down the EU
4-6) as dependent variable.32 As can be seen from Model 1 to 3, the larger the increase
in turnout between European Election and Referendum, the higher the share of Leave. An
increase in one percentage point leads to, on average, a 0.72 percentage point increase in
the Leave share, insignificantly estimated without control variables (Model 1). The large
standard errors in Model 1 are especially a consequence of the fact that prior Ukip support is
not controlled for, which is a strong predictor of Leave support. To increase the precision of
estimates, controls are included explicitly in Model 2, and implicitly via a differencing appro-
ach in Model 4. Effects are estimated similar in size and significant with sociodemographic
(Model 2, effect of 0.67, significant on the 5%-level) and additionally geographic control va-
riables (Model 3, effect of 0.61, significant at the 10%-level). Using a difference-in-difference
framework (Model 4-6), a one percentage point increase in turnout leads to an increase in
the Leave share around 0.78 percentage points (Model 1, without controls, significant at the
5%-level), estimated similarly strong in Model 2 with sociodemographic controls (effect of
0.80, significant at the 5%-level), and slightly less strong and more imprecise in Model 3
((insignificant) effect of 0.71). The more imprecisely estimated coefficient in Model 3 is a
consequence of the inclusion of region controls within a difference-in-difference framework.
This is a very conservative approach, partialling out differential turnout trends between re-
gions, so the treatment effect is estimated based on within-region variation in rainfall and
turnout trend. It is therefore comforting that throughout all models the estimated coefficients
are substantively very similar, and for the most part statistically significant at conventional
levels.
To further assess the internal validity of these estimates, I calculated effects with a binary
instrument ‘heavy rain’ drawing on local authorities with above median rainfall (see Appendix
Table F.8). As expected, coefficients are positive in all cases and similar in size for the main
specifications (Model 2 and 3).33 Furthermore, the results are robust to estimation with the
full sample of all of Great Britain (see Appendix Table F.9), thus under inclusion of especially
Scotland and Wales in the analysis, where election day rainfall was minimal.
Appendix Table F.10 reports results for a standard regression framework, with the same
variables as in Table 7.2 but no instrumentation of the turnout increase. In comparison,
the IV results are very similar to the coefficient in a model without control variables (0.82,
Model 1). However, including controls leads to estimates close to zero (Models 2 and 4).
Results even flip signs drawing on the difference in Leave and Ukip share as dependent
variable (Model 3). This underscores the importance of an approach that takes the potential
endogeneity between turnout and vote shares into account.
The substantive relevance of the estimates can be assessed using the framework of Fowler
(2015). Average Leave support is higher where weather was good and more occasional voters
turned out. Among the 0.5% of the electorate voting only in good weather, the Fowler-
32Full results are reported in Table F.7.
33The models with regional dummies are estimated less precisely; with a binary instrument less variation
within regions is left in the instrument.
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Table 7.2: Instrumental variable regression of difference in EE to Referendum turnout on
Leave share/increase in Leave vote
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. var: Leave share Leave share - Ukip
2016 Referendum turnout 0.72 0.67∗∗ 0.61∗ 0.78∗∗ 0.80∗∗ 0.71
- 2014 EE turnout (0.65) (0.27) (0.33) (0.34) (0.38) (0.47)
Constant 26.4 26.5∗∗ 22.4∗ -7.56 21.4 18.4
(25.1) (10.9) (13.5) (13.0) (13.1) (17.9)
Region controls No No Yes No No Yes
Socio-economic controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
N 275 275 275 275 275 275
Instrumental variable regression (two-stage least squares) with rainfall (in mm)
as instrument for turnout. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Control variables included (as indicated) are the ethnic white population share;
the population share being immigrants from outside the UK; population share
aged 20-30; population share aged 60+; share of unemployed; share of employed
in high skilled labor; share of employed in low skilled labor; change in 2015-
2016 unemployment; population density; population size (logged); share of Ukip
support in last European Parliament election (for non-delta specification of
explanatory variable only); regional dummies for Northern England, Southern
England, London. Sample is restricted to ‘rainy’ regions in England.
** (*,***) indicates p < 0.05 (0.1, 0.01)
approach implies a Leave share of 90.7% [11.8; 173.5]. Thus, this implies a preference gap
in Leave support of 36.6 percentage points between regular and these occasional voters. We
should not directly interpret this difference due to strong assumptions; nonetheless, taking the
results literally gives numeric support that preferences on EU membership differed strongly
between occasional and regular voters (comp. Appendix Section F.3 for details).
To summarize, the IV estimates consistently indicate that increases in turnout due to
weather conditions are related to strong increases in Leave share/the increase in Leave share
over European Election Ukip support. Results imply that voters whose participation decision
was influenced by rainfall (and which therefore abstained) were especially likely to support
Leave. As it was on average Leave supporters that were deterred from voting due to bad
weather, rainfall has played no role for the outcome of the referendum. However, as voters
marginal to slight increases in voting costs seemed to be leaning towards Leave, this indicates
more generally that the strong overall increase in turnout played a decisive role for the success
of the Leave campaign. Survey evidence supports this argument, as the next section argues.
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7.6.2 Supportive Survey Evidence
Does the observed effect plausibly generalize beyond weather-induced occasional voters to
the larger population of occasional voters?
In the Riker-Ordeshook framework (Riker and Ordeshook, 1968), a voter participates in
an election if the reward from voting is positive, R = PB − C + D > 0. Rainfall (r) is
affecting the voting cost function Ci(r) of voters, where we can expect ∂Ci(r)/∂r > 0 (voting
costs increase with rain). But which voters abstain? We can expect voter i to respond to
the instrument (and abstain) when the increase in voting costs due to rain is larger than the
(expected) utility of voting without rain, thus if Ri|r = 0 < ∂Ci(r)/∂r. As the treatment
effect is not outcome-neutral, either the left hand side or the right hand side of this equation
has to be correlated with referendum preferences:
Concerning the right hand side, the susceptibility of voting costs to rainfall could be
higher for occasional voters (Knack, 1994), e.g. due to wealth and transportation costs. But
if rainfall induces abstention of low-income voters across the board, the observed effects are
only consistent with a population of occasional (low-income) voters that on average lean
towards Leave. However, in survey data I find no support for this potential mechanism. For
this, I looked at rolling cross-sectional data in the pre-referendum weeks from the British
Election Study.34 Defining occasional voters as those respondents who abstained at least
once in the 2005, 2010 or 2015 general election35, a Wald test on differences in Leave support
shows no significant difference between occasional voters and the rest of the population (see
Table 7.3, Column 1).
We thus have to turn to the left hand side, the rewards of voting conditional on no rain.
If the population that just participates (as benefits of voting over costs are just on the mar-
gin) leans towards Leave on average, their turnout would be affected by rainfall. This would
indicate that the rainfall effect is relevant more generally to all increases in voting costs. In
Appendix Section F.4 I discuss in detail some evidence consistent with this argument: A
summary of this discussion shall suffice here. First, one incentive in participating stems from
the D-term and the desire to affirm a referendum preference. This would imply that the emo-
tionalized debate around EU-membership, focusing on economic consequences (as most im-
portant aspect highlighted by the Remain campaign) and national sovereignty/immigration
(highlighted by the Leave campaign), was more important for (latent) Leave compared to
34I used the EU Referendum Daily Campaign Data from the British Election Study In-
ternet Panel, which is an online sample of YouGov panel members. The BES collected
daily data on 500-770 respondents from Great Britain 48 days to one day before the re-
ferendum. Data is available online at http://www.britishelectionstudy.com/data-object/
wave-8-of-the-2014-2017-british-election-study-internet-panel-daily-file/.
35The abstention variable is self-reported and recalled, and for both reasons likely biased. However,
for results to be interpretable, it is only necessary to assume that this bias is affecting Leave-leaning and
Remain-leaning voters similarly.
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Table 7.3: Characteristics of regular and occasional voters
(1) (2) (3)
Leave vote Economic Issue Sov./Immig. Issue
Leave vote intention among:
Regular voters 0.507
(0.00470)
Occasional voters 0.493
(0.00918)
Likely turnout with issue most important:
No 0.897 0.863
(0.0105) (0.0142)
Yes 0.852 0.926
(0.0249) (0.0121)
N 18750 1373 1373
F-statistic for mean difference 1.775 2.814 11.49
P-value for mean difference 0.183 0.0937 0.000720
Standard errors in parentheses. Column 1 reports group means for vote intention ‘Leave’ drawing
on respondents indicating a vote intention. Column 2 and 3 report the share of respondents
announcing ‘Very’ or ‘Fairly likely that I turn out’ and holding issue in column heading as (not)
‘most important’ for their Referendum vote intention. Column 2 and 3 draw on occasional voters
only. BES survey weights for representative sample of Great Britain are used.
(latent) Remain supporters. Indeed, among occasional voters that see economic consequen-
ces as most important, turnout intention is relatively lower. Conversly, a voter that sees
sovereignty/immigration as most important issue has an on average higher turnout intention
(see column 2 and 3 of Table 7.3). This indicates that occasional voters with latent Leave
preferences were more likely to turn out than Remain-leaning occasional voters. Hence, the
mobilization of occasional voters was likely lopsided. Second, additional evidence on the per-
ceived closeness of the race indicates that voters that reported their intention to stay home
on average favored the Remain side, and at the same time perceived Remain to be winning.
Third, the temporal structure of the survey data allows a final test: The survey questioned
part of the survey-population each day, beginning 48 days prior to the referendum. We can
thus contrast ‘(very) likely’ turnout intention for Leave/Remain-leaning respondents over
time. Figure 7.2 reports a margins plot on whether Ukip supporters in the last general
election were more likely to intend to turn out the closer election day came relative to other
party supporters. An important feature of this comparison is that confounding factors that
influence turnout intention of past-Ukip and other party supporters similarly are implicitly
controlled for as long as they influence both groups similarly (e.g. overreporting). Time
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seems to play a role for the mobilization of (latent) Leave supporters. 48 days before the
referendum, Ukip supporters were equally likely to report an intention to turn out; just before
the referendum, however, Ukip supporters are predicted to be two percentage points more
likely to turn out.
Overall, the survey analysis supports the IV estimates: Results imply that the referendum
motivated (latent) Leave over (latent) Remain supporters and the mobilization of occasional
voters due to heterogeneous referendum issue salience played an important role for Brexit.
Figure 7.2: Difference in predicted probability of turnout between past Ukip and ‘other party’
supporters in the 12 pre-referendum weeks
Predictions for average marginal effects from a binary logistic regression regressing self-reported turnout
intention (‘fairly’/‘very likely’) on Ukip support at 2015 general election, date of response (1-48 days before
referendum) and an interaction term. BES survey weights for representative sample of Great Britain used.
95% confidence intervals are shown. Weighted N=12,551. Controls for socio-demographics included (comp.
Appendix Table F.12, Model 2). Strips indicate distribution of turnout intention variable (upper strip:
ones; lower strip: zeros), with crosses representing ‘other party’ supporters (N=10,860/N=346) and circles
Ukip-supporters (N=1,402/N=28).
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7.7 Conclusion
The present analysis argues that the stark increase in turnout to 72.2% for the United
Kingdom European Union membership referendum (‘Brexit referendum’) was related to an
increase in support for the Leave campaign. Given the potentially endogenous relationship
between electoral outcomes and electoral participation, I draw on election day rainfall as
instrument for turnout. As expected, rainfall is significantly and negatively related to the
observed increase in turnout. Subsequently, I show with an instrumental variables analysis
that an increase in turnout of one percentage point relative to the European Parliament
turnout baseline leads to an increase in the Leave vote of about 0.6-0.7 percentage points.
In interpreting these results, it is important to note that IV regression estimates are
internally valid only for the segment of voters that is susceptible to small variations in the
costs of voting (due to rainfall). This highlights a methodological perspective where, even
if exogenous variation in turnout is used, still only local average treatment effects can be
identified, making the comparability of results over time and cases challenging (Angrist and
Pischke, 2009; Fowler, 2013). In the case at hand, however, theory and accompanying survey
data provide support for the argument that the turnout effect identified is relevant more
generally for the observed variation in turnout.
These results might not have been expected given the predominant hypothesis in the lite-
rature that turnout benefits left-wing positions and parties. As well in Great Britain, earlier
research pointed to an advantage for leftist positions with increasing turnout (McAllister
and Mughan, 1986; Fisher, 2007). The political left in Great Britain in tendency supported
Remain. As it has been argued that partisan orientations are an important cue for voters in
referenda, particularly even in case of diverging partisan orientation and issue-specific attitu-
des (Selb, Kriesi, Ha¨nggli, and Marr, 2009), this would lead to the expectation that increases
in turnout are related to support for Remain as well. However, this is not the case here –
highlighting that referenda might follow a distinct logic beyond the traditional relationship
of turnout and partisan support. The focus of the Brexit debate on not only the economic
impacts of leaving the European Union, but as well immigration and sovereignty might have
transcended the traditional left-right-distinction.
The argument has been made that the mobilizational dynamics around Brexit in the
long run could revitalize politics in the UK. The argument was aimed at the participation
of (Remain leaning) young voters who were mobilized to participate and could participate
similarly in future elections (Birch, 2016) – given the results at hand, this is not the full
story. Leave-leaning occasional voters have likely been mobilized even more. This is again
surprising, as Ukip support (and hence support for Brexit) is at least in parts based on
economically marginal and politically disaffected citizens (Ford, Goodwin, and Cutts, 2012),
where mobilization would have been expected to be particularly difficult.
In a broader picture the results emphasize a theoretical perspective where fluctuations in
turnout with a low baseline likely lead to more volatile outcomes (Hansford and Gomez, 2010).
Future research could track more closely two specific mechanisms when mobilization leads to
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changes in electoral results. The population of interest would be occasional voters and how
heterogeneous their propensity to turn out for a given elections is. In the Brexit example,
negative voting (Fiorina and Shepsle, 1989) could be one part of the story, if opposition to
the issue at stake (i.e. EU membership) is of higher salience for (latent) Leave supporters
compared to the approval of the EU by (latent) Remain supporters. Another perspective
is given by the theory of expressive voting (Brennan and Hamlin, 1998; Aldrich and Jenke,
2018): If emotional factors appeal more to (latent) Leave supporters and the issue lends itself
more to a logic of expressive voting, this would as well explain heterogeneous Leave-leaning
mobilization of occasional voters.
Overall, the results add to a growing recent literature that turnout is critical to understan-
ding electoral outcomes and policy choice in democracies, and even more so in single-issue
referendums when partisan attachements are weak. While parts of the literature highlight
that increases in turnout lead to policy that is likely in line with median citizen preferen-
ces (e.g. Fowler, 2015; Bechtel, Hangartner, and Schmid, 2016), other research implies that
average information levels and thus the quality of vote choice might deteriorate with hig-
her turnout of low propensity voters (Schmid, 2015). From this perspective, low turnout
constitutes a “blessing in disguise” (Rosema, 2007). The results in this paper indicate that
occasional voter turnout was important especially for the Leave vote. This leads to the que-
stion whether voting decisions for Leave were as well based on lower average information
levels; similarly, it remains an open question whether bias in representation was lowered by
the turnout increase and whether preferences of average UK citizens and average UK voters
differed.
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The appendix for Chapter 2 (Rudolph and Da¨ubler (2016)) is available as supplemental ma-
terial on the Journal of Politics article site at doi: 10.1086/685378 (as of November 1st,
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Appendix B
Appendix for ‘Selecting Good Types
or Holding Incumbents Accountable?’
B.1 Appendix Figures
Figure B.1: Share of voters intending to vote CDU or CSU in 2002.
The figure reports average monthly vote intention for the ‘CDU/CSU’ by subgroups. Respondents are a random drawn of
a Germany wide rolling cross-section (average weekly n=2500, Forsa Study Nr ZA3909). Yellow bars depict 90%-confidence
intervals. Subgroups are coded through electoral precincts. Respondents declaring to abstain, giving no answer or being
undecided are excluded.
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Figure B.2: Share of voters intending to vote CDU in 2013
The figure reports average monthly vote intention for the ‘CDU/CSU’ by subgroups. Respondents are a random drawn of
a Germany wide rolling cross-section (average weekly n=2500, Forsa Study Nr ZA5927). Yellow bars depict 90%-confidence
intervals. Subgroups are coded through electoral precincts. Respondents declaring to abstain, giving no answer or being
undecided are excluded.
Figure B.3: Share of voters intending to vote CDU or CSU in 2013.
The figure reports average monthly vote intention for the ‘CDU/CSU’ by subgroups. Respondents are a random drawn of
a Germany wide rolling cross-section (average weekly n=2500, Forsa Study Nr ZA5927). Yellow bars depict 90%-confidence
intervals. Subgroups are coded through electoral precincts. Respondents declaring to abstain, giving no answer or being
undecided are excluded.
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Table B.1: Placebo analysis for 1994-1998 vote shares on district level
Full Germany Bavaria East
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. var.: PR vote share SPD CDU-CSU SPD CSU SPD CDU
Elbe 2013 -0.050 -6.24∗∗∗ 0.58 -2.67∗∗∗
(0.50) (0.71) (0.61) (0.78)
Danube 2013 0.60∗∗ 2.01∗∗∗ 0.27 -0.14
(0.25) (0.34) (0.25) (0.34)
Year 1998 4.53∗∗∗ -5.87∗∗∗ 4.87∗∗∗ -3.72∗∗∗ 3.14∗∗∗ -10.6∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.15) (0.13) (0.15) (0.45) (0.45)
Constant 35.7∗∗∗ 43.4∗∗∗ 29.5∗∗∗ 52.4∗∗∗ 33.4∗∗∗ 38.5∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.072) (0.056) (0.066) (0.17) (0.18)
N 804 804 192 192 152 152
District level data for Germany (total yearly n=402). Fixed effects estimation with district
and election year fixed effects drawing on the 1994 and 1998elections. Standard errors clustered
by district reported in parentheses. The placebo treatment groups consist of districts flooded
at respective river in 2013.
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Table B.2: Challenger results for 2002 Elbe and Danube
Unaffected Unaffected Unaffected Unaffected
and Elbe and Bavaria and Elbe and Bavaria
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. var.: PR vote share CDU SPD SPD SPD
Elbe Flood 2002 -0.97∗∗∗
(0.31)
Danube Flood 2002 -1.91∗∗∗
(0.37)
Elbe Flood 2013 -1.35∗∗∗
(0.36)
Danube Flood 2013 0.019
(0.24)
Year 2002 1.25∗∗∗ -2.80∗∗∗
(0.18) (0.14)
Year 2005 -2.07∗∗∗ -6.56∗∗∗ -5.25∗∗∗ -6.91∗∗∗
(0.27) (0.30) (0.30) (0.28)
Year 2009 -2.31∗∗∗ -16.1∗∗∗ -16.9∗∗∗ -16.8∗∗∗
(0.35) (0.31) (0.34) (0.30)
Year 2013 -14.8∗∗∗ -13.4∗∗∗
(0.33) (0.32)
Economic and political controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1224 1060 1224 1060
Clusters 306 265 306 265
Estimation as in Models 1 and 3 of Tables 3.1 and 3.2 with challenger party vote share as
dependent variable.
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Table B.3: Two-period estimation for 2002 Elbe and Danube
Unaffected Unaffected Unaffected Unaffected
and Elbe and Bavaria and Elbe and Bavaria
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. var.: PR vote share SPD CDU-CSU CDU CDU-CSU
Elbe Flood 2002 0.95∗
(0.56)
Danube Flood 2002 3.59∗∗∗
(0.71)
Elbe Flood 2013 0.90∗∗
(0.40)
Danube Flood 2013 0.059
(0.42)
Year 2002 -3.16∗∗∗ 1.58∗∗∗
(0.24) (0.30)
Year 2013 7.81∗∗∗ 7.15∗∗∗
(0.22) (0.17)
Economic and political controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 612 530 612 530
Clusters 306 265 306 265
Estimation as in Models 1 and 3 of Tables 3.1 and 3.2 drawing on time periods 1998/2002 and
respectively 2009/2013 only.
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Table B.4: SPD and CDU-CSU vote shares for the 1998-2013 period with individual slopes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. var.: PR vote share SPD CDU-CSU SPD CDU-CSU
Elbe Flood 2002 4.89∗∗∗ -0.60∗∗ 4.03∗∗∗ 0.092
(0.56) (0.26) (0.54) (0.34)
Elbe Flood 2013 -3.25∗∗∗ 2.37∗∗∗ -0.87 0.040
(0.37) (0.37) (0.53) (0.43)
Danube Flood 2002 -1.86∗∗∗ 2.98∗∗∗ -1.77∗∗ 2.93∗∗∗
(0.54) (0.79) (0.72) (0.91)
Danube Flood 2013 0.28 -2.11∗∗∗ -0.76∗ -1.42∗∗∗
(0.27) (0.28) (0.40) (0.42)
socioeconomic controls No No Yes Yes
time fixed effects and individual slopes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2010 2010 2010 2010
Treatment effects using individual slopes. Standard errors clustered at district level. Soci-
oeconomic controls on population density, share of employed on district population, share
of employed in agriculture, in production, in manufacturing, in construction, in trade, in fi-
nancial services, in other services and state incumbent being an SPD incumbent included as
indicated. Controls on SPD or CSU governor running for chancellor included. The treatment
group consists of districts flooded at respective river in the respective year.
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Table B.5: Matching effects using close-by municipalities
Federal Election State Election
Elbe 2002 Elbe 2013 Danube 2002 Danube 2013 Danube 2013
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep. var.: diff. in PR vote share SPD diff. CDU diff. CSU diff. CDU. diff. CSU diff.
ATE
Flooded 0.19 0.094 1.48∗∗∗ -0.86∗∗∗ 3.24∗∗∗
(0.22) (0.17) (0.22) (0.25) (0.40)
N 648 648 2056 2056 2056
Average treatment effect using nearest neighbor matching with robust standard errors with 8 neighbors [8=average
shared boundaries of a municipality] on latitude and longitude of municipality centroids and population density as
well as log population (with bias adjustment for the latter two variables) with difference in treatment period and
pre-treatment period vote shares as dependent variable.
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B.3 District Level Survey Data for 2002 and 2013
One important question is the extent, to which the (positive) evaluations of flood management
spilled over to non-affected ares. The following analysis of survey data assumes that these
spill-overs are geographically concentrated.
Figure 3.2 displays rolling cross-sectional survey data, aggregated to monthly evaluations
of the SPD for untreated states, flooded districts along the Elbe and unflooded districts in
East Germany. On the one hand side, this assesses whether the positive effects reported
above can be found in survey data as well, and additionally whether the behavior of voters
in adjacent areas follows similar temporal patterns.
Along the Danube (see Figure B.1), the share of surveyed voters opting for the CDU/CSU
increases only marginally in affected states, while it stays constant or is slightly decreasing
in non-affected districts. This would not point to strong spill-over effects in Bavaria. The
evaluations of Chancellor Schroeder and challenger Stoiber follow similar patterns.
Figure B.2 shows the share of voters opting for CDU in Elbe districts and control regions in
2013. Flood onset in June 2013 is followed by a rise in CDU evaluations along Elbe and in the
rest of East Germany – although this increase decays until election day in September. Strong
spill-over effects beyond affected districts are unlikely based on these patterns. Similarly,
Figure B.3 shows that the intended vote for the CDU/CSU rises, though not significantly,
immediately after the Danube flood onset in June 2013 and especially in directly affected
districts; the pattern until the election is, although overall increasing, not a clear-cut rise.
Again, there is no strong evidence for spill-overs beyond affected districts.
B.4 Anecdotal Evidence of Differing Political Atten-
tion of Actors Schro¨der/SPD and Stoiber/CDU-
CSU to Elbe and Danube Affected Districts
Objectively, federal and federal state level agencies jointly financed the flood compensation
programs in 2002 and 2013 and steered the employment of federal forces all over Germany.
The decision to declare disaster and to invite external emergency forces into these regions
is taken independently at district level. The literature is inconclusive on whether voters in
Germany attribute correctly in a setting of shared responsibilities and multiple levels of elec-
toral accountability (comp. e.g. Florack and Hoffmann, 2006; Ade and Freier, 2013). For
2002, anecdotal evidence shows for example a bias in political attention of the actors Stoiber
and Schro¨der to flood regions, which could be directly related to a differing perceived respon-
sibility for disaster management along Elbe and Danube by the electorate: The Schro¨der
government had announced millions of federal Euros for victims in affected regions not even
a week into the event, while the CDU/CSU needed three days to position themselves con-
cerning the federal flood compensation plans. But once established, flood compensation was
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not only distributed in districts affected by the August 2002 floods, but as well covered those
affected in minor floods in June 2013 in south-western Bavaria (BMVg, 2002), presumably
because of efforts by the Bavarian government. At the same time, the CSU federal state go-
vernment under Stoiber in Bavaria adopted a flood compensation scheme for Bavarian flood
victims as quickly as Schro¨der announced the federal plan. Disaster relief communication
and the attention of the candidates to the floods followed this pattern. Incumbent Schro¨der
was highly present in the flooded regions in eastern Germany, whilst the challenger Stoiber
visited the Bavarian disaster regions first (Bytzek, 2008). The media attention along the
Elbe quickly focused on chancellor Schro¨der. Many claimed that the appraisal of his lea-
dership skills in the electorate profited from his handling of the disaster and the visibility
of the federal incumbent government due to symbolic crisis management activities (Pappi,
Shikano, and Bytzek, 2004; Bytzek, 2008). Newspaper headlines prominently featured photos
of him wearing waterproof boots along the Elbe. At the same time, the challenger Stoiber
was criticized for being on a vacation, interrupted only for a brief visit to Passau (along
the Danube). A visit to the Elbe followed only several days into the catastrophe. From this
perspective of perceived responsibility, it is plausible that Schro¨der succeeded in depicting his
management skills along the Elbe - while Stoiber was seen along the Danube as the relevant
actor. Note that these events are compatible with another story: Schro¨der visited the most
severely affected regions (which happened to be on the Elbe); while Stoiber focused on his
responsibility as governor only (which happened to be along the Danube).
B.5 Alternative Explanations for Differential Flood Re-
sponse Between 2002 and 2013
An additional aspect to consider is the level of pre-election support incumbents have (comp.
Figures B.1-B.3): For example, along the Elbe 2002 incumbent Schroeder was trailing in the
polls; in surveys, his pre-disaster support along the Elbe was at around 35 to 40 percent;
on the other hand, in 2013, Merkel had already reached support levels above 50% in flood-
affected districts. Similarly, CSU support along the Danube was around 60% in 2002 and
around 45% in 2013, values all well above the national average incumbent rating. Such ba-
seline effects have so far not been systematically analyzed in the empirical disaster literature
in particular and the accountability literature in general. With the district level share of
supporters u for the incumbent, the disaster effect d is naturally bounded by 0 ≤ d ≤ 1− u.
The higher u, the lower the share of individuals that can change their voting decision if they
receive a positive signal on incumbent quality. In line with this argument, Bechtel and Hai-
nmueller (2011) e.g. argue that persuasion, not mobilization drives the 2002 Elbe effect. In
2013, with higher pre-flood incumbent support, the persuasion effect is therefore likely smal-
ler. For future research, this implies that positive demonstration effects should be relevant
especially for low-ranked incumbents, while negative demonstration effects should be relevant
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especially for high-ranked incumbents. This makes intuitive sense, as the information gained
with observing government performance is ex-ante likely unexpected by a larger share of the
electorate in both cases. More generally, it is related to the argument that disaster effects
will depend on prior beliefs on incumbents (Ashworth, Bueno De Mesquita, and Friedenberg,
2017).
Another aspect, the repetition of disaster exposure might have played a role. For directly
affected households, beneficial policy should imply at least short term electoral effects inde-
pendent of past exposure (comp. Zucco, 2013). But with respect to the indirectly affected
population, a repeated exposure can be expected to show diminishing returns – incumbents
in 2002 and 2013 responded with a nearly identical policy: Large scale, effective disaster ma-
nagement with federal and state forces and the quick promise of financial reimbursement and
reconstruction aid. The 2002 relief scheme thus set an example of a dominant government
response strategy as a combination of robust disaster relief and redistribution to affected
households that since has been applied as well to other, geographically more limited disas-
ters.1 However, if the dominant political strategy is a certain level of disaster relief, a voter
interested in selecting high quality politicians learns less on incumbent quality in a subse-
quent disaster: He can expect both incumbent and counterfactual challenger to have invested
in similar relief effort. This could explain why we observe lower electoral returns especially
along the Elbe comparing the 2002 and 2013 response – governments under both CDU and
SPD leadership implemented very similar disaster response programs in the very same area.
The results observed are consistent with a theoretical model, where exposure first increases
government support through an informational channel (voters (positively) update their view
on the quality of the incumbent), while the information gained with subsequent disaster
relief is decreasing. Additional micro-level research would need to track this mechanism in
future studies. Empirically, private donation data gives an indication of this pattern as well:
While the 2002 floods have been marked down as the disaster with the highest aggregate
private donation levels in post-unification Germany (with e.g. 300 million Euro for the state
of Saxonia alone (WWF 2007)), estimations for 2013 amount to a total of only 108 million
Euro (BMI 2013). This general decline in donations would not be affected by the electoral
cycle, but it is consistent with a perspective in which voters are updating information with
repeated exposure.
Last but not least, lacking disaster preparedness might have been highlighted through
repeated exposure in 2013. Governments could have been expected to prepared better for a
flood event in the case of the 2013 flood. Thus, if the observed aggregate electoral response
constitutes a net effect of punishment for occurrence and rewards for good management
and relief (Heersink, Peterson, and Jenkins, 2017), observed effects are consistent with the
argument that occurence (or lacking preparedness) was punished more in 2013 with the second
1E.g. as the governor of Bavaria put it, following what the media termed a ‘thousand year flood’ in
Bavaria in 2016: ‘Affected households can count on financial help by the state, in levels oriented at the relief
distributed after the 2013 flood’ (author’s translation), referring to the instant 1500 Euro per household
direct relief transfer of 2013 (Mitterer, 2016).
B.5 Alternative Explanations for Differential Flood Response 141
exposure. However, the literature so far has argued that voters do not take disaster relief into
consideration to a large extent, either because they are myopic(Healy and Malhotra, 2009)
or because effort in disaster preparedness is difficult to observe(Ashworth and Bueno De
Mesquita, 2012). Additionally, it has been argued that the 2013 disaster preparedness levels
along the Elbe were actually much better compared to 2002 and that disaster damage with
2002 preparedness levels would have been much larger (Merz, Elmer, Kunz, Mu¨hr, Schro¨ter,
and Uhlemann-Elmer, 2014).
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Appendix C
Appendix for ‘Die Mu¨nchner
Ergebnisse im Bundes- und
Landesvergleich’
The appendix for Chapter 4 (Rudolph (2017a)) is available as OnlinePlus on the Sprin-
ger book pages at http://www.springer.com/de/book/9783658156732 (as of November 1st,
2017).
146 C. Appendix for ‘Die Mu¨nchner Ergebnisse...
Appendix D
Appendix for ‘How to Increase
Turnout in Low Salience Elections’
The appendix for Chapter 5 (Leininger, Rudolph and Zittlau (2018)) is available as supple-
mentary material on the PSRM article site at doi:10.1017/psrm.2016.38 (as of November 1st,
2017).
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Appendix E
Appendix for ‘Natural Disasters and
Political Participation’
The appendix for Chapter 6 (Rudolph and Kuhn (2017)) is available as supplemental material
on the German Politics article site at doi: 10.1080/09644008.2017.1287900 (as of November
1st, 2017).
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Appendix F
Appendix for ‘Turning Out to Turn
Down the EU’
F.1 Appendix Tables
Table F.1: Summary statistics for variables used in the analysis
Great Britain Rainy regions (England)
(1) (2)
mean min max mean min max
Turnout in % 73.76 56.25 83.57 75.13 59.25 83.57
Turnout for 2014 EE 35.81 23.74 51.77 36.61 23.74 51.77
2016 Referendum TO - 2014 EE TO 37.94 12.83 49.24 38.52 12.83 49.24
Average rainfall (mm) 3.12 0.00 42.20 4.29 0.00 42.20
Share of population aged 20-30 12.54 7.62 27.93 12.58 7.62 27.93
Share of population aged 60+ 23.97 8.44 38.05 23.78 8.44 38.05
Share of unemployed 1.57 0.30 4.70 1.31 0.30 4.20
Change in 2016 unemployment share -0.07 -0.70 0.80 -0.09 -0.70 0.30
Population density 14.80 0.10 138.70 17.16 0.30 138.70
Population size (log) 11.81 7.70 13.89 11.79 7.70 13.89
Share of employed in high skilled labor 10.90 6.10 23.30 11.55 6.60 23.30
Share of employed in low skilled labor 11.08 3.60 21.10 10.82 3.60 21.10
Share of migrants from outside UK 0.97 0.18 6.45 1.08 0.22 6.45
Share of ethnic group 90.31 28.82 99.26 88.57 28.82 98.82
South England 0.48 0.00 1.00 0.66 0.00 1.00
North England 0.29 0.00 1.00 0.22 0.00 1.00
London 0.09 0.00 1.00 0.12 0.00 1.00
Wales 0.06 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Scotland 0.08 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Northern Ireland 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
UKIP share in EE 29.17 4.90 51.58 31.43 4.90 51.58
Observations 380 275
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Table F.2: Placebo regression on 2014 European Election turnout
Great Britain Rainy regions (England)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Turnout for 2014 EE
Average rainfall (mm) 0.23∗∗∗ 0.037 0.031 0.16∗∗∗ 0.037 0.027
(0.049) (0.030) (0.028) (0.043) (0.030) (0.028)
North England -2.61∗∗∗ -1.73∗∗∗ -2.57∗∗∗ -1.73∗∗∗
(0.44) (0.43) (0.47) (0.49)
London 4.31∗∗∗ 3.54∗∗∗ 4.31∗∗∗ 4.27∗∗∗
(0.66) (1.10) (0.66) (1.11)
Wales -3.87∗∗∗ -3.22∗∗∗
(0.75) (0.71)
Scotland -2.16∗∗∗ -1.47
(0.76) (0.90)
Share of population aged 20-30 0.12 0.10
(0.12) (0.14)
Share of population aged 60+ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗
(0.061) (0.064)
Population density -0.030 -0.030
(0.019) (0.020)
Population size (log) -0.28 -0.30
(0.38) (0.45)
Share of employed in high skilled labor -0.10 -0.21
(0.15) (0.15)
Share of employed in low skilled labor -0.56∗∗∗ -0.57∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.14)
Share of ethnic group -0.11∗∗∗ -0.073∗∗
(0.027) (0.028)
Constant 35.1∗∗∗ 36.5∗∗∗ 50.6∗∗∗ 35.9∗∗∗ 36.5∗∗∗ 50.3∗∗∗
(0.24) (0.30) (6.49) (0.28) (0.30) (7.37)
N 380 380 380 275 275 275
Adj. R2 0.083 0.29 0.39 0.050 0.29 0.38
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Table F.3: Placebo regression on 2016 postal ballot turnout
Great Britain Rainy regions (England)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Postal voting turnout
Average rainfall (mm) 0.020 -0.0015 -0.013 -0.070∗∗ -0.0084 -0.017
(0.027) (0.024) (0.020) (0.027) (0.024) (0.021)
North England -1.01∗∗∗ -0.26 0.098 0.42
(0.33) (0.29) (0.31) (0.32)
London -5.28∗∗∗ 0.29 -5.27∗∗∗ 0.15
(0.95) (1.05) (0.95) (1.06)
Wales -2.23∗∗∗ -1.79∗∗∗
(0.49) (0.55)
Scotland -4.47∗∗∗ -4.16∗∗∗
(0.56) (0.64)
Share of population aged 20-30 -0.030 -0.032
(0.10) (0.11)
Share of population aged 60+ -0.0034 -0.019
(0.051) (0.058)
Share of unemployed -0.95∗∗∗ -0.69∗
(0.29) (0.41)
Change in 2016 unemployment share -0.44 -0.059
(0.76) (1.03)
Population density -0.029 -0.030
(0.017) (0.018)
Population size (log) 0.27 0.24
(0.35) (0.45)
Share of employed in high skilled labor 0.067 -0.075
(0.091) (0.097)
Share of employed in low skilled labor -0.075 -0.22∗
(0.11) (0.13)
Share of migrants from outside UK -0.17 -0.31
(0.34) (0.34)
Share of ethnic group 0.11∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.031)
Constant 88.1∗∗∗ 89.4∗∗∗ 78.6∗∗∗ 89.1∗∗∗ 89.5∗∗∗ 82.8∗∗∗
(0.18) (0.21) (5.19) (0.19) (0.21) (6.36)
N 380 380 380 275 275 275
Adj. R2 -0.0017 0.27 0.55 0.010 0.28 0.58
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Table F.4: Balance test on covariates by rain/no rain in area
Great Britain
(1) (2)
No rain/ Positive rain/ Diff-In-Means/ N N No rain/ Positive rain/ Diff-In-Means/ N N
mean mean se Controls Treated mean mean se Controls Treated
Share of population aged 20-30 12.32 12.71 -0.39 172 208 12.08 12.78 -0.70 78 197
(0.37) (0.51)
Share of population aged 60+ 24.92 23.19 1.74∗∗∗ 172 208 25.56 23.07 2.49∗∗∗ 78 197
(0.51) (0.72)
Share of unemployed 1.86 1.34 0.53∗∗∗ 172 208 1.30 1.31 -0.01 78 197
(0.09) (0.09)
Change in 2016 unemployment share -0.04 -0.09 0.05∗∗ 172 208 -0.10 -0.08 -0.02 78 197
(0.02) (0.02)
Population density 9.52 19.18 -9.66∗∗∗ 172 208 9.82 20.07 -10.24∗∗∗ 78 197
(2.26) (3.33)
Population size (log) 11.82 11.81 0.01 172 208 11.76 11.81 -0.05 78 197
(0.06) (0.08)
Share of employed in high skilled labor 9.96 11.69 -1.73∗∗∗ 172 208 10.81 11.85 -1.04∗∗∗ 78 197
(0.24) (0.32)
Share of employed in low skilled labor 11.81 10.47 1.35∗∗∗ 172 208 11.87 10.41 1.46∗∗∗ 78 197
(0.24) (0.35)
Share of migrants from outside UK 0.71 1.18 -0.48∗∗∗ 172 208 0.77 1.20 -0.44∗∗∗ 78 197
(0.09) (0.12)
Share of ethnic group ‘white’ 93.93 87.31 6.62∗∗∗ 172 208 93.23 86.73 6.50∗∗∗ 78 197
(1.22) (1.77)
region dummies==South England 0.26 0.66 -0.40∗∗∗ 172 208 0.56 0.70 -0.13∗∗ 78 197
(0.05) (0.06)
region dummies==North England 0.49 0.13 0.36∗∗∗ 172 208 0.44 0.14 0.30∗∗∗ 78 197
(0.04) (0.05)
region dummies==London 0.00 0.16 -0.16∗∗∗ 172 208 0.00 0.17 -0.17∗∗∗ 78 197
(0.03) (0.04)
region dummies==Wales 0.13 0.00 0.13∗∗∗ 172 208 0.00 0.00 0.00 78 197
(0.02) (0.00)
region dummies==Scotland 0.12 0.05 0.07∗∗ 172 208 0.00 0.00 0.00 78 197
(0.03) (0.00)
region dummies==Northern Ireland 0.00 0.00 0.00 172 208 0.00 0.00 0.00 78 197
(0.00) (0.00)
UKIP share in EE 28.07 30.08 -2.00∗∗ 172 208 32.09 31.16 0.92 78 197
(0.96) (1.14)
Observations 380 275
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Table F.5: Additional tests on instrument relevance
Great Britain
(1) (2)
2016 Referendum TO - 2014 EE TO Turnout in %
Average rainfall (mm) -0.12∗∗∗ -0.038∗∗
(0.030) (0.017)
North England 0.55 -1.27∗∗∗
(0.42) (0.30)
London -1.92∗∗ 0.84
(0.95) (0.75)
Wales 2.68∗∗∗ -1.56∗∗∗
(0.68) (0.55)
Scotland 1.05 -5.55∗∗∗
(1.49) (0.97)
Share of population aged 20-30 -0.15 -0.22∗
(0.14) (0.12)
Share of population aged 60+ -0.24∗∗∗ -0.012
(0.053) (0.039)
Share of unemployed -1.64∗∗∗ -2.51∗∗∗
(0.31) (0.22)
Change in 2016 unemployment share 0.78 0.60
(1.01) (0.59)
Population density -0.014 -0.033∗∗
(0.016) (0.016)
Population size (log) -0.022 -0.11
(0.34) (0.23)
Share of employed in high skilled labor 0.65∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.10)
Share of employed in low skilled labor 0.17 -0.20∗∗
(0.12) (0.089)
Share of migrants from outside UK -0.20 -0.31
(0.43) (0.43)
Share of ethnic group 0.14∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.023)
Ukip share in EE 0.20∗∗∗ -0.018
(0.035) (0.026)
Constant 21.1∗∗∗ 75.2∗∗∗
(7.08) (4.90)
N 380 380
Adj. R2 0.69 0.85
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Table F.6: Relevance of instrument – full results
Rainy regions (England)
(1) (2)
2016 Referendum TO - 2014 EE TO
Average rainfall (mm) -0.21∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.029)
North England 0.96∗∗
(0.44)
London -2.70∗∗∗
(0.95)
Share of population aged 20-30 -0.15
(0.16)
Share of population aged 60+ -0.24∗∗∗
(0.052)
Share of unemployed -1.47∗∗∗
(0.37)
Change in 2016 unemployment share 0.88
(1.22)
Population density -0.012
(0.015)
Population size (log) -0.35
(0.29)
Share of employed in high skilled labor 0.58∗∗∗
(0.13)
Share of employed in low skilled labor 0.092
(0.11)
Share of migrants from outside UK -0.58
(0.38)
Share of ethnic group 0.13∗∗∗
(0.033)
Ukip share in EE 0.16∗∗∗
(0.037)
Constant 39.4∗∗∗ 30.0∗∗∗
(0.33) (6.26)
N 275 275
Adj. R2 0.042 0.79
F-Statistic 19.2 43.5
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Table F.7: Instrumental variable regression of difference in EE to referendum turnout on
leave share/increase in leave vote – full results
Dep. var: Leave share Dep. var: Leave share - Ukip
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2016 Referendum TO - 2014 EE TO 0.72 0.67∗∗ 0.61∗ 0.78∗∗ 0.80∗∗ 0.71
(0.65) (0.27) (0.33) (0.34) (0.38) (0.47)
Share of population aged 20-30 -0.48∗∗ -0.36 -0.40∗ -0.30
(0.23) (0.24) (0.24) (0.27)
Share of population aged 60+ 0.030 0.014 0.061 0.035
(0.10) (0.11) (0.12) (0.13)
Share of unemployed 1.21∗∗ 1.03 1.22∗∗ 1.06
(0.58) (0.68) (0.61) (0.74)
Change in 2016 unemployment share -4.67∗∗∗ -3.67∗∗ -4.96∗∗∗ -3.86∗∗
(1.53) (1.59) (1.64) (1.77)
Population density 0.024 0.00061 0.031 0.0031
(0.025) (0.025) (0.029) (0.026)
Population size (log) -0.18 -0.15 -0.092 -0.095
(0.45) (0.47) (0.47) (0.49)
Share of employed in high skilled labor -0.81∗∗∗ -0.75∗∗∗ -0.84∗∗∗ -0.77∗∗
(0.27) (0.27) (0.30) (0.30)
Share of employed in low skilled labor 0.79∗∗∗ 0.84∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗∗
(0.18) (0.18) (0.21) (0.19)
Share of migrants from outside UK -0.038 -0.36 0.066 -0.31
(0.69) (0.69) (0.73) (0.71)
Share of ethnic group ‘white’ -0.25∗∗∗ -0.21∗∗∗ -0.29∗∗∗ -0.24∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.062) (0.086) (0.086)
UKIP share in EE 0.94∗∗∗ 0.97∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.060)
North England 0.78 0.73
(0.70) (0.78)
London 3.57∗∗ 3.90∗∗
(1.50) (1.92)
Constant 26.4 26.5∗∗ 22.4∗ -7.56 21.4 18.4
(25.1) (10.9) (13.5) (13.0) (13.1) (17.9)
N 275 275 275 275 275 275
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Table F.8: Instrumental variable regression of difference in EE to referendum turnout on
Leave share/increase in Leave vote with binary instrument (above median rainfall)
Dep. var: Leave share Dep. var: Leave share - Ukip
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2016 Referendum TO - 2014 EE TO 1.65∗∗∗ 0.70∗∗ 0.56 0.64∗∗ 0.81∗∗ 0.62
(0.41) (0.32) (0.37) (0.26) (0.40) (0.47)
Share of population aged 20-30 -0.48∗∗ -0.37 -0.40∗ -0.33
(0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.27)
Share of population aged 60+ 0.037 0.0026 0.062 0.014
(0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.14)
Share of unemployed 1.25∗∗ 0.96 1.22∗ 0.95
(0.62) (0.75) (0.64) (0.75)
Change in 2016 unemployment share -4.69∗∗∗ -3.60∗∗ -4.96∗∗∗ -3.71∗∗
(1.57) (1.64) (1.68) (1.77)
Population density 0.025 0.000058 0.031 0.0017
(0.027) (0.025) (0.031) (0.026)
Population size (log) -0.17 -0.16 -0.091 -0.12
(0.46) (0.46) (0.47) (0.48)
Share of employed in high skilled labor -0.83∗∗∗ -0.72∗∗∗ -0.84∗∗∗ -0.72∗∗
(0.29) (0.28) (0.30) (0.29)
Share of employed in low skilled labor 0.79∗∗∗ 0.85∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗ 0.83∗∗∗
(0.19) (0.18) (0.21) (0.19)
Share of migrants from outside UK -0.011 -0.40 0.070 -0.37
(0.68) (0.67) (0.71) (0.68)
Share of ethnic group ‘white’ -0.25∗∗∗ -0.20∗∗∗ -0.29∗∗∗ -0.22∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.063) (0.091) (0.084)
UKIP share in EE 0.94∗∗∗ 0.97∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.065)
North England 0.85 0.84
(0.76) (0.78)
London 3.43∗∗ 3.61∗
(1.59) (1.90)
Constant -9.55 25.9∗∗ 23.8 -1.92 21.3 21.3
(16.0) (11.9) (14.9) (10.2) (14.0) (18.5)
N 275 275 275 275 275 275
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Table F.9: Instrumental variable regression of difference in EE to referendum turnout on
Leave share/increase in Leave vote with full Great Britain sample
Dep. var: Leave share Dep. var: Leave share - UKIP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2016 Referendum TO - 2014 EE TO 0.18 0.51∗∗ 0.66∗∗ 2.78∗ 2.51 1.63∗
(1.14) (0.25) (0.29) (1.49) (2.06) (0.85)
Share of population aged 20-30 -0.74∗∗∗ -0.55∗∗ -1.03∗∗ -0.11
(0.20) (0.26) (0.45) (0.40)
Share of population aged 60+ -0.047 0.011 0.22 0.23
(0.089) (0.11) (0.38) (0.23)
Share of unemployed 1.72∗∗∗ 2.08∗∗∗ 4.96 3.41∗∗
(0.51) (0.59) (3.15) (1.34)
Change in 2016 unemployment share 1.56 1.17 -1.60 0.45
(1.23) (1.27) (4.42) (2.19)
Population density 0.015 -0.012 0.089 0.012
(0.026) (0.029) (0.092) (0.042)
Population size (log) -0.53 -0.56 -1.17 -0.54
(0.43) (0.46) (1.10) (0.70)
Share of employed in high skilled labor -0.99∗∗∗ -1.06∗∗∗ -3.37 -1.53∗∗
(0.26) (0.30) (2.18) (0.61)
Share of employed in low skilled labor 0.87∗∗∗ 0.86∗∗∗ -0.49 0.43
(0.19) (0.20) (1.17) (0.40)
Share of migrants from outside UK -0.20 -0.47 3.86 -0.23
(0.72) (0.82) (3.38) (1.09)
Share of ethnic group -0.20∗∗∗ -0.19∗∗∗ -0.61 -0.42∗∗
(0.058) (0.066) (0.42) (0.18)
UKIP share in EE 0.81∗∗∗ 0.79∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.056)
Wales -2.80∗∗ -2.61
(1.14) (1.89)
Scotland 0.018 8.86∗∗
(1.74) (3.92)
London 3.94∗∗∗ 6.91∗∗
(1.35) (2.86)
Constant 46.3 43.4∗∗∗ 34.4∗∗∗ -81.4 34.9 8.08
(43.5) (8.59) (10.4) (56.6) (24.2) (22.7)
N 380 380 380 380 380 380
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Table F.10: OLS estimate of difference in EE to referendum turnout on Leave share/increase
in Leave vote
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Leave share Leave - Ukip
2016 Referendum TO - 2014 EE TO 0.82∗∗∗ -0.059 -0.17∗∗ -0.038
(0.13) (0.077) (0.074) (0.073)
Constant 22.5∗∗∗ 41.0∗∗∗ 29.2∗∗∗ 41.9∗∗∗
(5.06) (7.54) (2.93) (7.56)
Region controls No Yes No Yes
Socio-economic controls No Yes No Yes
N 275 275 275 275
OLS regression with robust standard errors in parentheses. Control variables
as in Table 7.2. Sample is restricted to ‘rainy’ regions in England.
** (*,***) indicates p < 0.05 (0.1, 0.01)
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Table F.11: OLS estimate of turnout difference in EE to referendum turnout on Leave
share/increase in Leave vote
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
‘Rainy regions’ (England) Great Britain
Leave share Leave - Ukip Leave share Leave - Ukip
2016 Referendum TO - 0.82∗∗∗ -0.059 -0.17∗∗ -0.038 0.74∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗ -0.26∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗
2014 EE TO (0.13) (0.077) (0.074) (0.073) (0.10) (0.064) (0.058) (0.060)
Constant 22.5∗∗∗ 41.0∗∗∗ 29.2∗∗∗ 41.9∗∗∗ 25.1∗∗∗ 50.6∗∗∗ 33.9∗∗∗ 50.4∗∗∗
(5.06) (7.54) (2.93) (7.56) (4.05) (6.58) (2.29) (6.56)
Region controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Socio-economic controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
UKIP support No Yes No No No Yes No No
N 275 275 275 275 380 380 380 380
Adj. R2 0.17 0.92 0.031 0.65 0.14 0.91 0.067 0.66
OLS regression with robust standard errors in parentheses. Control variables included (as indicated)
are the ethnic white population share; the population share being immigrants from outside the UK;
population share aged 20-30; population share aged 60+; share of unemployed; share of employed in high
skilled labor; share of employed in low skilled labor; change in 2015-2016 unemployment; population
density; population size (logged); share of UKIP support in last European Parliament election (for
non-delta specification of explanatory variable only); regional dummies for Scotland, Wales, Northern
England, Southern England, London.
** (*,***) indicates p < 0.05 (0.1, 0.01)
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Table F.12: Logistic regression on self-assessed turnout propensity by past Ukip vote and
time to referendum in British Election Study
(1) (2)
Referendum turnout likely or very likely
Referendum turnout likely or very likely
UKIP vote in 2015 general election=1 1.12∗∗ 1.15∗∗
(0.49) (0.49)
Days until referendum 0.0062 0.0029
(0.0050) (0.0055)
UKIP vote in 2015 general election=1 × Days until referendum 0.021 0.025
(0.015) (0.016)
Age 0.023∗∗∗
(0.0051)
Female 0.082
(0.13)
Scotland -0.14
(0.17)
Wales 0.38
(0.28)
Abstention in 2005, 2010 or 2015 general election -0.92∗∗∗
(0.13)
Political attention (0-10) 0.35∗∗∗
(0.027)
Married 0.12
(0.15)
No dependents in HH 0.18
(0.14)
Houseowner 0.11
(0.15)
Unemployed -0.39
(0.48)
White ethnicity 0.69∗∗∗
(0.22)
Migrant -0.15
(0.34)
Working class 0.073
(0.54)
Middle class -0.13
(0.14)
Constant 3.44∗∗∗ -0.27
(0.16) (0.43)
N 12636 12551
Pseudo-R2 0.0038 0.15
Log-Likelihood -1878.1 -1514.7
F.2 Appendix Figures 163
F.2 Appendix Figures
Figure F.1: Change in predicted probability of turnout between Ukip- and non-Ukip-
supporters in the 12 pre-referendum weeks
Predictions for Average Marginal Effects from binary logistic regression with dependent variable self-assessed
turnout intention (‘fairly likely’ or ‘very likely’) and independent variable whether respondent supported
UKIP at general election, whether he/she responded 1-48 days before the referendum and interaction term.
BES survey weights for representative sample of Great Britain used. 95% confidence intervals are shown.
Weighted N=12,636 (left panel). Right panel (weighted N=12,551) includes control variables as in Model 2
of Table A12.
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Figure F.2: Distribution of perceived closeness and preferences towards Ukip by stated refe-
rendum vote intention
BES survey weights for representative sample of Great Britain are used. Weighted N’s in left panel: 9,293.042
(Remain), 9,444.202 (Leave), 316.122101 (Would not vote), 1,349.634 (Don’t know), 20,403 (Total). Weighted
N’s in richt panel: 9,039.741 (Remain), 9,114.877 (Leave), 149.53261 (Would not vote), 1,084.849 (Don’t
know), 19,389 (Total).
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F.3 Preference Gap Calculation
The substantive relevance of the estimates can be assessed using the framework of Fowler
(2015). Taking the results of Table 7.2 literally, it is possible to disentangle the average
support for Leave among regular and among (weather induced) occasional voters: With good
weather, turnout increases; given the estimates in Table 7.1, Model 2, about 0.5% [0.25;0.75]
of the electorate vote only in good weather.1 Given the positive relation between turnout
increase and Leave support (0.61 in 7.2, Model 3), average Leave support is higher where
weather was good and more occasional voters turned out. Particularly, among the 0.5% of
the electorate voting only in good weather, the Fowler-approach implies a Leave share of
90.7% [11.8;173.5]. Thus, this implies a preference gap in Leave support of 36.6 percentage
points between regular and these occasional voters2 These calculations invoke very strong
assumptions3. We should therefore not directly interpret this difference; nonetheless, it gives
numeric support that an average (weather induced) occasional voter and an average regular
voter differ very much with respect to their preferences on EU membership in the case at
hand.
This does not imply, however, that persuasion was not relevant in the case at hand. The
point estimates suggest that a one percentage point increase in turnout (due to good weather)
led to around a 0.7 percentage point increase in the share of the Leave campaign. Overall,
turnout increased by around 38.5 percentage points from 36.6% to 75.1%; EU opposition
increased by 19.7 percentage points from a Ukip share of 31.4% to a Leave share of 54.1%.
We only observe these aggregate figures and cannot tell how much of this effect is due to
persuasion, and how much due to mobilization. However, even if we assume a constant
effects framework, the average increase in turnout of around 38.1 percentage points would
lead to an increase in the Leave vote slightly above 20 percentage points (e.g. 23.2 [5.3,45.7]
percentage points with an ATE of 0.67 as of Model 2). As we do not observe this increase,
1The effect of one millimeter of rainfall on the difference in turnout is 0.11 [-.17,-.06] (comp. Table 7.1,
Model 2). The average decrease in turnout due to average election day rainfall of 4.3 mm is therefore 0.5
[0.25;0.75] percentage points, i.e. 0.5% [0.25;0.75] of the electorate (PkO, the proportion of voters that is
marginal to rainfall).
2Voters under rainfall are the control group, voting despite rain; those voting only in good weather are
‘treated’ occasional voters. The average predicted increase in turnout under rainfall is 38.0 percentage points,
with an average baseline of 37.1 percent EU parliament turnout. Thus predicted turnout under rainfall is
75.1 percent (PR, the proportion of regular voters in the population). Finally, the predicted leave share under
rainfall is 54.1 percentage points (SR(Y )). Given these predictions, and drawing on the treatment effect of
0.61 (Table 7.2, Model 3), SkO(Y ) − SR(Y ) = ATE ∗ (1 + PR/PkO) calculates 90.7% [11.8;173.5] for the
Leave share of occasional voters (SR(Y )) and a preference gap of 36.6 percentage points between regular and
occasional voters.
3These estimates apply only to an average English districts/boroughs in the sample at hand. Additional
assumptions are invoked on the functional form of the predictions of turnout and vote shares, concerning
the instrument, and (not) weighting the estimates by varying population size; it is as well left aside that
the referendum likely brought other occasional voters to the polls, as predicted turnout under rainfall is still
higher than average general election turnout. Additionally, the uncertainty involved is large.
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persuasion is likely an important part of the story as well. (Note the wide confidence intervals:
For example, for Model 2 of Table 7.2 with an effect of 0.67 percentage points, these are
[0.14,1.20]. Predictions based on these models therefore have to be treated with caution.)
F.4 Referendum Preferences in the Population of Vo-
ters on the Margin of Participating
Electoral benefits stem from either the D-term or the PB-term. Understanding the D-term
as an expressive element of voting (Dhillon and Peralta, 2002), this would imply that the
emotionalized debate around EU-membership, national sovereignty and immigration was
more important for (latent) Leave compared to (latent) Remain supporters and thus the
former were more inclined to affirm their preference. A similar implication would follow from
expressive voting theories (Brennan and Hamlin, 1998), implying that the policy offered by
Leave is closer to the ideal point of citizens formerly alienated in the UK political system,
which are then mobilized to a relatively higher degree. There is evidence for this argument
in the survey data: According to pre-election polls the most important issues4 for voters for
the referendum had been the economy (mentioned by 21 %), immigration (20 %) and UK
sovereignty (17 %, trailing are issues with mention < 7%). For voters indicating a preference
for Remain, economy reaches 38%; for voters indicating a preference for Leave, immigration
and sovereignty are with 35% and 31% the most frequently mentioned topics connected
to their referendum-decision. However, in the group of occasional voters those individuals
indicating immigration and sovereignty as their most important topic report a significantly
higher average turnout intention (conversely a lower turnout intention if a voter states the
economy is her most important issue) (see column 2 and 3 of Table 7.3).5 These results hold
for the whole survey population and when using the average response on 4-scale interest in
the EU referendum as target variable. This indicates that occasional voters with latent Leave
preferences were more likely to turn out than Remain-leaning occasional voters. Hence, the
mobilization of occasional voters was likely lop-sided.
Was this lop-sided mobilization potentially driven as well by differing perceptions of vote
pivotality? Concerning the PB-term, the treatment effect could imply that occasional voters
had a heterogeneous perception of the pivotality of their vote, and those ultimately deciding
to cast a ballot had on average a preference for Leave. I find some support for this mecha-
nism among survey respondents: Respondents indicate whether they support Leave, support
Remain, or plan to abstain/don’t know yet. As reported in detail in Appendix Figure F.2
(left panel), Leave supporters and Remain supporters see their side winning on average, when
4Categorized by the BES-team following the question ‘What matters most to you when deciding how to
vote in the EU referendum?’
5The sample size is smaller, as only occasional voters are looked upon. Additionally, due to missings in
the variables of interests and the survey weight variable, the sample size drops. Results are robust to not
using weights.
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asked ‘How likely it is that the UK will vote to leave the EU’. However, those respondents
reporting an intention to abstain likewise see a victory for Remain ahead. These respondents
are not asked whether they would vote Leave or Remain. However, they on average (right
panel) have a strong dislike for Ukip, making Remain support their likely average prefe-
rence.This indicates that voters that stayed home on average favored the Remain side, and
at the same time wrongly perceived Remain to be winning. This implies as well that the
mobilization of occasional voters was lop-sided.
The arguments above indicate that among occasional voters, latent Leave supporters
were more likely to ultimately turn out. The temporal structure of the data allows for a
final test whether this argument likely holds. As random subsets of the survey population
were questioned each day 48 days to 1 day until the referendum, we can contrast ‘(very)
likely’ turnout intention for Leave/Remain-leaning respondents over time. As an indication
for (latent) Leave support, I differentiate respondents by support for Ukip in the last general
election. Figure 7.2 reports a margins plot on whether Ukip supporters in the last general
election were more likely to intend to turn out the closer election day came relative to other
party supporters.6 An important feature of this comparison is that confounding factors that
influence turnout intention of past-Ukip and other party supporters similarly are implicitly
controlled for as long as they influence both groups similarly (e.g. overreporting). It indeed
seems to be the case that time played a role for the mobilization of (latent) Leave supporters.
48 days before the referendum, Ukip supporters were equally likely to report an intention
to turn out; just before the referendum, however, Ukip supporters are predicted to be two
percentage points more likely to turn out.7
6Depicted here are differences in average marginal effects with socio-demographic and political controls.
However, the logistic regression coefficients and margins plots are nearly identical without using control
variables (reported in Appendix Table F.12 and Appendix Figure F.1). Overall, 93% of the respondents
assess themselves as likely voters. In the sample with full information on the variables used, this even reaches
97%. The Ukip vote is only slightly understated (10.5% in weighted sample against 12.6% at the election.
Bias in the direction of the depicted effect is induced, if Ukip supporters that respond to the survey are
systematically more likely to turn out compared to the general population of Ukip supporters or if Ukip
supporters overstate their turnout propensity relative to other party supporters.
7This finding links to research on the party-specific effectiveness of mobilization; the effect of campaigning
on turnout has e.g. been shown to be party specific in the 2010 UK general election (Fisher, Fieldhouse,
Johnston, Pattie, and Cutts, 2016). Similarly, in a more general note, the geography of abstentions are argued
to have favored particularly Labor in recent UK elections (Johnston, Borisyuk, Thrasher, and Rallings, 2012).
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